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In this PhD Thesis the researcher applies the method of 'Conversation Analysis' from the field of 
linguistics to a setting in financial reporting. Conversation Analysis, short CA, is a qualitative 
method for the systematic study of social interaction. The foundation of analysis are detailed 
transcripts that enable the researcher to examine how institutional roles are understood and acted 
out through talk, or "how institutions are talked into being". The data set contains of Q & A 
sessions held after interim and annual results presentations by six major British investment banks 
in 2015. All banks are listed at the London Stock Exchange, were part of the FTSE100 in 2014, 
and uploaded video or audio files of meetings and conference calls on financial results in form of 
webcasts. Overall more than 13 hours of interactions between financial analysts and the 
management of respective corporations have been recorded and analysed. The study aims to show 
how that financial analysts make an effort in demonstrating cooperation and social solidarity with 
management in public interactions, and it is argued that both the financial analyst’s and the 
management’s behaviour construct the setting as one that enforces transparency.  
The findings of the study are organised as follows: Firstly, it is analysed how financial analysts 
perform their role publicly, by examining how patterns in question design demonstrate 
knowledgeability and entitlement to further information. The second empirical chapter shows how 
analysts do “being sceptical” when phrasing initial questions, and especially when following up 
on an answer. This was found to be accomplished by interactants through adopting one of two 
roles: The “puzzled” analyst, or the “diagnosing analyst”. It is argued that financial analysts use 
contrast structures to demonstrate affiliation instead of explicitly challenging the management’s 
accounts. Lastly, a third empirical chapter is dedicated to laughter in this setting. Both analysts 
and management use laughter to mitigate socially risky actions, like managing speaking rights, 
withholding information, or when challenging the askability of a question, which results in the co-
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When this thesis was submitted in autumn 2018, the collapse of one of the too-big-to-fail 
corporations, Lehman Brothers, had its 10-year anniversary. As it is widely known, this event 
sent shockwaves around the globe, and what followed was the biggest financial crisis since the 
1930s. It affected people worldwide, as not just jobs within the financial sector were lost or put 
at risk, but it also caused the worst recession in 80 years and ensuing austerity measures.  The 
consensus on the effectiveness on programs to overcome this crisis is however quite clear: 
Another stock market crash is expected to happen, as structural banking reforms have not 
brought about the widely desired change (Cassidy 2018 (The New Yorker), Elliot 2018 (The 
Guardian), Fricke 2018 (Der Spiegel)). As the general public felt major effects of the financial 
crisis, interest in actors and processes within the banking and finance sector increased, in order 
to find answers to questions concerning who is to blame and what exactly went wrong. People 
showed bewilderment over complex and abstract financial products that had been sold without 
practitioners fully understanding them (Crotty 2009), and the hubris of managers, which was 
sometimes ‘sanctioned’ with a forced change in career and large bonus sums (Guardian 
Editorial 2018). Financial intermediaries were under scrutiny: It was questioned why financial 
analysts had not been able to forecast these gross capital flow imbalances (Ramskogler 2015), 
auditors were accused of having been ‘complacent’ in the financial crisis (BBC 2011), and e-
mails from analysts of rating agencies were published in media outlets which confirmed that 
the breakdown of the stock market did not come as a full surprise to experts (Neate 2012). 
Financial analysts had just been in the news only a few years before the crisis, during the famous 
downfall of the Wall Street darling Enron. After it had become public that the company had 
inflated its income by over $0.5 billion since 1997, it was investigated why analysts only started 
to be sceptical concerning Enron’s reporting and performance problems in August 2001 
(Savage and Miree 2003). While the Wall Street was “schnuckled” – or duped – by Enron, only 
one analyst doubted its value in the late 90ies, which first did not have any effect other than his 
firing at Merrill Lynch (Schwartz 2002). A few years later, John Olson’s story of being the one 
person who spoke out broke the news and turned him into a “Houston celebrity”, whereas his 
former employer had to answer a few embarrassing questions.  
This thesis is concerned with what financial analysts actually do in disclosure processes. The 
author of this thesis however does not have a background in Finance or Accounting, and like 
many other laypeople only developed an interest in the field during the aftermath of the crisis. 
Before engaging with relevant literature for this study, the author shared widespread 
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expectations regarding actors in the crisis that turned out to be false: Public debates around the 
flaws and weaknesses of the financial system as well as the human errors that enabled crashes 
and scandals revealed misconceptions concerning financial intermediaries and their role within 
the financial system. In the academic literature this is referred to as the “the expectation gap” 
(Shaikh, Talha 2003). Already starting in the 1970s, ‘unrealistic expectations’ concerning the 
tasks and responsibilities of financial intermediaries by the public became a concern: Non-
experts seem to understand fraud detection as one of the key competencies and responsibilities 
of for instance external auditors, whereas practitioners argue that judging whether financial 
statements by a firm are “true and fair” does not include hunting down fraud (ibid.). This 
mismatch between the expectations and reality regarding the duties and power stretches to other 
financial professions as well. In the financial disclosure literature, financial analysts are 
theoretically assigned a ‘watchdog’ role, which they practically cannot fulfil. Financial analysts 
have been found to be positively biased when making recommendations and forecasts (Healy 
and Palepu 2001), and even though studies found a decline in analyst optimism (Matsumoto 
2011), a lack of analytical rigour is still held against the profession as a whole, a decade after 
the crisis (Salzedo et al. 2018). Financial analysts, in particular sell-side analysts, conduct 
detailed analyses of companies within a particular sector, and publish reports for investors in 
which they evaluate company performance and potential (Whitehouse 2018). Analyst 
recommendations can have a significant impact on the market, which is why the law requires 
the analysts to be objective and to base their assessments on facts. However, conflicts of 
interests like access to management and own company affiliations play into the report as well 
(ibid.). In light of calls for more transparency after the crisis, as well as the ongoing critiques 
of ineffective structural changes, the researcher was interested in the negotiations between 
management and financial intermediaries throughout the financial disclosure process. Both in 
the media as well as in the academic literature, the institutional roles of financial analysts and 
auditors are depicted as highly ambiguous in terms of their responsibilities and aims. Due to 
the researcher's background in Applied Linguistics, the question of how participants managed 
these conflicting interests in talk arose. Luckily, due to the increasing significance of publicly 
available conference calls, audio- and video-recordings of conversations between both parties 
are accessible and hence eligible for analysis.  
Transparency requirements for listed companies changed in the early 2000s across the West. 
The Sarbanes- Oxley Act (2002) in the United States provided new guidelines for financial 
reporting and the protection of investors as a consequence of the Enron scandal, and the EU 
passed a Transparency Directive in 2004 which was implemented in the UK with the 
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Companies Act of 2006. The Companies Act regulates the timing of publication of half-yearly 
and annual financial reports, mandatory contents and dissemination formats. Quarterly 
operating statements were also recommended, or the publication of management statements 
during the first and second six-month period of the financial year (The Companies Act 2006). 
Such updates are nowadays often freely available online in the form of webcasts, which was 
crucial for the data collection for this study. Developments in digital information and 
communication technology enable companies to reach a wider audience at low cost, which 
changed discursive practices within investor and public relations greatly (Crawford 
Camiciottoli 2010). Communication with investors and the public has become multimodal, 
meaning that messages are sent with a variety of semiotic resources and through different 
channels (ibid.). Quarterly results presentations and discussions of banks listed at the London 
Stock Exchange form the data set of this study.  
Listed companies tend to hold regular conference calls and meetings after results have been 
published, and also for extraordinary announcements (Rocci and Raimundo 2018). Quarterly 
conference calls are routine events for many corporations, and the highest ranked executives 
are always in attendance, which conveys that events where investors and management interact 
are of utmost importance to the company (ibid.). These conference calls and meetings are often 
uploaded on company websites in form of webcasts, which are open to the public in general for 
a limited amount of time. The researcher watched, and recorded webcasts of quarterly results 
reports in the year of 2015 from six investment banks that are listed at the London Stock 
Exchange and were part of the FTSE 250 in 2014. The conference calls in this data set are of 
the same structural pattern as described in the literature (Crawford Camiciottoli 2010): They 
start with an opening by the teleconference operator, and an introduction by the CEO or CFO; 
the executive officers then present a financial overview, financial details, and a wrap-up. Lastly, 
a Question & Answer or discussion session is held, in which financial analysts can call in and 
ask questions. For this thesis, only this last step of the conference call is of interest. In the field 
of Financial Communication, the majority of studies focus on the strategies by management in 
manipulating their messages to investors and the general public. The literature offers rich 
insights into the timing and phrasing of various types of written documents and oral 
presentations (for instance Parker 2013; Brennan and Merkl-Davies 2013). Within the field of 
Financial Disclosure, it has been researched how the market reacts to strategic Public and 
Investor Relations, by linking such efforts to trading activities or analyst and media reports 
(Beattie 2014). What has not been analysed in depth yet is how the financial analysts co-create 
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disclosure practices through their active participation in public events which are meant to 
facilitate and achieve more transparency.  
For this study, 13 hours of talk during Q&As were recorded and analysed with Conversation 
Analysis. Conversation Analysis allows the researcher to closely examine conversational and 
relational aspects of financial disclosure practices. This method has its roots in Sociology and 
Applied Linguistics and does not problematise what is being said, but how it is being said. 
Conversation Analysis is an evidence-based approach which aims to show how interactants 
shape and orient to the institutional context and social structures. In an empirical analysis, the 
researcher shows demonstratable patterns and features of the participants' talk, which fall into 
the following six dimensions by Drew and Heritage (1992): Turn-taking organisation, overall 
structural organisation of the interaction, sequential organisation, turn design, lexical choices 
and interaction asymmetries. The thesis aims to answer the two following research questions:  
 
1. How do the social relations between financial analysts and the company management 
get displayed and played out in their interactions?  
 
2. How do financial analysts display an understanding of their respective institutional roles 
in the design of their turns at talk? 
 
The questions reflect the two main interests of this study, as it will be examined how the 
institutional roles as well as the social relations are linguistically manifested. Both factors are 
not clearly distinguishable, as an institutional role is displayed through social interactions with 
others. However, the empirical analysis in this thesis looks at several different aspects of talk. 
One empirical chapter focusses on the initial turn design of the financial analysts, and less on 
the sequential organisation of the interaction, as talk in this setting often only consists of one 
turn per participant. The analysis is informed by the research literature on questions in 
institutional interactions and on directness and politeness in requests. Analysts have multiple 
choices in formulating their information request and can display differing degrees of entitlement 
and regards of the recipients’ contingencies in providing requested information. To offer an 
example from mundane talk: A speaker can use an imperative (“Pass me the salt.”), a declarative 
(“I need the salt”) or an interrogative with a self-referencing frame that entails a modal verb 
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(“Would you mind passing me the salt?”) (Curl and Drew 2008). When we choose a linguistic 
format to make a request, we consider how likely it is that our request will be fulfilled, and we 
adapt the degree of politeness depending on the power imbalance or degree of social distance 
to the recipient.  Press conferences are a setting which has generated influential studies on 
making requests in a public and formal setting, particularly the questioning of presidents 
(Clayman and Heritage 2002, 2006, 2007, 2013). Findings point at an increasingly assertive 
tone, which the behaviour in this setting will be related to (Clayman and Heritage 2002).  
As briefly mentioned before, it is examined how financial analysts manage expectations 
regarding their role in talk, such as a lack of analytical rigour, and being a watchdog. It is 
expected that financial analysts participate in a conference call in order to discuss 
uncomfortable topics, such as benchmarks that have not been met or when announcements 
concerning future investments change. The expression of scepticism in talk is assumed to show 
whether the financial analysts attempt to directly hold management accountable for their 
actions, and elaborate single turns offer insights into how financial analysts claim their right to 
more information by displaying their own expertise. This thesis furthermore investigates how 
such actions are carried out with regard to managing the relationship with management. The 
study of the management of the social relationship between participants is not limited to the 
financial analysts, but also analyses the behaviour of management: Especially when follow-up 
questions are asked, the conversation has multiple turns which allows the study of the sequential 
organisation of social actions and the application of the next-turn proof procedure.  
The thesis is organised in the following way: In Chapter 2, relevant literature and concepts from 
Accounting Communication are outlined and discussed. Basic concepts like information 
asymmetry and agency theory are explained, and company internal structures and processes 
that influence the format and scale of disclosure are also discussed. Lastly, the ‘narrative turn’ 
in Accounting and Finance is discussed, with its predominant methodologies and research 
questions. Chapter 3 focusses on the social actors and the context of the study: The professional 
roles, dependencies and obligations of the protagonists of the data set, financial analysts and 
company managers are explained. Then relevant research findings regarding the context of the 
data set, conference calls particularly, are presented. Lastly it is explained that interactive, 
dialogical approaches to Accounting Communication are still rare, making it a considerable gap 
within the field. In Chapter 3.4 studies that have a more interpretive perspective are outlined in 
order to show which research questions have been answered so far, and which are still to be 
addressed. Each of these two chapters highlight a different aspect of Goffman’s 
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conceptualisation of performances in his work on dramaturgical sociology (1959): Chapter 2 
examines the ‘Backstage’ of the performance of public disclosure – investor relations and 
disclosure policies, whereas Chapter 3 outlines the ‘Front Stage’ where these policies are acted 
out, namely conference calls. In Chapter 4 the intellectual heritage and central concepts of 
Conversation Analysis (CA) will be explained. The chapter starts with symbolic interactionism, 
as the approach laid the foundation for methods like CA. It continues to outline the impact of 
Erving Goffman's work, and the discipline of Ethnomethodology, with which CA shares its 
roots. The researcher then goes on to explain how CA is conducted, including what the 
aforementioned six dimensions stand for and how they shape the analysis. The chapter 
concludes with the definition of concepts within CA that were important for the analysis of this 
data set, like requests and questions, humour and laughter, epistemics, face, politeness, identity 
work, alignment and disalignment, and affiliation and disaffiliation. Chapter 5 introduces the 
data set and explains how the researcher accessed and recorded the webcasts. The sample as 
well as the participants are presented. Characteristic features that distinguish how a CA study 
approaches data from more ‘mainstream’ qualitative methodologies within Social Sciences are 
also explained. This includes the process collection building and the ‘emic’ perspective of CA. 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 present the empirical findings of the study. Chapter 6 analyses a range of 
reoccurring patterns of information requests by financial analysts. Topics include mitigation 
techniques, the demonstration of knowledgeability, the strategic association with a group, as 
well as the management of entitlement. Chapter 7 studies the risky social action of expressing 
scepticism in an information request. The researcher found patterns in question designs that 
allow the financial analysts to present a discrepancy between their expectations or analysis and 
disclosed information by the company without actually questioning the competency or 
knowledge authority of management. The last empirical chapter, Chapter 8, analyses the 
occurrence of laughter and humorous statements and its effect on social relationships in this 
data set. It was found that laughter eases the accomplishment of socially risky actions, like for 
instance withholding information. It creates alignment between both the financial analyst and 
management, even when a dispreferred response is given. Chapter 9 discusses these findings 
and relates them back to relevant studies that have been reviewed in Chapters 2 - 4. Especially 
Clayman and Heritage’s (2002) research on journalists questioning presidents over time serves 
as a reference point for the findings, as aforementioned assertiveness and directness was not 
found in this data set.  
The thesis is concluded by answering the research questions above and by clarifying how this 
study contributes to the literature. This thesis aims to contribute to both fields – Applied 
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Linguistics, as well as Accounting Communication. The Accounting Literature is divided on 
the question whether participation in a conference call is beneficial for analysts. Sharing own 
analyses and answers to questions with the competition is risky, and answers are likely to not 
be helpful at all (Brown et al. 2015). This study offers empirical findings that show how 
financial analysts orient to management as willing and cooperative, and furthermore also 
demonstrate knowledgeability in elaborate question prefaces in which their analyses and 
information sources are presented. Both factors show that the participants treat the disclosure 
processes in financial results Q&As as important information resources and as part of a 
transparent system. This study also shows the careful handling of risky actions, demonstrating 
that it is a priority to analysts to maintain a positive relationship with executive managers of the 
firm they follow. Analysts only rarely used a more assertive tone to get information. In terms 
of research in language use, this study found linguistic strategies that allowed the analysts to 
mitigate potentially risky questions that have not been analysed in the literature yet – most 
importantly the use of contrast structures. 
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2. Literature Review: Financial Communication 
This chapter will outline relevant studies and research that have been conducted in the field of 
Accounting Communication, by both reviewing the setting of this study as well as the impact 
of the narrative turn on the field. The studies that were reviewed stem from multiple disciplines, 
like Finance, Investor Relations, Applied Linguistics and Accounting. The chapter is structured 
the following way: Firstly, in 2.1, the concept of information asymmetry in Finance is briefly 
outlined, as this is the basis of research on financial disclosure practices. In this thesis, the 
presentations and discussions during conference calls and meetings are treated as performances. 
Goffman’s concepts of performances of the Front Stage and the Backstage as outlined in his 
work on dramaturgical sociology (1959) shape the structure of this chapter and Chapter 3: 
Firstly, ‘The Backstage’ of the results presentation performance will be discussed. The 
increasing number of departments dedicated specifically to Investor Relations (IR) indicate that 
the communication aspect of disclosures and forecasts is gaining more significance amongst 
practitioners, and their role in the process of preparing and presenting value-relevant 
information to outsiders will therefore be briefly explained. The author also reviews studies that 
show how besides the executive managers, who maintain direct links to favoured analysts and 
important investors, Investor Relations Officers are employed to strengthen such 
communications, as well as to strategically manage news that are fed to the public. The ‘Front 
Stage’ is addressed in the next chapter (Chapter 3.3: The Front Stage: Conference Calls). 
Finally, the impact of the so-called narrative turn on the field of financial reporting and the 
disclosure literature is outlined in 2.3. In recent years, researchers have started to apply methods 
from linguistics like Discourse Analysis or Corpus Linguistics to written documents in which 
management addresses investors. Theories from Sociology, like Goffman’s Impression 
Management have also been used to examine disclosure strategies. This thesis aims to add to 
this body of work, but focusses on the negotiation of disclosure and professional relationships 
between the management of a company and financial analysts through spoken discourse. The 
contributions this thesis aims to make to the literature will be discussed in the next Chapter 
(Chapter 3.4). 
2.1. Information asymmetry  
The first question that needs to be addressed in the field of Accounting Communication is a 
basic one: Why is disclosure important? To begin with, it is fundamental for the functioning of 
an efficient market. Akerlof depicts this in the famous example of the used automobile market 
in his paper “A Market for Lemons” (1970): He presents a scenario with four kinds of cars, new 
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and old, plums and lemons. New cars obviously have a higher value than used ones, but used 
and good cars, the plums, and used and bad cars, the lemons, are sold at the same price. Only 
the seller knows if the car he offers is actually good or bad – but is also aware that if he sells a 
good car, he will not get the price it is worth. So, the plum might not be traded at all whereas 
the lemons to a higher price – which drives the good cars out of the market, so that the market 
collapses. Akerlof draws the parallel to the stock market as “bad money drives out the good 
because the exchange rate is even” (Akerlof 1970, 489). The literature refers to this as the 
information problem and the agency problem (Healy and Palepu 2001). The former describes 
conflicting interests and incentives between the management of a firm and savers or investors 
(ibid.). The agency problem arises from the separation of investment and management in the 
corporation. Certain decisions such as the involvement in high risk capital might be profitable 
for management but harm the interests of investors (Healy and Palepu 2001). 
Disclosure is crucial for reducing these problems. Internal institutions are commissioned to 
limit the opportunities for management to take advantage of the information asymmetry. 
Transparency establishes a more stable relationship with the shareholders, which is why many 
corporations choose to disclose more information than they have to (Peasnell et al. 2011). 
Voluntary disclosure includes management earnings forecasts, dividend decisions, new product 
announcements, management’s commentary, management changes, and it can take the form of 
conference calls, road shows, internet presentations, press releases or board presentations to 
analysts (Bassen, Basse Mama and Ramaj 2010). Unlike mandatory disclosure, as the annual 
report, voluntary disclosure is not bound to the financial calendar or strict regulations on what 
information has to be included, but management has to ensure that price sensitive information 
is not released to a specific group only. This is one strong advantage of releasing information 
via the webpage of a corporation: both mandatory and voluntary disclosed information are 
provided to everybody at the same time. Webcasts are an important feature of this public 
channel. A corporation’s online presence has proven to positively contribute to the investor’s 
perception of management’s accessibility (Hodge et al. 2004). In the following internal 
company processes that have an impact on disclosure strategies and formats will be outlined, 
followed by a review of literature concerned with the analysis of language use in published 
disclosures. 
2.2. Backstage: Investor Relations 
Especially public announcements concerning performance and earnings are carefully crafted. 
Most corporations have a department dedicated to exactly this: building solid relationships with 
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investors, which also includes communicating with analysts or the press. Conference calls and 
half or annual results meetings are one of numerous events that investor relations officers plan 
and prepare management for. After ground-shaking scandals like Enron in 2002 or the financial 
crisis in 2007/8, the investor relations profession experienced a renaissance as corporations felt 
the need to rebuild investor confidence through “reliable and open communication streams” 
(Laskin 2009, 209). The Investor Relations Society defined the profession in the following way: 
“Investor relations is the communication of information and insight between a 
company and the investment community. This process enables a full 
appreciation of the company’s business activities, strategy and prospects and 
allows the market to make an informed judgement about the fair value and 
appropriate ownership of a company.” (2014) 
Further aspects of the profession are concerned with the financial media, and this involves press 
releases, the web presence, organisation of road shows, preparing talks by management leaders 
and - very relevant for this project - it is also the financial relations officer who prepares the 
CEO or CFO for Q & A sessions (Phillimore 2012). An effective communication with the 
public and the investors is supposed to result in a fair share price that reflects the value of a 
firm, a greater liquidity of shares, less shareholder activity and greater analyst coverage 
(Hoffmann, Pennings and Weis 2011). Communication in investor relations is defined as “two- 
way communication”, meaning that information is not just provided to investors, but IROs also 
seek feedback from their audience, which in has an impact on the development of the firm’s 
disclosure policies and strategic planning (Laskin 2018). The actual impact of investor relations 
is however controversial, as findings are inconsistent even within the low volume of academic 
research in that area (Laskin 2009). Interestingly, studies with a communication perspective are 
very rare – a review from 2009 only found two articles that explore this fundamental aspect of 
IR (Laskin 2009). In the 1990ies practitioners have usually not been trained in communications, 
as it’s mostly been the financial affairs department that is charged with IR, where it’s not seen 
as a public relations function (Laskin 2009). In a 2009 survey however, the majority of 
respondents from Fortune 500 companies reported to be working in a dedicated IR department, 
which indicates that the relevance of professional communications with the investment 
community is on the rise (Laskin 2009). As said above, the tasks of IROs are twofold: they 
communicate with shareholders as well with the press. The structure of the IR department as 
well as the tasks of the IROs depend on the type of investors that follow and invest in it. 
Companies with for instance a large private investor following would emphasise working with 
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the press. The channels chosen for these tasks are quite different. Institutional investors are the 
most influential shareholders, as one may hold a significant stake of up to 20 % (Phillimore 
2012). In order to maintain a positive relationship with this money source, IROs dedicate most 
of their time to build a stable relationship with them (Laskin 2009; Holland 1997). A permanent 
communication channel is supposed to be established, which goes beyond the publicly available 
information sources a corporation offers (Holland 1997). Credibility and trust cannot be reached 
when the corporation only contacts its primary shareholders when they are in trouble (ibid.). 
Public information releases like announcements or reports are fundamental tools to enrich the 
market with controlled information, however do managers describe the market as unpredictable 
and ever-changing, which is why regular interactions are seen as necessary to ensure that these 
sentiments do not have an undesirable impact on the main investors (Holland 1997). The 
effectiveness of these measurements is indirectly confirmed by studies that examine the 
relevance of the financial media for investors. The role of the financial journalist has undergone 
a steady decline in authority since the nineties, as they are no longer invited to first rounds of 
presentations by mangers and the IROs state that generally they devote only little time to 
interactions with them (Laskin 2009; Davis 2006). As mentioned before, institutional investors 
have much more up to date channels, one of which can be the direct contact to the corporation. 
Interviews with managers of corporations show how these exchanges work: Publicly available 
information like the annual report merely function as basis for the private discussion of 
qualitative factors as management strategy and recent changes in management and resources 
(Holland 1997). This means that the how and the why were preferably discussed in private one-
to-one meetings to reassure the shareholders, to signal accessibility and at the same time to 
“check if their construction of ideas about us is OK”, which is called two-way communication 
(Holland 1997, p. 25). Additional voluntary disclosure to the annual report is very welcome, 
because the document itself is hardly comprehensible to non-experts. Also, expectations for 
future developments cannot be expressed in definite numbers, and as this point is crucial for 
the investment community, it requires explanation. So, for the IROs the actual work only starts 
after the report has been published, as the phone will be constantly ringing with analysts and 
investors asking for comments and explanations. The webcast can give some insight on how 
those interactions might look like. 
As the private channel has been attributed a key function from both viewpoints, one could 
assume that adverse selection costs can be reduced effectively solely by dedicated IROs. As 
indicated before, is this only half the story. Other information sources like analysts and the 
22 
 
media do have an impact on both private investors and institutional investors, only to a different 
extent (Phillimore 2012). Individual investors that are not equipped with the resources and 
information channels of an institutional investor rely more on the financial mass media, 
especially when it comes to finding stock, they would like to invest in. Studies show that private 
investors are more likely to buy attention-grabbing stock advertised through the media, whereas 
institutional investors follow the coverage to know when to sell (Barber and Odean 2008). Even 
though the individual investors own a much smaller amount of stock than the institutional ones, 
their behaviour plays into what the managers in the above-mentioned interviews referred to as 
“market sentiment”. Higher trading volume, press coverage and analyst following are therefore 
key components to evaluate the interest in stock (Peasnell 2011). The impact of investor 
relations on these dynamics is contradictory. This becomes clear with the role of the media: as 
outlined does the institutional investment community not adduce newspaper articles for 
investment decisions, because they are always lagging behind (Davis 2006). However, does 
everybody read the financial newspapers and in the case of London it remains a core part of the 
City’s “culture” (Davis 2006, p. 15). So, it does have a considerable impact on the market, and 
IROs consider them as the most influential financial audience on the share price after 
Institutional investment managers and stock analysts and brokers, but at the same time see them 
as the least important audience for their services (Laskin 2009). And even though managers and 
investors increasingly promote the importance of investor relations, studies do not only fail to 
distinctively show that investor relations departments have a positive effect on the share price, 
it was even found that in crisis – when IROs should have established strong stable relationship 
to investors – firms that do have award-winning investor relations programmes were actually 
hit harder (Peasnell 2011). Results do also show that firms with these programmes outperform 
their competitors with less well-developed IR structures in good times, but the intended 
relationship stability does not seem to be achieved on a large scale, as events like accounting 
scandals of other firms result in disproportional large downgrades (ibid.). It remains therefore 
to be explored what measures are taken by the corporations to manage the information risk 
more effectively through IR. 
2.3. Discourse and Disclosure 
In the fields of accounting and finance the research literature on disclosure in conference calls 
predominantly attempts to examine whether the communication is effective by focussing on the 
content, and not the delivery. Within Financial Communication it is assumed that “soft 
information”, like the tone and rhetoric do have an impact on the audience as well, although 
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such an effect is more challenging to prove. This section attempts to give an overview of studies 
that examined various types of documents that are part of a firm’s financial disclosure, like 
annual reports, earnings press releases, the company homepage, and conference calls. While 
applying both quantitative and qualitative methods, researchers attempt to show a strategic and 
persuasive language use by the firm in written documents, and in a few studies also in spoken 
discourse.  
The prevalent method in studies that are concerned with accounting narratives is content 
analysis (Beattie 2014). This approach can be divided in quantitative content analysis, or 
qualitative content analysis, also referred to as text analysis. In both streams the researcher uses 
either theory-driven categories or establishes emerging categories. For the content analysis the 
frequency of occurrence is central, for text analyses the most often used framework in published 
articles follows Gioia and Corley (2004) and groups the emerged categories into second order 
themes and finally into aggregate dimensions. These methods have been applied to settings 
which are formally and thematically close to the webcasts that the researcher will look at. Press 
releases, letters to shareholders and chairman’s statements all add qualitative information to a 
financial results report and therefore entail narratives. One point of interest here is the self-
portrayal of management in crisis: What do they take responsibility for, and what is blamed on 
external factors? What is emphasized, what is left out? Three literature streams deal with this 
question: the crisis-denial, threat-rigidity response theory and the environmental scanning 
literature (Keusch et al. 2012). The first theory’s hypothesis is that management ignores crises 
and keeps the balance between internal and external influences in the report, whereas the second 
assumes that management focusses on internal factors as they are in control of them, and the 
latter suggests that more attention is paid to the environment external to the firm (ibid.). Content 
analysis studies often look at attributions, so words that carry a certain meaning. One of the 
crucial findings here is that a positive performance is related to internal factors, which is called 
‘acclaiming attributions’, whereas negative outcomes are ascribed to the external environment, 
called ‘defensive attributions’ (Henry 2008). The latter are used to distance management from 
negative results, whereas the ‘acclaiming attributions’ stress that management is in control. 
Management strategies are measured in “absolute and relative terms”, which is a classic 
example for purely quantitative content analysis. Frequencies are counted in absolute numbers 
and then compared to each other (Keusch et al. 2012, p. 630). Findings show that self-serving 
biased statements are a strong feature of annual report narratives: Keusch et al. (2012) found 
that during the financial crisis in 2008 the number of positive attributional statements did not 
decrease compared to 2006, before the crisis. This suggests that the positive tone is not affected 
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by actual company performance. This is in line with the assumption that “conditions of 
accountability foster impression management” and with the process of ‘information 
inductance’, in which management formulates disclosures in order to control feedback effects 
(Merkl-Davies et al. 2011). Merkl-Davies also used content-analysis to examine self-
presentational dissimulation by looking at pronouns and positive and negative “emotion words” 
and found that impression construction in annual report documents was not inconsistent with 
how management perceived the outcomes, but they are nevertheless positively biased.  
Results of content analyses can also be related to other statistical results, as for instance to how 
institutions and regulations influence financial reporting. Osma et al. (2011) find for instance 
that firms with a strong board of directors are more likely to publish negative information in 
press releases. There is an emergent literature on the strategic use of accounting narratives to 
present management in a self-serving manner (Osma et al. 2011; Beattie 2014). Henry (2008) 
reviewed earnings press releases and related tone, defined as comprising of both content and 
lexical choices, the length of the document, the use of ‘plain English’ and the amount of 
numerical data to investor reactions. A qualitative rhetorical analysis is linked to a short-
window event study method, which shows that more profitable firms publish press releases with 
a positive tone. Said documents tend to be comparatively short and use fewer complex words 
and sentence structures, but the simpler lexical choices do not have an impact on investors 
(ibid.). This mixed-methods study shows that a press release has not just an informational, but 
a promotional value, and it confirms the generally alleged positive bias of financial results 
documents. Content analysis is not to be put on a level with “large-scale positivist economics-
rotted quantitative analyses”, it is rather part of the so-called “narrative turn” in accounting 
research (Beattie 2014, p. 112). The narrative turn draws on research traditions of fields as 
sociology and philosophy to understand how meaning is created by humans for humans (ibid.). 
Content analysis allows the researcher to transform words and other linguistic features as tone 
into numbers, which then can be related to other numerical results (see above or McKay Price 
et al. 2010). Popular concepts in the genre of financial communication are the already 
mentioned impression management, which draws upon Erving Goffman’s work about the use 
of dramaturgical metaphors (Merkl-Davies and Koller 2012) and also sensemaking and 
sensegiving (Beattie 2014). Both sensemaking and sensegiving are processes that are expressed 
through interaction or simply talk (Weick et al. 2005). These two concepts are investigated in 
financial communication to understand the creation of legitimacy or strategies to attract 
resources (Beattie 2014). The methodologies used range from purely quantitative studies that 
for instance relate sensegiving activities to media attention or mixed methods that perform a 
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textual analysis on initial public offering prospectuses to find out whether “effective 
storytellers” acquire the money they need (Petkova and Rindova 2013; Martens et al. 2007).  
As indicated, content analysis does increasingly incorporate qualitative analysis or apply textual 
analysis; however, the majority of studies still rely on quantitative results (Tregidga et al. 2012). 
Said studies mostly look at the relation between phenomena, and questions concerning motives 
and intentions as well as the impact of language use remain unanswered (Tregidga et al 2012). 
Much more known about the content of diverse documents like Chairman and CEO statements 
and CSR reports, which are intended to communicate a particular message, but “ad hoc 
communications” are widely omitted (Tregidga et al 2012, p. 224). It is even argued that 
concepts such as Impression Management in quantitative studies are superficially researched 
and that the chosen categories are often crude (ibid.). The editors of the special issue for the 
Accounting Forum Journal (Vol. 36, 2012) call for accounting research that takes public 
relations seriously and includes the creation, reception and contestation of corporate messages. 
Linguistics only slowly finds its way into Financial Communication and Accounting Narrative 
Research, even though one would guess that this was a natural consequence of the ‘narrative 
turn’. For example, Critical Discourse Analysis has been applied to set communicative 
strategies as referential vagueness and passivisation in relation to the wider discursive practice 
and social context (Merkl-Davies and Koller 2012). Especially Lischinsky (2011, 2014).  
introduced corpus-based studies to the field by examining the construction of the financial crisis 
in global reports and of the environment in CSR-reports. Corpus Linguistics is a quantitative 
approach. With the aid of computer software words of a corpus, which is a text document 
compiled by the researcher, can be counted and patterns of word use be made visible. The 
quantitative findings give valuable insides about a genre, as Lischinsky shows (2011, 2014). 
He looked at the references to the environment in CSR reports and found that it is rather treated 
as an abstract concept, which is not included in quantitative assessments and is almost only the 
subject of relational verbs like to be and have, and not with verbs that express a definite action 
(Lischinsky 2014). Concordances furthermore showed a strong correlation with the word 
“reduce” and synonyms, which the author interprets as an action to mitigate that the firm does 
have a negative impact on the environment (ibid.). Amongst written documents, verbal 
exchanges are also of increasing interest as the tone or formulations in less planned settings are 
argued to be more revealing than texts published by IR departments or rehearsed speeches. 
Larcker and Zakolyukina (2012) argue that linguistic features by CEOs and CFOs in conference 
calls can be used to detect deceptive behaviour. Their data set consists of transcripts with 
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statements by management that were later taken back or corrected, so knowingly misleading. 
They created prediction models and included linguistic features, like a greater amount of group 
references as were found to liars tend to disassociate themselves from their story, into their 
statistical analyses. Linguistics scholars like Crawford Camiciottoli (2010) also conducted 
qualitative studies with conference call data. Her research includes studies on how the financial 
community has established a distinctive communicative practice in earnings calls through 
consistent patterns, references to other incorporated texts (intertextuality) and practices 
(interdiscursivity).  
Many of the above discussed studies, which use a variety of methodologies and data, have one 
thing in common: Their analysis is informed by the concept of Impression Management. This 
concept has been initially introduced by Erving Goffman, and his contributions on the study of 
social interactions will be outlined in the next chapter (Chapter 3.1). The persuasive use of 
language has for instance been examined in transcripts of Q & A sessions in conference calls 
(see Matsumoto, Pronk and Roelofsen 2011; McKay Price et al. 2012), annual reports (Merkl-
Davies and Brennan 2011; Smith and Taffler 1992; Aerts 2005), press releases (Henry 2008) 
or company websites (Campbell and Beck 2004). This concept highlights the dual 
communication function of financial disclosure - informative, and persuasive. It allows the 
researcher to examine how management uses language strategically and opportunistically in 
order to create a favourable impression of the company’s financial performance, the normative 
appropriateness of the practices and structures of organisation or the image or reputation of a 
company (Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2011). Impression management includes both the 
emphasis of positive news, and the concealment of negative news, which creates a distorted 
image for the audience (Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2011). The audience can either be defined 
as shareholders and financial intermediaries, or as the society as a whole (Merkl-Davies and 
Brennan 2013). The former is usually the case for studies which study the presentation of 
financial performance, whereas the latter is more appropriate for studies on CSR reports or 
organisational legitimacy (Beelitz and Merkl-Davies 2012; Merkl-Davies 2014; Matsumoto et 
al., 2011). In this thesis, potential efforts by management to conceal or distort information is 
mostly disregarded, as the analysis would then rely on the researcher’s interpretation of the 
company’s results. As will be explained in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, Conversation Analysis 
only includes what members make relevant in talk in the analysis. This means that Impression 
Management by management can only be analysed with CA if financial analysts orient to 
disclosure as problematic or untrustworthy. This was not part of the Research Questions of this 
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thesis, but the notable absence of such claims is nevertheless included in the discussion (Chapter 
9). 
Lastly, most of the outlined studies here have focussed on the discursive practices applied by 
management with the aim to receive favourable views by investors, financial analysts, and the 
financial market as a whole. Only very few studies examine the reception of this strategically 
issued information. Quantitative studies have looked at stock market reactions, but failed to 
assess how market participants shape the discursive choices of management: What are the 
institutional restraints, what can be said openly? How do financial analysts, investors and 
journalists negotiate disclosure with management? Very recently, a special issue by the Journal 
of Business Communication has published a special issue that focusses on Pragmatics in 
Financial Communication, confirming and strengthening a shift of attention to language use by 
participants in financial disclosure. Two articles that were published in this special issue are of 
particular interest here, as they examine the analyst’s discourse in interactions with 
management during earnings release conference calls (de Oliveira and Rodrigues Pereira 2018; 
Crawford Camiciottoli 2018). Informed by Crawford Camiciottoli’s studies that outlined the 
discursive characteristics of interactions during conference calls (see Chapter 2.3 in this 
Chapter), de Oliveira and Rodrigues Pereira (2018) closely examine what formulations 
financial analysts chose during one conference call hosted by a major underperforming 
Brazilian firm, especially when asking delicate questions. The study shows how financial 
analysts seek different degrees of generality and specific in their responses in order to manage 
the balancing act of expressing a desire for requested information while maintaining a positive 
professional relationship with management. Crawford Camiciottoli (2018) examines the use of 
intensifying and evaluative lexical items, and how, when and by whom these “boosters” are 
used. The study examines language use by both the analysts as well as management, and found 
that evaluative boosters, like “good”, “great”, “improved”, were used by management 
regardless of strong or weak financial performance, and by analysts in an empathetic way, 
which strengthens the relationship with management (ibid.). Camiciotolli furthermore confirms 
with her findings that negative connotations are used to describe processes external to the firm, 




3. Context of the Study: Social Actors in Financial Results Q & As 
This chapter outlines the academic literature around the protagonists and the setting of the data 
analysed in this thesis. Financial results presentations and Q & As are one of the ‘The Front 
Stages’ of financial disclosures: It is a public practice, in which both financial analysts and 
managers of a company evaluate shared information and negotiate the disclosure of further 
relevant material. This can take place as either a face-to-face meeting, or more commonly, as a 
conference call. The latter medium gained prominence in the 1990s, and due to legislature 
changes has been made accessible not just for selected existing investors, but also potential 
investors, meaning the public in general.  
This chapter is structured as follows: Firstly, the role of financial analysts within the social 
practice of disclosure will be explained, and the academic literature concerning factors that have 
an impact on their behaviour throughout the Q & A and on their reports following such events 
will be reviewed (Chapter 3.1). Secondly, research on reporting practices by management that 
potentially strengthen investor confidence will be outlined (Chapter 3.2). A common medium 
for sharing financial results in general is the conference call, and in the data set for this study 
conference calls took place more often than face-to-face meetings. Conference calls as a setting 
for results presentations are therefore discussed in detail in this chapter (Chapter 3.3). The 
review of the literature includes an outline of the conference call as a genre, and how legal 
changes regarding sharing value-relevant information have changed the content and impact of 
conference calls. Studies show that not only presentations during conference calls add 
information to published reports and press releases, but also the subsequent Q & A (for instance 
see Salzedo et al. 2018). This underlines the relevance of the empirical analysis undertaken in 
this thesis. The interactions of these financial results Q & As were accessed through webcasts. 
Webcasts are live- recordings uploaded to company homepages, and they remain available 
online for a limited time after the date of the presentation. Moreover, due to the critical role of 
the internet for accessing and collecting the data, the changes of disclosure practices through 
the internet will be briefly outlined at the end of this chapter (Chapter 3.3.1). This chapter 
concludes with contributions that this study aims to make to the literature in Accounting 
Communication (Chapter 3.4). 
 
3.1 Financial Analysts 
The financial analyst represents the market and investors in the setting of the Q & A after a 
results presentation. He or she, though usually he, follows particular corporations of an industry 
and publishes earnings forecasts, commentaries on firm performance and investment 
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recommendations on the basis of which investors make decisions (De Franco and Hope 2011). 
There are two main types of financial analysts: sell-side and buy-side analysts. Both types need 
a profound expertise of the sector they are following and usually hold a degree in economics 
and finance (Whitehouse 2018). Differences between them include the number of companies 
they study and report on, as well as the depth of their research and how they make these reports 
available (ibid.). This study does not differentiate between different analyst types, which is why 
this distinction will not be discussed in further depth. The following outline of research on the 
profession concerns financial analysts which take part in conference calls. According to the 
literature, these are mostly sell-side analysts (ibid.). High accuracy of their reports, also in 
comparison to their peers, enables them to increase their influence, salary and career 
opportunities (ibid.). Figure 1 below shows the financial analyst’s position within the field of 
financial communication: 
 
Figure 3.1: Whitehouse 2018 
As can be seen in Figure 1, three arguably independent institutions are standing between a 
company and its investors: rating agencies, financial journalists and financial analysts. Major 
players in rating agencies such as Standard & Poor assess how likely it is that the borrower will 
pay back their loan, and they were also famously criticised for their late downgrading of failing 
institutions during the financial crisis in 2008 (ibid.). Financial journalists might publish their 
reports in widely read newspapers, which reflect the interests of the market, but often lack the 
resources to undertake in-depth research on market developments or complex financial products 
(Tambini 2010). As a result, the financial press is considered to be relatively uncritical, because 
they often simply reprint press releases formulated by an Investor Relations Officer (short IRO) 
or get their information from analysts, who themselves have direct connections to fund 
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managers and the corporations (Davis 2006). This makes journalists an important source for 
private investors, whereas institutional investors heavily rely on direct links to financial analysts 
for decision making (Whitehouse 2018).  
Figure 1 also shows how the analyst’s ability to fulfil the task of collecting and evaluating 
information is heavily dependent on the disclosure by the management of a corporation. 
Legally, value-relevant information must be shared to all market participants openly and at the 
same time, as will be discussed in Chapter 3.3 below, making public settings where both parties 
interact directly a potentially insightful source to study. However, these are not the only 
instances in which investors and management meet, private channels or conferences and road 
shows are also commonly used meeting opportunities (Hollander 1997, Brown et al. 2015). 
Within the field of Financial Communication and the disclosure literature, a central point for 
debate is whether reports published by analysts lack rigour and objectivity, due to such strong 
institutional constraint such as maintaining access to management, employer incentives like 
increasing the investment banking business, or visibility (Salzedo et al. 2018). This bias by 
financial analysts is reflected in the rare occasions in which hold or sell recommendations occur 
(Barber et al. 2006), and in the optimistic forecasts that are published even when prior 
performance has been weak (Walther and Willis 2013). Research suggests that both 
participation in conference calls and more so a direct link to management are very crucial 
factors to success for analysts, but these communication channels are at risk when analysts 
report negatively on a firm. A review of the literature on analyst bias’ in their forecasts by Libby 
et al (2007) concluded that: “[F]indings suggest that managers prefer optimism in beginning-
of-period and pessimism in end-of-period analysts’ forecasts, but leave open the question of 
why analysts appear to cooperate with management and issue forecasts that are consistent with 
their preferences” (p. 178). Libby et al’s (2007) answer to this missing link are relationship 
incentives: a better relationship with management grants more access to information. 
Interestingly, besides private interactions this also includes the right to ask questions during 
conference calls. Since the early 2000s, it is illegal to share value-relevant or sensitive 
information in private conversations, but that does not mean that all interactions are held 
publicly (Brown et al. 2015). These studies suggest that public interactions complement 
analysts’ assessments that were made based on private interactions, and lead to more accuracy. 
Unsurprisingly, this implies that regulation changes that aimed at levelling the playing field 
between analysts have not fully achieved their goal. Favoured analysts make more accurate 
forecasts and spend less effort to do so, and hence are more successful in their career – which 
according to Mayew (2008) hands a powerful discrimination tool to management when 
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appointing analysts during conference calls. Mayew (2008) shows that the likelihood of being 
allowed to ask a question during a conference call increases when forecasts published by the 
analyst are in the firm’s favour and the prestige of the analyst. Salzedo et al. (2018) also looked 
at conference call transcripts to examine the alleged biases from financial analysts in this setting 
and argue that financial analyst’s notes and questions do show increased analytical rigour when 
confronted with unexpected bad news. Furthermore, the more improvised form of language use 
that occurs during the discussion section of a conference call shows that analysts are more direct 
than in their written reports (ibid.). This is especially of interest for this thesis, as it will examine 
how analysts balance the various institutional pressures and expectations around their behaviour 
during a conference call. Studies that examine discursive strategies by financial analysts in 
conference call discussions have been outlined in Chapter 2.3.  
3.2 Management 
The dynamics of financial reporting and disclosure are researched from multiple perspectives 
in the accounting discipline. Central to this field are firstly the motives for sharing extra 
information. Researchers argue that the question is not really “if” a corporation should disclose 
share value-relevant information, but “when” (Lundholm and Van Winkle 2006). No news 
would in any case then be understood as “the worst possible news”, and a timely disclosure 
would come across as completely credible (Hollander et al. 2010; Lundholm and Van Winkle 
2006). Lundholm and Van Winkle (2006) depict this logic in their imagined “basic disclosure 
game” in which 5 firms of a shared market would have a customer retention rate of .5, .6, .7, 
.8, .9 (5 being the worst possible result, 9 the ideal). Who would disclose? As every firm would 
want to be assessed as high as possible, possibly all firms except for the one with 5 and 6 would 
lift the lid on their result, as they’d had to prove that they are above the average of .7 (ibid.). 
The case of the firm with 6 is however not 100% clear, as it could chose to stay silent and be 
overvalued or disclose that it’s not the worst on the market. It’s naturally not that simple, as 
certain frictions can impede the model. As it is assumed that there is a positive relation between 
disclosure and stock-price based incentives by management (Nagar et al. 2003), information 
might tend to be disclosed less frequently when the managers’ profits are not connected to the 
share price (Lundholm and Van Winkle 2006). Another factor is that given price sensitive 
information must be disclosed publicly, this means that the competition finds out (Graham et 
al. 2005). A further consideration is whether a stricter regulation law only allow disclosures 
which the firm is absolutely certain about, and if they could not gather enough information to 
make sure the release would not put investors on the wrong track, they might withhold the hints 
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they have (Lundholm and Van Winkle 2006). In terms of the conference call Q & As, as Salzedo 
et al (2018) show, the disclosure of negative information leads to more scrutiny during public 
encounters by even the most favourable analysts. One strategy to avert this scrutiny when 
delivering bad news or poor financial performance was the use of more obscure language, or 
misleading statements, but its effectiveness depends on the sophistication of the audience 
(Smith and Taffler 1992). Later in this chapter (3.4), further studies that examine narratives 
strategically chosen by management will be discussed in more detail, especially with regards to 
impression management. 
Another main focus in the literature is on the impact of institutions which are involved in 
compiling as well as monitoring the financial report. The association between corporate 
governance and disclosure is usually analysed with quantitative methods, and a popular proxy 
for this is the number of independent members of either the board of directors or the audit 
committee (Anderson et al. 2004). The outside director’s independence is presumed due to the 
“virtue of his profession”, and the higher the number of outside directors on a board, the higher 
the inclination of the board to foster the publication of voluntary disclosed information (Ajinkya 
et al 2005, p. 344). A factor which levers this effect out is concentrated institutional ownership 
of a firm, as private channels are then the preferred mode of communication (Ajunka et al. 
2005). Regulations across most Western Countries however prohibit the release of information 
to a selected audience, which is why this effect slowly declines (Ajunka et al. 2005). The 
existence of an audit committee is supposed to reduce agency costs, as it reviews the 
effectiveness of internal controls and thereby improves the disclosure quality and quantity 
(Avison and Cowton 2012). Assuming the independence of these institutions in quantitative 
studies is however highly criticized by scholars especially after the financial crisis, when 
auditors deliberately overlooked ‘red flags’ in reports of almost all ‘distressed’ banks (Sikka 
2015, 2). External auditors are also appointed and employed by the management of a 
corporation, so it is argued that the reputation amongst those who fill in the pay check is of 
more importance to an auditor than the moral duty towards the shareholders (Healy and Palepu 
2001; Ho and Wong 2001). The actual impact of the popular measurement category 
“independence” is therefore dubious. Reforms undertaken since 2008 are said to simply serve 
the purpose of reassuring investors, without bringing about fundamental change (ibid.). 
According to the accounting literature, however, these measures are quite fruitful. A review 
article by Bedard and Gendron (2010) suggests that a great number of studies find a positive 
association between a strong financial reporting system and the presence of an audit committee, 
frequent meetings and independent members. The desired effect of more investor confidence is 
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found to be reached directly by implementing stricter controls and the adoption of best 
practices, regardless of their actual effect on information quality (Bedard and Gendron 2010; 
Farber 2005). The authors however add that the studies on this topic are for a large part 
descriptive and relational, so they find what relations exist between particular factors, but there 
is a lack of exploratory studies that examine the how and the why (Bedard and Gendron 2010).  
3.3 The Front Stage: Conference Calls 
One of the most frequently used channels for both voluntary and mandatory disclosure are 
conference calls. Calls hosted by a company, around the time of the quarterly earnings release, 
have become a more widely used disclosure medium in the 2000s as opposed to the preceding 
decade of the 1990s (Frankel et al. 1999). The importance of this channel for analysts is 
disputed, as we will see below, but to management it appears to be a key event, as the CEO and 
often additional executive managers are present on every call (Rocci and Raimundo 2018). The 
CEO faces the audience in person and answers their questions, which provides credibility and 
demonstrates a high level of commitment to direct communication with external interest parties 
(ibid.). The conference call is usually organised in the following manner: first a short 
presentation takes place, which consists of four ‘discourse moves’: An introduction, the 
financial overview, financial details, and wrap up (Crawford Camiciottoli 2010). Apart from 
the Safe Harbour disclaimer, the presentation takes place in a rather informal conversational 
style, with use of first names and colloquial terms (ibid.). The investor relations literature, 
however, shows that these presentations are heavily scripted and rehearsed with the IROs 
(Rocci and Raimundo 2018). The discussion follows the presentation, and even though 
responses are immediate and to a degree spontaneous, potential questions and strategic answers 
are typically rehearsed beforehand (ibid.) The announcement of a conference call and the 
execution of it follows the following timeline (taken from Rocci and Raimundo 2018): a public, 
written announcement is made with the date, time and connection details. The distribution is 
made through newswire services and the firm homepage. Then conference calls with regulators 
follow; these are private. The Investor relations officers then compile handbooks for the 
executives in order to offer guidance during the presentation and the Q & A. Preceding the 
conference calls, an earnings press release is published to the wider public in a format for 
financial journalist to reuse. The presentation slides are also published before the call goes 
ahead. After the conference call, a more detailed report is published a few days afterwards.  
Nowadays, conference calls are often open and easily accessible through the company’s 
website. This has not always been the case – regulation changes in the early 2000s made it 
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illegal for firms to disclose value relevant information to selected groups in the US, with the 
UK with the EU following (Bushee et al. 2004; EU Directive 2004). Managers could therefore 
deny access to competitors, particular analysts and the wider public prior to a law referred to as 
Reg FD. Beneficial for this project was the additional rule from 2003 by Sarbanes Oxley, 
according to which transcripts of calls had to be made available (Cheynel and Liu- Watts 2016). 
The new rules were highly controversial, as market participants feared that disclosure quality 
would decrease, or trades would be affected as less competent private investors would react to 
information they did not fully understand (Bushee et al. 2004). Studies conducted the years 
following this crucial change, however, show that a ‘fair disclosure’ did not result in less 
informative disclosures. Bushee et al. (2004) compared firms that held closed calls previous to 
the regulation change with those that held open calls both before and after it was required by 
law, in order to examine what effect the new regulation had on the corporate landscape. 
Expected effects were that managers would stop hosting conference calls or would share less 
valuable information. Yet, the results of the study suggested that the critics were wrong – the 
majority of firms with a previously closed-call disclosure policy changed it to an open call 
policy, without changing the timing or quality of information to complicate following the firm 
(Bushee et al. 2004). Furthermore, price volatility decreases, and small trades increases for 
firms who change their policy according to the new law, reflecting an increased 
knowledgeability in the market (Bushee et al. 2004). This increased knowledgeability not just 
amongst market participants in general, but specifically through financial analyst’s ability to 
correctly evaluate a firm’s performance by following regularly held conference calls. This has 
also been confirmed by further and more recent studies conducted after the regulatory change 
(Bowen et al. 2002; Brown et al. 2004; Frankel et al. 1999; Matsumoto 2011). Bowen, Davis 
and Matsumoto (2002) examined whether opening conference calls to all analysts would make 
a difference in the accuracy of their forecasts, or in other words, whether conference calls were 
a decisive source of information. This has been done with a sample of 3800 forms prior to the 
change of the law. It was found that access to conference calls leads to both decreased forecast 
error and forecast dispersion, leading to the assumptions that conference calls contain additional 
disclosure (ibid.). Furthermore, it was tested what type of financial analyst could make the most 
use of conference calls as a source of information, and it was found that both analysts from 
more prestigious brokerage firms and superior forecasting ability and analysts with lesser 
forecasting ability or prestigious affiliation made less forecasting errors, with the latter group 
being benefiting slightly more (ibid.). Bowen, Davis and Matsumo (2002) therefore claim that 
open conference calls would “level the playing field” (p. 287). Frankel, Johnson and Skinner 
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(1999) sampled over one thousand conference calls made during the financial year of 1995, 
also preceding the Reg FD law. Their study also tested whether conference calls provided 
information to market participants in the first place, and what the reasoning behind holding 
conference calls was for the management. It is assumed that investors are provided with 
additional value-relevant information throughout the call, as financial analysts would otherwise 
stop making the effort to participate in a conference call and simply refer to the press release 
instead – keeping in mind that conference calls were not necessarily recorded at the time. The 
first finding of the study is that firms that are larger, have a bigger analyst following and higher 
than average sales to growth rates and market-to-book ratios, tend to hold conference calls 
(ibid.). As second finding Frankel et al. (1999) can confirm their hypothesis that larger investors 
trade in real time based on information they receive during a conference call. 
In a more recent study, Matsumoto, Pronk and Roelofsen (2011) analyse a sample of 10,000 
conference call transcripts, including the Q & A. They argue that a conference call is more 
informative than a press release already due to its less restrictive format: A manager gives verbal 
cues, both during the presentation and throughout the discussion, and the analyst is able to 
actively influence the disclosure of information by pressing on issues when they are unsatisfied 
with a reply (ibid.). Studies that focus especially on such verbal cues as tone or silence have 
been discussed in Chapter 2.3: Disclosure and Discourse. It will also be shown in the analysis 
in Chapter 7, which particularly looks at the expression of scepticism in discussions during a 
conference call. Matsumoto et al. (2011) compared the length of a conference call and number 
of words exchanged with intra- day trading data and found that both the presentation and the 
discussion of a conference call contain relevant information that leads to increased trading, with 
the discussion section being the slightly more informative of the two. The study also compares 
the informativeness of the calls to firm performance and finds that management discloses more 
information when performance is poor (p. 1385), which is in accordance with studies on 
strategic disclosure of bad news (Lundholm and Van Winkle 2006; Hollander et al. 2010). 
Another important finding is that the disclosure of future-oriented and non-financial disclosures 
are typical for a conference call, which adds to the usually financial and backward-looking 
information of an earnings release (ibid.). This finding corresponds with the data that has been 
analysed for this thesis: When rejecting to answer a question that requested a concrete number, 
management still always provided at least non-financial forward-looking information 
(Hollander et al. 2010). Chapman and Green (2018) examined the role of analyst participation 
in conference calls and whether it has an effect on management’s voluntary disclosure. Their 
hypothesis is that two actions from the analyst - requesting guidance on information that has 
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not been shared yet or remaining silent on an issue – are met with two potential reactions by 
management: They could interpret a lack of questions as disinterest and disclose less on it, and 
they could offer more information on an issue that has been inquired about going forward 
(ibid.). They apply a textual analysis software that filters forward-looking words from Q & A 
sessions of almost 150.000 conference calls taken place in 2014, as well as the six most common 
types of guidance according to NIRI (p. 49), and the study confirmed their hypothesis. Overall 
the literature on conference calls as a disclosure medium shows that this medium is more than 
just a mere ritual. The market reacts to these interactions, and studies indicate that management 
uses the feedback from the analysts to optimise their disclosure policies. This setting is arguably 
where information asymmetry between management and analysts is played out, and other than 
the studies above that researched conference calls with large data sets and quantitative methods, 
this thesis aims to examine how both sides accomplish this in actual interactions.   
3.3.1 The internet and disclosures 
The web presence of corporations has probably attracted more attention since regulation 
policies have eliminated the practices of selective disclosure of price sensitive information 
(Zhao, Davis and Berry 2009), encouraging companies to use the internet as their primary tool 
for disclosure (Seaton Kelton and Yang 2008). Studies show that non-professional vs. 
institutional investors make different use of these webpages (Hodge et al. 2004; Seaton Kelton 
and Pennington 2012). Accounting research also deals with the impact of technological 
financial reporting choices on investor behaviour. In Seaton Kelton and Pennington’s (2012) 
study it was shown that the overall investment judgement was the same using paper-based or 
online-data, but online users had to make more effort due to a higher cognitive load. New 
search-facilitating technologies are however found to improve non-professional investors’ use 
of financial information, forecasting a better-informed participation in the financial market 
(Hodge et al. 2004). Research also indicates that certain features of a firm may foster a higher 
online activity: internet-based disclosure is more likely in large firms, when shareholder rights 
are weak, block ownership is smaller, a higher number of independent board members are 
present and audit committee members have a higher financial expertise (Seaton Kelton and 
Yang 2008). Company websites are also found to be used for crisis communication, making 
“ethical reputation management” a central function of company websites (Campbell and Beck 
2004). Highly profitable international firms like Procter and Gamble or Nestlé were found to 
respond to allegations on their websites, however with clear differences in quality and rate. The 
emergence of Web 2.0 in the past decade has also had an impact on investor relations, due to 
more channels which investors can use to gather and exchange information. Shareholders tend 
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to be less apathetic, and more active, for instance through rising trends of ‘i2i’ communication 
(investor to investor), sites like twitter, facebook, wikinvest or seeking alpha (Duhe 2018). 
Shareholder engagement is nowadays expected to be incorporated into governance structures 
in order to remain competitive, and as it also makes it more unlikely for activist investors to 
target a firm (Hoffman and Lutz 2015). This development is especially of interest for smaller 
investors, who have less access to firms. Studies show how, in terms of shares, insignificant 
investors did rally a higher number of fellow investors to push through an agenda (Duhe 2018).  
3.3.2 Conference calls and meetings in the webcast-format 
Corporations that decide to upload webcasts on their webpage usually do this at least for the 
annual results presentations. As the major part of the data will be about annual or interim results 
presentations, the following section will focus on the procedures of this form of disclosure. The 
full year figures of the annual accounts count as mandatory disclosure, and the minimum 
content and timing is determined by regulatory bodies. The annual accounts usually consist of 
a balance sheet, an income statement, auditor’s notes and management notes (Sutton 2004). The 
annual report is usually published before the financial figures, and it discusses and analyses the 
company’s performance of the past year (ibid.). The management reports can be divided in the 
chairman’s letter to shareholders, which sheds light on the major strategic decisions of the year, 
the review on operations, in which management presents sales and operation results on each of 
the company’s markets, the financial review and an outlook for the current year (ibid.). These 
commentaries are not just prepared and presented by management, they also at the same time 
assesses their performance in leading the company. It’s not only investors that follow the 
presentations, it’s also analysts, journalists and competitors. This is especially of importance 
for the annual results webcasts, as institutional investors reportedly follow these results as part 
of an initial screening for a potential investment (Holland 1997). The presentations are either 
given via the phone, or in front of a real audience, and for the question and answer sequence 
shareholders can either dial in to ask questions, or just raise their hand at the conference. The 
presentation in the webcast is based on both the annual accounts and reports, and it takes place 
after the respective documents have been released, and the questions are accordingly very 
sophisticated. Webcasts can therefore be seen as the middle way between mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure, as they are used as a platform to add qualitative information to regulated 
reports. Formats like this take on greater significance as the annual report itself is described as 
too complex, technical and too large and therefore not user-friendly (Holland 1997). 
Management therefore endeavours to provide qualitative information when releasing the 
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accounts, which is provided in written form and in presentations like in the annual results 
webcasts (ibid.). 
3.4. Contribution of this thesis to the literature 
As clarified already in Chapter 3.3, this study closely examines interactions that take place on 
the Front Stage. Studies within Accounting Communication show that not just cognitive 
processes, but also the ways in which results are communicated are important for a successful 
outcome. This thesis does not focus on how management present their results, but on how the 
analysts actively participate in this disclosure practice. Interactional practices by participants of 
conference calls reveal situated social norms and rules, or in other words show how analysts 
“do” disclosure. The above outlined studies mostly work with large data sets, and turn linguistic 
features, if included at all, into variables that can arguably reveal how informative public 
disclosures are, by showing the immediate reaction by the stock market. This thesis is therefore 
more closely linked to the still narrow Accounting Communication literature that applies 
qualitative methods from Social Sciences, including Applied Linguistics, to authentic 
interactions between insiders and external interest parties. Only one article was found so far 
that has a methodological approach which is close to Conversation Analysis, the method which 
will be applied in the empirical chapters of this thesis (see discussion of de Oliveira and 
Rodrigues Pereira 2018 in Chapter 2.3).  
The studies and findings regarding institutional restraints and conflicting interests according to 
agency theory, the symbolic nature of public interactions and the ambiguity concerning the 
importance of actively participating in a conference call have had an impact on the discussion 
of the thesis results. Firstly, it is fairly undisputed that management can have conflicting 
interests with external interest parties like investors or financial analysts. Financial analysts and 
investors are also not necessarily on the same side. Research uncovered a balancing act for 
analysts, as they cannot fulfil their theoretical role as “watchdogs”, because they are highly 
dependent on a direct link to management. A report that is more accurate but damaging for the 
firm they follow might offer the investor a more realistic picture on which they can make 
investment decisions but could at the same time put the analyst’s connections at risk. An 
uncritical report shortly before a crisis could however also damage the analyst’s reputation. The 
importance of maintaining a good relationship with management while still demonstrating 
knowledgeability and claiming analytical rigour heavily informed the interpretation of the data 
in this thesis. Furthermore, Goffman’s lens of Front Stage and Backstage interactions led the 
researcher to treat the questions as both information seeking but also as performative actions. 
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The literature shows that private communication can be more informative and less risky for 
analysts, which is why it is assumed that questions are at times of a more symbolic nature. This 
means that analysts might anticipate a rejection of their information request, but the 
participation alone seems to already achieve an institutional goal, namely the demonstration of 
a personal and cooperative link with management. This thesis will not elicit what topics are 
being discussed in this setting but look at how disclosure is being negotiated and accomplished 
publicly. An emphasis is laid on the financial analysts’ questions, as the body of literature on 
strategic communication efforts by management are much richer than those by the recipients of 
disclosed information. It will be shown how financial analysts present their institutional role 
publicly, how analysts are being critical but not sceptical, and how social solidarity is achieved 
through these interactions.  
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4. Conversation Analysis as a Research Approach 
This chapter discusses the chosen method for this project, Conversation Analysis (CA) in more 
detail. This method was chosen to examine discussions taking place during conference calls. 
Micro-analysis of detailed transcripts compiled by the researcher may offer insights into how 
financial analysts and management understand and enact their institutional roles in a public 
setting. As shown in Chapter 3, research examining the language use in financial reporting 
documents and settings is conducted within the fields of Finance, Accounting and Economics, 
and applies methods that dominate within these fields. Approaches that are primarily 
quantitative relate factors such as the length of discussions, the number of attributes or the 
occurrence of themes, to trade activity and company performance (Beattie 2014). Studies from 
the field of critical accounting bring in more qualitative methods, and conduct interviews with 
financial analysts to investigate whether actively participating in a conference call is a ritual, or 
if it serves as a platform where important issues are preferably discussed (Brown et al. 2015). 
As the literature review in Chapter 2 shows, the results are mixed. The present study aims to 
add to this body of research, albeit, with an entirely different approach. By using a much smaller 
data set, the researcher explores what participants actually do in these public discussions. With 
a special focus on the financial analyst, it is examined how participants present themselves and 
represent their professional roles when engaging in the Q & A – what mood is created, how 
they relate to a wider community of practice, how they legitimise their participation and 
questions, and how socially risky actions are handled. CA offers insights into how participants 
produce and manage their roles in relation to the immediate context through an examination of 
how they engage in talk-in-interaction.  
Conversation Analysis is by some understood as a method that operates based on a number of 
specific ontological and epistemological assumptions, a 'research policy' (ten Have 2007, 6), or 
as a social theory in itself (Heritage 2008). In this chapter, the intellectual heritage of this 
approach will be outlined.  In Chapter 4.1, Symbolic Interactionism and Goffman’s work on 
social interactions are discussed, and in Chapter 4.2. the approach of Ethnomethodology (EM) 
is introduced. Apart from Goffman’s impact on interaction research, concepts from his Theory 
of Dramaturgy (1959) have also become very relevant in the field of Financial Communication, 
which will be discussed in this chapter. Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis share 
the aim to study structures in society from the members’ perspective and in an authentic context 
(Maynard and Clayman 2003). What distinguishes EM/CA from Symbolic Interactionism is 
that “action and sequence and intelligibility” are pursued empirically (ibid., p. 174), discussed 
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in more detail below. In Chapter 4.3, the development of Conversation Analysis by Harvey 
Sacks, Emmanuel Schegloff and Gail Jefferson (1968, 1986, 1992) will be explained, detailing 
relevant settings and concepts that have been studied with this approach.  
 
4.1 Social Interaction as a form of social organisation in its own right 
The origin of methodologies such as Conversation Analysis in Sociology lie in symbolic 
interactionism, which developed as a response to dominant functionalist approaches (Carter and 
Fuller 2015). In structural functionalist research, it is assumed that an individual’s actions are 
the result of macro-level institutions, the latter being the analytical focus of the field. Parsons’ 
action theory is amongst the most influential positivistic works that examine order in society 
and social actions (Fine and Manning 2003). In contrast with this, symbolic interactionism 
understands the link between the individual and society from a “bottom up” perspective and 
focuses on interactions between individuals (Carter and Fuller 2015). What is examined is how 
individuals make sense of and create social structures, which is seen as the bedrock of society 
(ibid.).  
The Chicago School under Herbert Blumer laid the groundwork for symbolic interactionism, 
where “social institutions exist only as individuals interact; society is not a structure but rather 
a continuing process where agency and indeterminateness of action is emphasised” (ibid). 
Amongst the many famous graduates of the sociology department at the University of Chicago 
is Erving Goffman. Goffman argued that interactions constituted other social institutions, like 
the family or religion, and that it can and should be researched systematically. In particular his 
work on interaction order and syntax shaped what later became Conversation Analysis, as he 
dismissed the notions of talk being chaotic as promoted by Chomsky or Parsons and that the 
course of an interaction was entirely up to the speaker’s and hearer’s personalities (Heritage 
and Clayman 2010). He argued that participants oriented to an underlying social order when 
interacting with each other, and depending on the context, different “ceremonial rules” were at 
play and shaped participants' expectations concerning which behaviour is appropriate and 
which is not (Hviid Jacobsen 2017, 205). He also criticised the conceptualisation of participants 
of an interaction – the speaker and the hearer respectively. In his work on ‘footing’ (Bolden 
2013) he notes that the roles of the speaker and the hearer are more complex than was assumed 
then. Especially the notion that all participants’ roles are subject to change, where the influence 
of differing responsibilities and rights to speak has become one of the core principles in 
conversation analytic studies of social institutions (Heritage and Clayman 2010). Goffman 
supported the idea that the speaker – hearer dyad was an inappropriate and simplistic label, and 
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in his participation framework he called for an inclusion of subordinate forms of talk besides 
“principal” conversations, meaning that relationships and positioning of all speakers should be 
included in analysis (Goodwin 1999, 177). However, Goffman treated the hearer and the 
speaker as analytically separate units, and in his focus of the speaker producing talk and thereby 
taking on different tasks and roles like the animator, author or principal, he disregarded the 
hearer’s actions to co-construct the talk and action (Bolden 2013). For CA, participants of an 
interaction cannot be isolated from one another for analysis – central concepts as sequential 
pairs, turn-taking or repair, are based on the assumption that talk is the process of participants 
co-constructing meaning.  
Goffman’s preferred approach to what he understood as “the micro-domain of social life” was 
to be an “observant participant, rather than a participant observer” (Goffman 1953, p. 2). He 
conducted ethnographic studies in multiple settings throughout his career and was interested in 
mundane face-to-face encounters as well as staged and institutional interactions. For his PhD 
thesis, he investigated the social structures on the Shetland Island community of Unst (1953), 
and only a few years later he published the highly praised book “Asylums” (1961), based on 
his one-year employment at the St. Elizabeth’s psychiatric hospital. His examinations of the 
social situation of mental health patients became highly influential for health policy decisions 
(Weinstein 1982). One of the most relevant concepts for Financial Communication is the 
“dramaturgical metaphor” he developed in his work “The Presentation of Self In Everyday 
Life” (1959). Dramaturgy, due to its rising popularity in said field (Svetlova 2012; Giorgi and 
Weber 2015, Nyquist 2015), has influenced the researcher’s approach to her own data set. 
Goffman hereby refers to individuals as performers, who for diverse motives put on an act when 
presenting themselves to other observers (Goffman 1959). He differentiates between a social 
front or Front Stage, which includes the appearance and the setting, and a back stage, which is 
not accessible to observers (ibid.). Crucial to this dramatic realization on the Front Stage is how 
the individual expresses their role in interaction. Performers' attempts to control or manipulate 
how the audience receives their stage presence have been analysed with Goffman’s concept of 
‘impression management’. Goffman argues that individuals always engage in Impression 
Management, both in mundane and professional contexts, and the enactment of their situational 
roles becomes observable through non-verbal and verbal communication (Jacobsen 2017). 
Impression management, which includes both conscious and subconscious efforts to manipulate 
the perception of the self towards others in social interactions, can be verbal or non-verbal 
(Hooghiemstra 2000). In Financial Communication, Impression Management as strategic 
behaviour becomes especially relevant when examining how the management of a corporation 
43 
 
present themselves and the company performance to external interest parties, such as financial 
analysts, institutional and private investors, or the media. This can be done in face-to-face 
meetings, conference calls, or in written discourse, like in CSR reports or chairman letters 
(Brennan and Merkl-Davies 2013). 
Another concept that Goffman coined and that will be touched upon in the analysis chapters are 
‘face’ or ‘face-work’. According to Goffman, one’s face image needs to be in accordance with 
judgements by others (Haugh and Bargiela – Chiappini 2010), and an individual undertakes 
face-work in interaction in accordance with what is deemed appropriate by the social circle they 
associate themselves with (Goffman 1967). Face-saving activities are what members 
understand as social-skill or tact and can be directed at others but also in favour of the speaker 
(Goffman 1967). Then, one can commit face threatening acts, either out of clumsiness, be 
unplanned, or deliberate, with respective consequences for the social relationship between the 
participants (ibidem).  
Later in this chapter, in Chapter 4.3.4, we will discuss how the concept of face is used within 
the field of CA. Beforehand we move on to Conversation Analysis as a methodology, another 
social interactionist who had a major influence on the emergence of the approach will be 
reviewed: Harold Garfinkel. 
 
4.2 Ethnomethodology: Rethinking social order 
 
 
‘‘I’m the father of ethnomethodology?’’ . . . ‘‘Yes, and 
everybody knows the ethnomethodologists are a bunch 
of bastards. But nobody knows whose bastards they 
are.’’  
(Garfinkel 2007a:13, taken from M. Lynch 2015, 604) 
 
 
Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis share a close but ambiguous relationship. EM 
as a scientific approach and as an alternative to dominant research traditions within sociology 
at the time, was developed by Harold Garfinkel. CA is understood by some as a way to practice 
EM, as Sacks and Schegloff were undeniably influenced by Garfinkel’s studies when they 
developed CA (ten Have 2013). Others understand the first step of CA as the 
‘ethnomethodological’ step, which is the analysis of a single case, and the second step if the 
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formulation of rules or patterns, which is not compatible with EM (ibid.). Therefore, the brief 
history of EM, its principles and practice, will be outlined below, before moving on to CA.  
The cornerstones of Ethnomethodology were laid by Garfinkel’s works as far back as the 1940s, 
and culminating in his publication “Studies in Ethnomethodology” of 1967 (Rawls 2008a). EM 
is a radical challenge to common research practice in sociology, as promoted for instance by 
Garfinkel’s very own mentor, Talcott Parsons (Rawls 2008; Whittle 2018). Garfinkel criticized 
both how researchers following “Parsons’ Plenum” assume social order was established, and 
how they go on to investigate it (Garfinkel 1988). Functionalism as taught by Parsons assumes 
that social order is a result of the individuals’ effort to comply with dominant social norms. The 
behaviour that two individuals display during a conversation would therefore be viewed as 
underlying rules that are imposed from the outside. For example, a greeting could be more 
formal because two individuals represent an institution that requires it, or, in a more mundane 
situation, two individuals might feel obliged to use a formal, more polite greeting, because a 
common friend or family-member introduces them to someone new and they’d like to make a 
good impression on them. In EM’s ‘mother discipline’ sociology, methodologies that offer 
representativeness, validity and reliability, like interviews or surveys, are the preferred method 
to investigate what goals and behaviour are socially acceptable or what could be restraining to 
an individual in a cultural or social group (Ten Have 2004). Garfinkel rejects a notion of a fixed 
and imposed set of rules that people simply follow and argues that members of society produce 
these rules ‘from within’ (Hester and Francis 2004, 20). He furthermore argues that a central 
question is not answered in this construct: How do individuals recognize what the socially 
acceptable behaviour is? An interaction would therefore have an order on its own, not imposed 
entirely by the context it is situated in, but by its members. Garfinkel breaks with functionalism 
by changing the research aim in a slight but critical way: Social structures are the 
accomplishment of members of society, and the methods they use to do so should be observed 
and studied. EM assumes that meaningful orderliness has its origin in ongoing efforts by 
members of society and are not given and simply reacted to. Garfinkel hereby also renounces 
the notion of rules that are established and followed, as they are “themselves oversimplified 
conceptualisations of the constitutive features of social practices” (Rawls 2008, 123).  
EM does not just offer an alternative angle to social theory, but also promotes a different 
approach to field work. Without being set on a single methodology, researchers should not have 
their mind already set on what they expect the data to look like(Rawls 2008). This would create 
an “analytic universe to replace the real one” (Rawls 2008, 130). The idea of ‘unmotivated 
looking’, which supports an inductive and bottom-up approach to data, is also a perspective that 
45 
 
Conversation Analysts share with Ethnomethodologists. This will be touched upon in Chapter 
4.3. EM strives to study members’ concrete practices as they happen, in order to understand the 
very object that conventional social theory has been examining all along. In order to do so, 
Hester and Francis (2004) suggest three methodological steps: Notice something that is 
observably-the-case about some talk, activity or setting; pose the question How is it that this 
observable feature has been produced such that it is recognisable for what it is?; and consider, 
analyse and describe the methods used in the production and recognition of the observable 
feature (p. 26). Additionally, Hester and Francis (ibid.) highlight the necessity of “acquired 
immersion” by the researcher. This means that EM requires the outsider to become an insider, 
and to see members’ methods from the perspective of a member. Garfinkel’s objective here is 
to understand how said methods are produced and re-produced locally, without making 
generalisations based on the findings (Ten Have 2013). Some streams of CA however assume 
that underlying rules of interactions can be applied to a wider range of interactions and settings, 
which is criticised by researchers in the field of EM (ibid.). This for instance applies to CA 
within workplace settings, which this study also contributes to. 
 
4.2.1 A few concepts central to EM 
In order to understand how Ethnomethodologists make sense of their data, a few of the main 
tools that enable researchers to look through Garfinkel’s lens should first be explained. The said 
label already comprises three ideas: “Ethno” stands for members of a social or cultural group, 
“method” refers to things people do or say in order to create and recreate social practices that 
establish, reinforce or transgress with social order. “Ology” is the same suffix as we know it 
from “sociology” or other sciences, pointing to “the study of” member’s methods (Rawls 
2008a). In order to study these methods, they have to be observable to members as they happen, 
and thereby also to a researcher. Garfinkel calls this ‘account-ability’ (Garfinkel 1967). Unlike 
the everyday use of the word, in EM accountability does not refer to holding someone 
responsible for an action, but that actions are available to members, meaning that they have an 
account of them (ibid.). Ethnomethodologists observe how shared meaning informs and is 
thereby reflected in the production and recognition of actions (Heritage and Clayman 2010). 
Garfinkel famously used breaching experiments when teaching principles of 
Ethnomethodology, which is still often mistaken for a research practice in the field (Rawls 
2008). Breaching experiments are small-scale experimental procedures in which participants’ 
sense-making of everyday processes is challenged (Heritage and Clayman 2010). “Seen but 
unnoticed” assumptions are contradicted, and when attempts to make sense of such breaches 
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with the assumed norm fail, participants are usually left frustrated (Ten Have 2004, p.47). For 
example, Garfinkel invited students to play noughts and crosses, and asked them to take the 
first turn. An experimenter then would erase the mark the student had made, and place it 
somewhere else in their turn (Heritage and Clayman 2010). This demonstrates that rules are not 
just showing the players the aim of the game, which is how to win it, but are constitutive (ibid.). 
Participants rely on other participants to apply common sense methods, and they orient to an 
underlying order, and this way this order becomes observable. This is referred to in EM as the 
“documentary method of interpretation” (Ten Have 2004). When playing tic tac toe, taking 
turns in making marks without moving or erasing the other ones are normative expectations, 
and the constant achievements by members that make the game work are shared methods 
(Rawls 2008). 
Deviating from such a norm can lead to social sanctions. This becomes clear when we think 
about our own everyday life: When we face a new and unfamiliar situation, we observe what 
others are doing in order to make sense of the situation, before we attempt to adapt. If we fail 
to do so, this can lead to frustration of others, or embarrassment on our side. Examples of this 
would be skipping or standing at the wrong side of a queue, choosing the wrong phrase when 
speaking to a native speaker in a different language, arriving at an event being over- or 
underdressed, etc. An individual can only maintain a status as a competent member of a group 
if he or she constantly achieves mutual intelligibility with other members. In this thesis, the 
empirical chapters also aim to show what makes an individual a competent financial analyst 
during a Q & A discussion. Ethnomethodologists aim to understand how members achieve such 
a mutual understanding, and crucial for the study of this in interactions is the role of context. 
The context of a conversation makes the meaning of an utterance transparent (Francis and 
Hester 2004). Transparency does not mean that misunderstandings are avoided, but interactants 
would understand the same sentence very differently depending on the relationship they have 
to the person who said it, the time and place where the exchange took place or what social roles 
interactants represent at that moment in time. EM suggests that in most cases, 'occasioned' 
interpretation processes are not chaotic, but rather unproblematic (ibid.). Researchers show how 
this is accomplished in interaction by applying the concepts of 'indexicality' and 'reflexivity'. 
Through the moment-by-moment progression of an interaction, members display how they 
understand each other's actions, and make it thereby observable. Actions are 'indexical', in the 
sense that they are based on previous actions and thereby demonstrate how the speaker made 
sense of "anything sequentially previous" (Mortensen and Wagner 2013). Actions are 'reflexive' 
as the context does not just influence what is being said, but any new action offers new ways 
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of understanding and thereby re-shapes the context (ibid.). This dynamic notion of context is 
shared by both EM and CA.  
 
4.3 Talk-in-Interaction 
Conversation Analysis, or CA, has been developed by Emanuel Schegloff, Harvey Sacks and 
Gail Jefferson in the 1960s. Heritage and Clayman sum up the impact the new perspectives on 
interaction research the following way: 
 
"From Goffman, they took the notion that talk-in-interaction is a fundamental social 
domain that can be studied as an institutional entity in its own right. From Garfinkel 
came the notion that shared methods of reasoning are implicated in the production 
and recognition of contributions to interaction, and in these contributions advance 
the situation of interaction in an incremental, step-by-step fashion." 
       (Clayman and Heritage 2002, 12) 
 
The hypothesis was that even mundane interactions were bound to an inherent structure, and 
they started to analyse it systematically with recordings of naturally-occurring data (Hutchby 
and Wooffitt 2008). Sacks' early work in which the principles of CA were established was on 
telephone calls to a suicide prevention centre. The centre was finding it problematic to get the 
callers to share their identities with the call-takers, and when Sacks examined transcripts of 
such calls, he was especially interested in the following excerpt and asked the question "‘where, 
in the course of the conversation could you tell that somebody would not give their name" 
(Sacks 1992; vol. 1, p. 3): 
Sacks wondered what the caller was actually doing in line 2. The call-taker answers the call 
with an introduction, by giving his name in line 1. In order to complete the call opening, one 
might expect that the caller also gives their name. The caller avoids this without directly 
refusing to share this personal detail by claiming that he did not understand Person A. Person 
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A repeats his name, and Person B again achieves remaining anonymous by repeating the name 
of Person A. So, the social action of introducing each other in a call opening was amended by 
the caller, as he instead reported a communication problem, and the call-taker reacts to it as 
such. Due to the early works by Sacks, Conversation Analysts assume that social actions like a 
call opening have an underlying order that participants orient to. A basic unit of a ’sequentially 
organised’ social action is referred to as ‘adjacency pairs’ (Stivers 2012). The concept of 
adjacency pairs encapsulates the notion that utterances depend on what has been said before 
and also on what might come next. Speakers are expected to provide a ‘type-fitted response’ to 
what has been said before at the earliest opportunity: an initial greeting would be responded to 
with a greeting, or a request for an action would be followed with a denial or a granting (ibid.). 
The relationship between the first-pair part action and the second-pair part action is normative, 
but not every first-pair part action makes a response conditionally relevant (ibid.). Canonical 
actions like greetings make a response necessary, and not providing the expected second part 
to the action might lead to explicit or implicit social sanctions. Other less canonical actions only 
invite a response. The finding that the action a speaker performs is highly dependent on the 
sequential position of the utterance was a breakthrough that eventually lead to Conversation 
Analysis being a discipline in its own right. According to CA, both institutional and mundane 
interactions all are inherently orderly and can therefore be subject to "rigorous analysis", 
regardless of the setting and its formality (Schegloff 1968, 1075).  
Another fundamental concept within CA which reflects the assumption of an underlying 
structure of talk is turn-taking. Participants of a conversation take turns at talk, and each turn is 
designed to accomplish an action. The management of speaking rights, or who gets to talk next 
is commonplace in every interaction, and research shows that generally participants achieve 
smooth transitions between speakers (Ford 2013). Participants generally have a high 
proficiency in managing that only one person speaks at a time, pauses as short as 0.1 seconds 
and overlaps become noticeable and have consequences for the interaction (ibid.). Turn-taking 
in mundane interactions is assumed to be organised by speakers on a turn-by-turn basis, whereas 
institutional interactions tend to be ‘prescripted’, as participants are expected to adhere to more 
fixed rules concerning turn allocation (Heritage 2005). This does not apply to all types of 
institutional interactions to the same degree: A business meeting between colleagues of the 
same rank can for instance take on a relaxed and informal structure, whereas resisting the very 
fixed rules concerning speaker selection leads to immediate sanctions in a courtroom or a 
classroom. Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson argued that within an interaction, TCUs ("turn 
construction units"), are a reoccurring structure that participants orient to in every interaction 
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(Ford 2013). TCUs can consist of a variety of linguistic resources: besides lexis, timing, 
laughter, aspiration, gestures, and many more (Drew 2013).  
Speakers may self-select or select other speakers at so-called TRPs ("transition-relevance 
places") (ibid.). CA assumes that every interaction can be broken down into such units, and 
participants act according to said principles of order when managing speaking rights, topic 
transitions and when repairing others' utterances, or their own. The following transcript taken 
from Schegloff's study on telephone openings illustrates this quite clearly: 
 
The context of the interaction is that the two participants are friends and are having a private 
conversation (Schegloff 1986). After answering the phone in line 2, the adjacency pair in line 
3 and 4 shows a mutual greeting, and the intonation in line 4 shows that Nancy recognises Hyla. 
Familiarity of the two is reflected in the omission of names in sequence. In the lines 5 - 8 both 
briefly engage in small talk, and after a brief pause Nancy introduces the first substantive 
question (Wooffitt 2005). These actions were found not to be specific to this particular phone 
call, but they are the norm, a pattern, that participants choose to reproduce.  
CA assumes that the social context of an interaction cannot be treated as an external condition 
which participants simply adapt to. Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis both reject 
a “bucket theory” of context which treats circumstances of a conversation as pre-existing and 
determining to the interaction itself (Goodwin and Heritage 1990). Instead, Clayman and 
Heritage (2010) compare the relationship between talk and its context to the Beatles’ “Yellow 
Submarine” movie, in which in one scene the road materialises as they walk along – their 
actions create the context (p. 21). Like Ethnomethodology, CA assumes a reflexive relationship 
between social actions and their context. “Context is the project and product of the participants’ 
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own actions”, and participants’ awareness of the role of the immediate context to their actions 
become observable as they maintain, resist or reinforce it (Clayman and Heritage 2010, p. 22).  
For CA it is crucial that the analysis of sequences in talk is not theory-driven, but strictly emic. 
The term emic was coined by Kenneth Pike (1954). Emic is the suffix of the word phonemic, 
which stands for an implicit system of contrasting sounds in structural linguistics. Pike intended 
to use the contrast between emic and etic, as in phonetic, for studying social behaviour. CA 
uses the term “emic” to refer to the basic assumption of the discipline that every interaction is 
treated as unique and setting-specific, meaning that underlying norms are reproduced, but the 
conversation itself will not happen again. The perspective of the participants in an interaction 
is analysed, without making guesses about what their internal motivations and agendas might 
be (Pike 1967). This minimises hypotheses of the researcher from the interpretation. In contrast, 
etic research aims to make universal claims concerning human behaviour, and links these to 
factors that are of importance to the researcher. Within CA however, only the context and 
content which is made relevant by the participants and therefore observable is regarded in the 
analysis (Mortensen and Wagner 2013). This is referred to as the-next-turn-proof-procedure in 
CA (Sidnell 2012). The participants’ perspective and interpretation of other interactants’ actions 
can be shown through the analysis of their next turn (Sidnell 2012). In this setting for instance, 
the researcher does not evaluate whether a response by management was valuable or 
informative just based on the content of the manager’s turn. It is instead about investigating 
how the financial analysts treat the response. If they thank the management, they accept it, and 
when they interrupt the management’s turn or follow up on the response, the financial analyst 
orients to the response as a dispreferred action. In this thesis, the next-turn-proof procedure 
cannot always be applied, due to the strict turn-design in the setting. In most cases, one elaborate 
question is followed by one elaborate response, and as the responses are often very formal and 
rehearsed, they might give only limited insight into how the participants interpret each other’s’ 
actions. Therefore, especially when patterns in question design by the financial analyst are 
examined, the response by management is not always included in the transcript excerpts.  
Another contribution to research that CA makes is that it looks at data of naturally occurring 
interactions, which per definition would also have taken place as it is recorded without the 
presence of a researcher who set it up, like in a laboratory. The examined sequences and also 
the analysis are not a product of the researcher’s agenda, and due to this less biased (ten Have 
2007). Another advantage is that it brings the researcher "closer to the phenomenon" by working 
directly with the recordings of interactions (ibid.). CA transcripts can be very fine-grained, 
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depending on the research interest. Interactional features which are performed subconsciously 
like pauses, intonation, stress and overlaps are included as they were found to serve social 
functions. Overlaps and pauses for instance play a central role in turn-taking. Overlaps can 
express strong affiliation and approval: 
1 Dia Jeff made an aspargus pie it was s: so [good 
2 Cla        [I love it 
      (taken from Ford 2013) 
Unusual long pauses however might signal upcoming disaffiliation. A typical example for this 
is when one rejects an invitation - we are in general much more hesitant when we have to give 
an answer the recipient disprefers (Ford 2013). Already silence of only half a second length is 
noticeable enough to express disaffiliation.  
4.3.1 Institutional CA 
CA is not just a tool to understand the mechanics of an interaction, it also seeks to uncover what 
roles and identities participants of an interaction make relevant, and of course how they do this. 
The basic assumption here is that every participant has multiple identities, but not all are 
relevant in every interaction. Establishing what identity matters in talk is in CA referred to as 
‘procedural consequentiality’ (Heritage 2005, p. 110). Showing that a participants’ identity is 
consequential for the interaction and procedures the talk organises is simpler in institutional CA 
than in basic CA: When I talk to my dentist for instance, my identity as a patient is crucial, but 
unless I am not a dentist as well, my profession or other categories like my nationality and 
gender might not have in impact on my check-up. Institutional CA looks at how professional 
identities and whole institutions are constructed and reinforced through talk. This refers back 
to the property of reflexivity of context: The dentist and I also create the setting of a doctor's 
visit, by talking to each other accordingly. The first building block of the notion that "social 
institutions are talked into being" is therefore that the participants live up to their institutional 
identity (Heritage and Clayman 2010, 20). Three elements distinguish institutional CA from 
basic CA: participants orient to a specific goal related to their institutional identity, the format 
of the interaction is directly affected by constraints related to the institution the participants are 
part of, and participants orient to institution- specific procedures in their behaviour (Heritage 
2005, p. 106). The analysis of a conversation between the dentist and a patient becomes 
institutional when the goal of the interaction is for instance to determine the right treatment for 
an issue or determining what exactly the issue is. In the data set of this study, the goal of the 
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interaction is to reach an agreement over the extend of information disclosure, which can be 
challenging as the goals of management and financial analysts can be conflicting, or to solve 
misunderstandings and problems related to disclosed information, which is in the interest of 
both parties. Constraints in financial results Q&As are the limited amount of questions that can 
be asked, and the power of management to shut down a conversation if it continues for too long. 
Determining procedures and inferential frameworks have been part of the research questions of 
this thesis. They are often implicit, and only recognisable through participants’ behaviours, and 
departing from the context’s norms might lead to a breakdown of the interaction. Such 
procedures include strategies of framing a risky request in a manner that still receives an answer.  
The degree of formality of an institutional context can increase its constraints – one of the most 
formal contexts would for instance be a court. Research on interactions in courts shows how 
participants can utilise these strict formats for their own agendas (see Signell 2010, this 
chapter). The less formal a setting is, the more elements of mundane talk are embodied in it 
(Heritage and Clayman 2010). The following two examples from two-person call-opening 
sequences illustrate the differences between mundane talk and an institutional interaction: 
 
1   ((ring)) 
2 operator: midcity emergency? 
3 caller:  yes uh: I need a paramedic please 
04 operator: where to 
      (taken from Heritage, Clayman 2010) 
 
The fact that this call is made to an emergency centre shapes the opening sequence, as usual 
customs as greetings or introductions are left out. The caller gets to the point with the first thing 
he says. This is treated as normal by the operator and he immediately asks the follow-up 
question. In the next interaction this is a bit different. 
 
1   ((ring)) 
2 operator:  country dis:patch 
3   (0.4) 
4 caller:   hi 
5   (1.0)  
6 operator: hi (0.2) how are you 
7 caller:  .hh fine howya doin' 
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8 operator: fine. 
     (taken from Heritage, Clayman 2010) 
 
Here the operator opens the call by saying the company name, which marks this interaction as 
a professional call. After a short pause, the caller responds with “hi”, which usually occurs in 
private interactions. Another noticeably longer pause in line 5 shows that the informal second-
pair part to a formal first-pair part of the introduction adjacency pair do not fit or are unexpected 
to the operator. Instead of continuing to treat this call as a professional interaction, the operator 
responds with an informal greeting. The interaction shows the transition from a professional to 
a mundane interaction within the same setting, and also shows the breach that changes the aim 
of the conversation (line 5). 
Normative structures in mundane interactions that are not confined to professional or 
specialised settings are slow to change whereas institutional norms can be subject to a faster 
pace of change (Heritage 2005.). What also differs between basic CA and institutional CA is 
that the latter is usually driven by the following main questions (Heritage 2005, p. 109):  
 
1. What is institutional about institutional talk? 
2. What kids of institutional practices, ideologies and identities are being enacted in talk? 
3. How does the use of particular interactional practices matter for issues that are beyond 
talk? 
 
Like basic CA, the institutional context is not treated or given, but it is analysed how 
participants manage the interaction locally in order to make it institutional. Institutional CA 
seeks to uncover the ‘distinctiveness’ of interactional practices like sequential organisation, turn 
design or lexical choices. Every professional or institutional setting has its own specific set of 
practices, and the resistance or performance of these reveal ideologies, discrepancies in power 
and access to resources of participants. The small changes participants make to their actions in 
order to accommodate for differing needs and objectives show how they understand their role 
as part of the context they are in. Institutional CA also seeks to uncover how practices can be 
improved by examining why and when conversations break down (Schegloff 1968) or what 
practices are successful (Cora Garcia 2017), which can have an overall impact on the 
community of practice. Especially the Conversation Analytic Role-play Method (CARM) 
shows the impact that CA studies can have on professional communication: Practitioners from 
a wide range of workplace settings receive training based on authentic interactions from their 
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field (Stokoe 2014). Instead of working with hypothetical and simulated adaptations of 
encounters, participants analyse naturally occurring interactions together and evaluate what 
practices work and which do not, and why (ibid.).  
 
4.3.2 Question and answer sequences in institutional CA 
As of today, settings in finance have not been studied by Conversation Analysts. So instead of 
relating the findings of this thesis to research studies of the same institutional context, the 
researcher explored the academic literature of other relevant and comparable contexts in terms 
of sequence organisation. Conference calls have a strict turn-taking structure: The analyst asks 
a question, and the manager answers. If the answer is unsatisfactory, a follow up question is 
asked by the analyst, followed by another turn of a manager. A number of settings have similar 
adjacency pairs, and Conversation Analytic studies of such settings have enabled the researcher 
to gain a better understanding of the institutional roles of participants in her own study. These 
include the analysis of interactions in court rooms (Atkinson and Drew 1979; Sidnell 2010, 
Komter 2012), interactions between medical professionals and patients (Heinemann 2006), 
phone-in radio shows (Drew et al. 2012), and broadcasted interviews (Clayman and Heritage 
2002; Thornborrow and Montgomery 2010, (Antaki et al. 2000). The questioning of politicians 
by journalists is thus far the empirical setting closest to the analysis conference calls.  
Of the two activities in question and answer sequences, questioning has been understood as 
more powerful than answering, as the questioner is in the position to direct the conversation 
(Thornborrow and Montgomery 2010). Researchers have studied various types of questions, 
the situations they are used in and how the questions are designed to direct the answer. Within 
mediated interaction for example, it is suggested that two question types usually occur: Firstly, 
the presenter does the "inferentially elaborative probe", which is more a comment than a direct 
question, but the recipients treat it as a question and elaborate more on the topic (Thornborrow 
and Montgomery 2010). The second type, the "information-eliciting question", is a direct 
question (ibid.). Concerning the recipient, it was found that an expert in a talk show is asked 
both types of questions, whereas a layperson is only asked the second type, which mirrors their 
institutional roles (Fairclough 1995). For call-in radio shows it was found that callers have to 
do more explicit work to mark their role as the questioner: When they call to ask a question to 
a guest of a show, they usually frame their question ("my question is,...", "I was wondering") 
whereas established hosts do not have to do so (Thornborrow and Montgomery 2010, p. 293). 
Further reoccurring patterns were found and analysed, like assessment sequences. The function 
of high-grade assessments by the interviewer, such as "brilliant" or "terrific", were found to be 
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task-oriented rather than content-oriented (Antaki et al. 2000). These words were not used to 
evaluate what has been said, but to mark that a question has been fully answered, and that the 
next question will be asked. It is therefore more an organizational device, and "emphasizes the 
interviewer's institutional impersonality" (Antaki et al 2000). In fact, this use of assessment 
sequences has generally not occurred in large non-institutional settings.  
Another relevant aspect for the setting in this study is research concerning the differences in 
talk between face-to-face encounters and telephone interactions. The webcasts are partly from 
conference calls, so interactions happen solely over the phone, but meetings are also held with 
a real audience that asks questions. Paul Drew et al. (2012) compared the two types of 
interviews and found that the "more effortful listening" over the phone had an impact on the 
interactions: the telephone interviews were shorter, requests for clarification as well as checks 
on adequacy were more frequent, and vocalized acknowledgement checks as well as completed 
turns occurred less often. Heinemann looked at interrogative requests and found a different 
treatment of entitlement between positive and negative requests. Positive interrogative requests 
like ‘will you’ or ‘could you’ were usually additionally mitigated with phrases like ‘please’ and 
the entitlement of asking these questions is relatively low. It was legitimate for the recipient to 
negate the request (Heinemann 2006). Negative interrogatives painted a completely different 
picture as they were rarely mitigated. By both sides they were oriented to as something that 
should routinely be done, and therefore not resisted ("Can't you turn on the overhead light?") 
(Heinemann 2006).  
Of most use for this study are probably the insights from Clayman's and Heritage's study on 
"Questioning Presidents" (2002), as the setting is quite similar. They look at the questions asked 
to presidents over time (Eisenhower and Reagan, in a later study also Clinton) and as the 
journalists are only allowed to ask one question, the question design is of crucial importance. 
The findings of their study become relevant in the discussion of this thesis, as the comparison 
with Clayman’s and Heritage’s work helps the researcher to make sense of her own study. 
Therefore, the most relevant aspects of “Questioning Presidents” will be outlined below. The 
questioning journalists in Clayman and Heritage (2002) came from established news channels 
or newspapers, and were specialists in their field. Their task was to analyse received provided 
information in order to inform their clients, or readership, in depth about a particular issue 
concerning the American government, and their career depended on a direct link to their most 
important source, which is the government itself or government officials. Moreover, the 
questioning takes place in a public space. In terms of institutional roles, the journalists are 
expected to hold politicians accountable for their actions, in the name of their readership. Press 
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conferences demonstrate a transparency and cooperation with the law and the constitution. 
Heritage and Clayman (2002) are particularly interested in features of the journalists’ question 
design that demonstrate adversarialness, and they established the following categories for such 
activities: initiative, directness, assertiveness, and hostility. It is argued that the journalists have 
become more aggressive in their questioning over time, also by offering more elaborate 
question-prefaces, which do more than simply provide more background information for the 
actual question.  Additionally, a sharp increase in follow-up questions was seen as exercising 
more initiative, as usually only one turn is allocated to each speaker. A follow-up question is 
understood by the researchers as a decline to accept the answer of the President. When 
measuring directness, Clayman and Heritage looked at self-referencing frames in actual 
questions. Mitigations like “I just wondered” or “I would like to ask” arguably “mitigate the 
forcefulness” of the journalists’ requests, and frames like “can you” or “could you” emphasise 
contingencies that could have an impact on the president’s ability to give an answer (ibid.). 
They find that journalists tend to refrain from using these frames in comparison to earlier press 
conferences. Overall however, such frames were never the norm: Almost 80% of the questions 
directed at Eisenhower had none of these frames, and for Reagan this comes to over 90%. 
Assertiveness, the third category of the study, was expressed through what Clayman and 
Heritage refer to as a “preface tilt” (ibid.). Below, one of the examples discussed in their article 
is shown:  
 
 
The journalist’s negatively formulated question has a clear tilt, which makes it seem like he is 
sharing an assessment, not actually seeking information. This is also how the President at the 
time, Bill Clinton, treats this turn, by immediately taking a stance to what has been said. The 
last category, hostility, applies to questions with open criticism. The article sees an increase of 
such questions from 2% towards Eisenhower to almost 20% towards Ronald Reagan (ibid.). An 




Interestingly, this journalist chooses a contrast structure in the question preface, and then 
indicates in the actual question how he or she interprets this change in the president’s political 
agenda. In terms of directness, the findings go hand in hand with Trine Heinemann’s study on 
requests (2006): can you/ could you and will you/ would you, are labelled “other-referencing 
question frames” which leave a way out for the recipient, and thereby mitigate the request and 
are more indirect. Using a frame that draws the attention to the questioner and could I / I 
wondered if / I would like to ask if (“self-referencing question frames”) are almost used to ask 
for permission, and are therefore regarded as most indirect (ibid.. p. 760-61). Negative 
interrogatives are treated much differently, namely as a viewpoint which is to be disagreed with. 
The concepts of directness and politeness, as well as assertiveness and hostility are crucial for 
the analysis of the role of the financial analyst, and whether practitioners orient to a watchdog 
role or not. Such behaviour can also be revealing concerning the relationship between two 
parties, and in regard to what is expected of both sides in order to maintain it.  
Clayman (2001) also analysed the answers of this setting, and his study deals with the risk of 
being perceived as evasive. The positive dimension entails the structures of answers, which 
move beyond the parameter of the question (ibid.). The negative dimension deals with 
incomplete answers up to the extreme form of a sheer refusal to answer (ibid.).  
A bit further removed in terms of similarity of the setting, but also close due the central role of 
strategic questioning, are courtroom interactions. Like news interviews, interactions in 
courtrooms are also designed for a wider audience, which is expressed in a strict orientation to 
procedural correctness as well as consistent references to fairness and legality of the 
participants’ actions (Komter 2012). Drew and Atkinson (1979) also show how speakers 
structure their turns to ensure that complex argumentations are heard and followed, especially 
when a jury is present. The overall institutional aim of courtroom talk is to find out ‘what really 
happened’ by deciding which of the different accounts of the same event is most credible, 
meaning that interactants constantly handle blame in asymmetric institutional interactions 
(Komter 2012). Direct accusations towards the witness slowly build up through a series of 
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questions, through which the questioner declares what type of responses are ‘no answer’ or ‘no 
proper answer’ (ibid.). The multiple turns in courtroom interactions show when a witness 
assumes or anticipates blame in a question, attempting to deflect blame often before it is cast 
openly (Drew and Atkinson 1979). This fixed question and answer pattern does not allow for a 
witness to initiate talk, but they can only comment on, or agree with, the lawyer’s interpretation 
and depiction of events (Sidnell and Ehrlich 2008; Sidnell 2010). Witnesses can attempt to 
resist blame by withholding a type-conforming reply, while at the same time still producing a 
response that is an identifiable response the question (ibid.). Sidnell’s (2010) further study of 
courtroom interactions showed that witnesses understood interrogatives as ‘not questions’, 
which are less concerning with finding new information, but instead hold the recipient 
accountable for an action, based on the question design alone. As will be explained later in the 
thesis, a given setting handles blame very differently, and the fixed question and answer 
structure works in the favour of the people being questioned.  
Another institutional context in which questioning others is a central and accepted action are 
classroom interactions. The teacher makes information requests and selects a speaker who 
answers it. Usually, an information request consists of at least the following components when 
the information request is fulfilled: The first speaker makes the information request, the second 
speaker shares the information which the first speaker presumed he or she had, and the first 
speaker thanks the other for their help. In classrooms, this third or final turn of an interaction 
also often does something else: It evaluates the response of the second speaker. Mehan (1979) 
refers to such instances as ‘known information questions’. A response like “very good” or 
“correct” after informing a person about the time or a bus schedule, instead of an 
acknowledgement, would lead to confusion in mundane interaction. This makes this three-part 
sequential structure a marker for classroom interaction. This “instructional discourse” is 
specific to an institutional context, and linked to particular institutional roles, as the teacher and 
the student are unlikely to swap speaker roles. In the setting at hand, interactions also have a 
three-part sequential structure: The financial analysts make the request, management responds, 
and the financial analyst thanks management. In many instances, an evaluation also takes place, 
but other than the teacher in a classroom, the financial analyst does not orient to his 
knowledgeability as being superior. However, financial analysts can share what quality and 




4.3.3 Relevant concepts from the CA literature 
Besides Question and Answer sequences, further central concepts from the field of 
Conversation Analysis were relevant for the study of conference calls, and these will be outlined 
in the follow. For Chapter 6, the conceptualisation of identity, epistemics and entitlement were 
the basis of analysis. Chapter 7 examined affiliation and disaffiliation, alignment and 
disalignment with regards to the management of epistemic imbalances.  Lastly, Chapter 8 
analysed laughter and humour in institutional settings. As definitions of said concepts can be 
fairly broad, and, in some cases, even spike heated debates, a discussion of the researcher’s 
understanding on each of them can prevent misunderstandings. For terms like laughter we might 
have a common-sense understanding, but within CA, especially when analysis is not grounded 
in the researcher’s interpretation of events, a clear description of a multi-facetted phenomenon 
strengthens the analysis. Concerning epistemics, a debate between two camps has emerged 
throughout the past years, and even though the researcher does not aim to side with either, the 
aspects of epistemics that are relevant for the analysis, as well as the researcher’s understanding 
of them, will be discussed below.  
Identity in Talk 
As outlined in relation to institutional identities in Chapter 4.3.1, social identities in CA, as in 
other qualitative approaches to interaction research, are understood as dynamic, multiple and 
complex, chosen and ascribed, variable in strength and salience, and conveyed through verbal 
and non-verbal means in accordance with social identity theory (Tajfel 1981). However, due to 
CA's "Ethnomethodological spirit" (Antaki and Widdicombe 1998), it is only such identities 
that are made relevant by the speaker that are of interest for analysis. As outlined previously, 
internal processes are not included in CA, as there is no proof-procedure for cognitive 
processes. This way, it is ensured that identity claims stem in fact from the efforts of the 
participants, and not from the researcher. Antaki and Widdicombe (1998) listed five aspects 
that are central to the EM/CA literature when analysing the display and enactment of identities: 
an identity is a category with associated features, that the speaker, the addressed, or the spoken 
about participant is linked to or links himself/herself with, and that action is indexical or 
occasioned. Again, this identity needs to be made relevant in the interaction, and this needs to 
be visible in the way participants make use of conversational structures. An individual has 
multiple identities, but not all of them are relevant in every context. Lastly, actions linked to 
identity work must be consequential in the interaction. In this thesis, indexicality is of particular 
importance. Devices like pronouns carry a different meaning, depending on the setting. When 
a financial analyst uses the phrase "but I am telling you to do so" at the dinner table with the 
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family, his identity of being father is more relevant and the source of his authority in telling his 
children what to do. At work, particularly during conference calls, the pronoun use refers to his 
professional identity as a financial analyst, or in terms of disclosure to his role as an outsider. 
Chapter 6 explores this in more detail, particularly the change from first person singular to first 
person plural within the same turn, and what this change of reference implies.  
Additionally, a conversation analytic approach differs from other discussed methodologies 
applied within the field of accounting communication, where examined discussions between 
financial analysts and management are treated as "occasioned". This means that certain 
identities are salient at a particular point in time of the interaction, which can then change at 
any time, and also during the conversation itself (Wooffitt and Clark 1998). For the researcher 
to claim that participants take on specific discursive identities, he or she must demonstrate that 
the participants orient to that situated identity. Wooffitt and Clark (1998) use an example by 
Goodwin in their study on social identities in knowledge talk, which outlines how a speaker 
tells a story to a diverse audience with knowing and unknowing members. The speaker orients 
to his partner's knowing status by 'forgetting' a piece of information, so that the partner could 
get involved in the conversation by adding to the story. By doing this, the discursive identity of 
a knowing participant also demonstrates the social identity of being the speaker's partner. In 
this setting, the financial analysts expectably also orient to knowledge imbalance in their 
questions, when at the same time also demonstrating a high degree of competency and 
knowledgeability. This will play a role in Chapter 6.3, which explores how financial analysts 
claim knowledgeability while asking questions. This also brings us to the next relevant concept 
of this thesis' analysis: the management of epistemic asymmetries in interaction.  
Epistemics 
The study of the distribution and conveyance of knowledge, referred to as Epistemics, and the 
debate around how this should be studied, reflects internal tensions that the discipline of CA 
has only started to address in the past twenty years (Heinemann and Steensig 2016). At the heart 
of debates around this lies the intention to ensure that only demonstratable behaviours are 
studied, instead of the researchers’ interpretations (Heinmann and Steensig 2016). Heritage’s 
take on participants’ epistemic stance and status, and the impact of the cognitive relationship 
between participants on the development of the interaction have been criticized by 
Ethnomethodology scholars close to Garfinkel (Heritage 2012a; Heritage 2012b). One’s 
epistemic status refers to their ‘territory of knowledge’, and is a relational and relative 
condition, whereas one’s epistemic stance is how the speaker positions his knowledgeability 
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through talk (ibid.). According to Heritage, the epistemic status constitutes action formation 
(Heritage 2012a). Critics problematise that the epistemic status of participants is not grounded 
in a sequential analysis or the next-turn proof procedure (Lindwall et al. 2016), and that it is 
cognitivist, as external knowledge and assumptions inform the researcher’s take on the 
participants’ epistemic stance (Lynch and Wong 2018). Heritage himself strongly rejects that 
his approach is ‘cognitivist’ (2018). 
The thesis does not aim to contribute to the ongoing discussion within the EM/CA community 
around epistemics, but the analysis is informed by key concepts of knowledge in conversation, 
due to the relevance of information asymmetry in the setting. The notion of epistemic stance as 
a driver for social action is, however, adopted: It is assumed that interactants design a turn based 
on their assumptions on what they know in relation to what the addressee knows. Within CA, 
one of the first articles that was dedicated to efforts to elicit further information in interaction 
was Pomerantz' "Telling my side: 'Limited access' as a fishing device" (1980). In this article, 
she differentiates between type 1 and type 2 knowables: type 1 being those that one has the 
right or obligation to know, and type 2 are those that one has limited access to or is less 
accountable for. In interaction, participants can make explicit what knowledge type applies to 
them, and as a result display higher or lower entitlement to more information. In the literature, 
participants' orientations towards how knowledgeable they are and how knowledgeable they 
are expected to be are referred to as epistemic access, primacy and responsibility (Stivers, 
Mondada and Steensig 2011). In the same vein, participants make epistemic claims which form 
an epistemic stance (Stevanovic and Svennevig 2015). The study of epistemics in CA includes 
participants' methods to elicit or claim access, their orientation to their relative rights to tell, 
know or assess something (epistemic primacy), and the responsibility to know or share 
information (Stivers, Mondada and Steensig 2011). Relevant for the analysis of conference calls 
and the behaviour of financial analysts are studies on sequences in both professional and 
mundane interactions in which participants share evaluative assessments. The following three 




The participants Bea and Norma are talking about a third person, which Bea has known for 
years and Norma only met the previous night, during an event both Bea and Norma attended. 
This knowledge asymmetry concerning that third person is made clear in lines 2 and 3: Norma 
does what in CA is called "epistemic downgrading" her assessment, by using the verb "seems", 
whereas Bea confirms this with a declarative.   
 
Here Jenny phrases her evaluation as a tag question, instead of a declarative. This way, Vera 
does not simply confirm Jenny's assessment, but is oriented to as having the answer to a 
question and is thereby treated as the participant with knowledge authority over the matter 
discussed, which is in fact her family. These two examples are referred to as first position 
assessments. Such statements declare an epistemic stance, other than second position 
assessments, which are reactions or responses. For the data set in hand, the initial questions by 
financial analysts are first position assessments, whereas responses by management and follow-
up questions are second position assessments. This last excerpt from the article shows a 
conversation between Lesley and her mum. They speak about Lesley's daughter's teeth, 
information Lesley as her mother has more direct access to than her mother. Lesley, in her 




In line 3 as well as in line 9, Lesley's mum diagnoses her granddaughter's situation with a tag 
question, and Lesley responds with her own evaluation, and she upgrades her epistemic claim 
in line 11 by partially repeating the tag question and agreeing with it.  
The epistemic imbalance between the management of a corporation and a financial analyst is 
inherent to the community of practice - the managers being insiders, and the owners, journalists, 
analysts and everyone else being outsiders, or external interest parties. In all three empirical 
chapters examine how financial analysts manage the role of the outsider. They make an effort 
to demonstrate knowledgeability in first position assessments (see Chapter 6.3), challenge the 
legitimacy of a limited epistemic access and their ascribed epistemic status in second position 
assessments (see Chapter65.4), or use the legitimacy of the institutional epistemic imbalance as 
a resource to avoid confrontation and to demonstrate social solidarity.  
Alignment/ Disalignment, Affiliation / Disaffiliation 
As mentioned in the literature review, one of the central questions concerning conference call 
discussions is their purpose in the bigger disclosure game - some articles claim that being able 
to actively participate in these calls is beneficial for the analyst’s career (Mayew 2008), others 
say that the participation has next to no benefits, but mostly involves risks (Brown et al. 2015). 
By applying CA, this thesis cannot speculate on the motivations for participating in a Q & A, 
but it can shed light on how participants orient to each other and their institutional aims in this 
setting. The analysis in this thesis draws from CA literature that examines how certain question 
types and their degree of directness create disaffiliation or disalignment between participants. 
These terms are often used interchangeably, however, there is a crucial difference in definition: 
‘disaffiliation’ means breaking with the stance of the previous speaker, and disalignment breaks 
with the suggested structure of the interaction (Stivers 2008). In this context, for example, a 
financial analyst signals disalignment when he or she interrupts a lengthy answer from 
management with a comment or follow-up question. By giving an elaborate answer, the 
manager as a current speaker takes the floor until his turn is finished, and usually treats the 
answer as closing the interaction. The financial analyst would ‘align’ with the speaker by 
actively supporting the assigned speaking roles through tokens that signal listening to 
information, like nodding or sounds like ‘mhhmhh’, or by simply remaining silent. By 
interrupting, the financial analyst breaks with the structural asymmetry (Stivers 2008). This is 
noted in Chapter 6.4, where forms of disaffiliation are also discussed. As Steensig and Drew 
(2008) state – “asking a question is not an innocent thing to do”. The above discussion of 
epistemics showed that the way we formulate a question displays our assumptions concerning 
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how entitled we feel to an answer, how certain we feel that we will get an answer, and if we 
think the person we askor we ourselves know more about the issue we are asking about. 
Therefore, questions do not just seek more information, but also fulfil a wide range of other 
social actions, which can be disaffiliative, like complaining, disagreeing, doubting, challenging 
or reproaching (Drew and Steensig, 2008). 
In order to communicate disaffiliation or affiliation, the participants need to have a shared 
understanding of what the preferred and dispreferred second-pair part to an initial action is. In 
CA the turn design, lexical choices or sequence organisation that manage alternative, but non-
equivalent speaker choices are referred to as preference organisation (Pomerantz 1984). 
Preferred and dispreferred activities are managed differently: The former are performed 
directly, whereas the latter are delayed, softened and made indirect (ibid.). Softening, also 
commonly referred to as mitigation or downplaying strategies, as well as indirectness do not 
just occur in dispreferred responses, but also in requests which anticipate a dispreferred 
response (Caffi 1999). In general, individuals try to avoid producing an outright rejection 
(Pomerantz 1984). For example, if an acquaintance, colleague or friend asks if we are free for 
dinner, but we cannot or do not want to give the preferred response that we can join them, it is 
unlikely that we would just say “No”. We might apologise, give a reason, or evade and stall a 
response, in order to avoid embarrassment. At the same time, if we make an offer which we are 
not confident about, we might mitigate it as well, in order to put less pressure on the recipient 
or to pre-empt the embarrassment of a decline. Instead of asking “Would you want to go for 
dinner?” we would say “I know you’re very busy, but in case you are hungry too, I am going 
to grab some food later”. This includes potential contingencies by the speaker and downplays 
the social action of having food together. The analysis of such variations includes concepts like 
politeness and face, which will be outlined in the following. 
Face, Politeness & Entitlement 
The study of socially risky actions in institutional settings is intrinsically linked with politeness 
theory (Brown and Levinson 1978) and the concept of ‘face’ (Goffman, 1967). Face is not to 
be equated with the concept of identity; in the literature, face is treated as a relational concept 
(Spencer Oatey 2007; Locher and Watts 2005; Angouri and Locher 2012; Sifianou 2012). 
Brown and Levinson linked these concepts to universal politeness rules, like for instance, the 
“preference for agreement” (Sifianou 2012, p. 1555). The CA literature is particularly sceptical 
of the Brown and Levinson’s dominating conceptualisation of face-work, as it focusses on the 
mitigation of face-threatening acts (Locher and Watts 2005), leaving aside instances or even 
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settings in which coined face-threatening actions like disagreement could be welcome or 
expected (Angouri and Locher 2012). Disagreement does therefore not necessarily result in 
conflict or social sanctions but can be treated by participants as a resource for more intimacy or 
lead to more creativity (ibid.). In moving away from a black and white notion of what is polite 
and not polite, preferred or dispreferred, researchers have been calling for a return to Goffman’s 
initial take on face-work (Locher and Watts 2005). For CA and indeed for this study, neither of 
the two are appropriate, given that they are not entirely reconcilable within a social 
constructivist approach. Firstly, both approaches are etic – the analyst decides what pressures 
and norms from the social group affect the participant’s idea of his or her face (Haugh, Bargiela 
– Chiappini 2010). Secondly, both assume that communication is based on the transmission 
model, which assumes a linear channel between sender and receiver, instead of treating it as a 
collaborative effort (ibid.). Arundale (2010), amongst others, call for treating face as an 
interactional achievement, as a result of the relationship between participants which is co-
created discursively.  
Social norms like politeness are also expressed in information requests through the degree of 
directness. Often referenced in this regard is the categorisation of directives and requests by 
Ervin-Tripp (1976). Her study emphasises the complexity of their use, as one syntactic form 
cannot be ascribed to one social function. Participants are bound to misunderstand, but 
interestingly often do understand the speaker’s communicative intent and social ‘features’, as 
they share a mutual understanding at a certain point of an interaction (Ervin-Tripp 1976). The 
image below shows the six types Ervin-Tripp found after collecting data from multiple settings. 





The first category, need statements, were, for example, found between two individuals of 
clearly different ranks, when a superior addressed a subordinate, or between people with a close 
relationship, like family members. Ervin-Tripp also offers structural variants of these directive 
types, as for instance for imperatives: elliptical forms were preferred when the necessary or 
requested action was obvious to all participants, and if that was not the case, people added 
‘attention-getters’ like ‘here’ or ‘excuse me’, before formulating an imperative or raising the 
pitch, amongst others. Question directives offer the addressed person an escape route, as the 
speaker does not tell the recipient what to do but asks an information question instead. If a 
negative tag question is added, the speaker shows that he or she finds a non-compliance reply 
likely – which is different from, for instance, a need statement. Ervin- Tripp (1976) assumes, 
but does not test in her work, that leaving a maximum choice to the recipient might fulfil a 
social function. Curl and Drew (2008) developed this typology further, and order different 
request forms on a contingency and entitlement continuum. Regards to contingencies are 
present in requests, when the speaker makes a fulfilment dependent on factors outside of his or 
her control (Craven and Potter 2010). Such markers that include capacities or desires of the 
recipient are absent in directives (ibid.). Speakers do not necessarily make syntactic choices 
based on the social rank but depending on the contingencies that could prevent an answer. 
Speakers do distinguish between the use of “I wonder if” and “could you”: For both institutional 
as well as mundane interactions, participants tended to use “I wonder if” when they were unsure 
about contingencies that might prevent the granting of a request, for example, in cases where 
they were not familiar with a procedure or a schedule (Curl and Drew 2008). “Could you/would 
you” requests tend to be made when participants anticipated that the request would be fulfilled. 
The impact of entitlement on the phrasing of a request is also supported by research on 
emergency calls: In 100 calls, not a single person made use of “I wonder if” prefaces, but in 
non-emergency calls to the police they were the most common form of requests (Zimmerman 
1992). This thesis examines what participants display as the norm when committing socially 
risky actions like doubting, challenging or disagreeing. The use of self-referencing frames as 
well as other mitigation techniques, and the display of entitlement and contingencies, are central 
to the study of this data set. 
Non-seriousness in Institutional Settings 
This last section will discuss theoretical differences between humour, laughter, joking, teasing, 
sarcasm and gallows humour, and then proceed to discuss relevant social functions of laughter. 
Studies on humour within CA showed how laughter, jokes, sarcasm, gallows humour and 
teasing are joint accomplishments by participants (Morris 2015). In mundane interaction, we 
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often use humour, laughter and joking interchangeably, but for the sake of a detailed analysis, 
some differences between these concepts will be outlined here. The Oxford Dictionary (2010) 
defines humour as something that is comic or amusing. It can be intended or unintended; 
successful, meaning understood, or unsuccessful, meaning not recognised or misunderstood 
(Haugh 2016). Joking is one form a humorous statement, which often elicits laughter through 
breaching with an expected turn-organisation, adjacency pair or preference statement (Stokoe 
2008). Sarcasm can also elicit a response that marks the comment as amusing, by phrasing a 
negative message positively, or the other way around (Kunneman et al 2015). Teasing is the 
social action of provoking or criticising someone while claiming that a statement is not of a 
serious nature (Haugh 2016). When the speaker is the “butt of the humour”, humour becomes 
self- denigrating, or gallows humour (Schnurr and Chan 2011).  
So, how do we recognise that something is funny? In philosophy, three theories offer an 
explanation: The Superiority Theory, The Relief Theory and Incongruity Theory (Morreal 
1982). According to Superiority Theory, laughter expresses superiority over others, which 
limits the motivation and effect of laughter to scorn and aggression (ibid.). The Relief Theory 
focusses on the physiology of laughter and treats it as simply a release of energy (ibid.). The 
Incongruity Theory was refined by Schopenhauer and Kant and argues that we find things funny 
that do not fit into the orderly patterns that constitute our world (ibid.). According to Morreal, 
the latter might be the most comprehensive attempt to explain laughter in non-serious 
interactions, but still fails to address serious situations in which we chuckle, laugh or smile. For 
any form of humour to be successful, all participants must necessarily share knowledge and 
understanding of the context of the interaction. Laughter is always referring to something or 
someone as part of that context, and participants who do not know the referent will not 
understand the laughter (Glenn 2003). This property makes laughter indexical. Studies of social 
interaction have examined context in which both serious and non-serious laughter occurred and 
demonstrated further functions and reasons for laughter. 
Laughter is considered both pervasive and universal aspect of human communication, with a 
variety of functions that are being studied within the field of CA (Holt 2013). In almost any 
type of mundane and institutional interaction it can be observed, and it also observed to be 
occurring in every conference call in this data set. The researcher was interested in examining 
the forms and the social actions behind laughter further, as laughter can give meaningful 
insights into participants’ efforts to construct their institutional roles. This is especially 
interesting if one assumes that laughter is not necessarily planned, but can still be used 
strategically. Laughter comes in many different variations - as probably every individual has 
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experienced by himself or herself, laughter can be loud and involve the whole body, it can be 
just a chuckle or a smile, it can be shared, or not shared. Laughter or a laughable, which are 
statements, gestures or sounds with which the speaker invites laughter (Rees and Monrouxe, 
2010), can be a turn in its own right; it can accompany, precede or follow talk (Holt 2013). 
Interesting for this thesis are the social functions of laughter: In interaction, it can display 
affiliation and alignment, but also disaffiliation or disalignment, it can strengthen or challenge 
someone’s social status, and it can mitigate statements or create intimacy through signalling a 
shared understanding or shared knowledge. Laughter is also the most common marker of 
humour; however, the absence of laughter does not mean that a statement was not designed to 
be humorous, and laughter does also occur without a joke being told. Holt (2013) suggests 
seeing the link between humour and laughter as one of “siblings, who share a close, but 
complicated relationship”. In the following, studies that examined laughter and humour in 
delicate situations are discussed, as this is also the premise for the analysis conducted in Chapter 
8: Laughter in Conference Call Discussions.  
Studies conducted in medical settings provide most insights for the use of humour and laughter 
between professionals or between individuals representing institution and laypeople. Fatigante 
and Orletti (2013) examined laughter during delicate moments, as for instance when the patient 
expresses doubt concerning the doctor’s decision. A smile allows the patient to deliver the 
problem in a less hostile manner. Patients also initiate laughter to signal compliance with the 
practitioner (McCreaddie and Wiggins, 2009), or when talking about their own problematic 
health condition in order to make themselves seem less vulnerable (Beach and Prickett, 2017). 
In settings that are immensely stressful for the patient, like oncology interviews, patients seem 
to employ laughter and humour to both distance themselves from health threats as well as to 
“talk health and healing into being”, meaning they use it as a device to demonstrate that they 
are not just sick, but getting better (ibid.). In the discussed instances, practitioners usually did 
not join the laughter, which still created alignment, as they oriented towards the laughable as a 
problem that they were requested to solve. When laughter occurred between practitioners, the 
patient responded with a smile or by turning towards the two medics, maintaining engagement 
and avoiding exclusion. Other studies examined bedside teaching activities in hospitals and 
found that doctors would treat suggestions by students as laughables, resulting in teasing, which 
manifested their superior professional status (Rees and Monrouxe, 2010). Students either joined 
in with the laughter, aligning with the doctor, or refused to join in, resisting a clear inferior 
status. Overall, Holt (2013) sums up three roles for laughter in a medical setting: reframing 
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patient’s problems, inviting laughter at a problem the speaker refuses to treat as an issue, thus 
preventing a confrontation.  
The CA literature on laughter and affiliation or disaffiliation also explores other settings, like 
business meetings (Voege 2010), telephone conversations (Holt 2012), meetings (Warner- 
Garcia 2014, Raclaw and Ford 2017), and employment interviews (Glenn 2010).  Vöge (2010) 
shows how laughter is used differently in complaint sequences, depending on the seniority and 
hierarchical status. As laughter achieves implicitness, and especially when the complainant is 
of a lower status than the complainer, laughter is used to indicate problematic behaviour, 
whereas when both are on the same level, complaints are addressed explicitly, but problematic 
actions are treated as laughables. Warner – Garcia (2014) explores in her work what she refers 
to as the “strategic ambiguity of laughter”, and examines four functions of ‘coping laughter’, 
which refers to laughter in potentially face-threating situations, like disagreements. Warner- 
Garcia (ibid.) argues that such strategic use of laughter mitigates face-threats, conceals potential 
face-loss, reframes an interaction from serious to non-serious, and facilitates the change of 
topic. The goal of these four functions are very similar in nature: The effect of a face-threatening 
remark is softened, which can be achieved through laughter, either initiated by the speaker who 
made the remark, or by the recipient in their response (ibid.). Laughter has a social function in 
the sense that it is directed at the relationship between the participants, as it can de-escalate a 
situation, and at the same time it does not affect the stance that is expressed in a disagreement. 
Holt’s study of laughter as response to complaints shows a similar effect on examined 
interactions: In difficult social encounters laughter can serve as a resource to avoid taking a 
clear stance, as the interactant is not taking the other’s side, but also does not contest it. This 
means that the complaint is not developed further and allowing topic closure (ibid.). The 
ambiguity of laughter and humour provides a ‘safety valve’, where the speaker can address 




Chapter 5: Methodology 
The adoption of CA as the methodology for this study contributes a novel approach to the fields 
of Management Studies and Finance and Accounting, where more typical qualitative 
approaches involve qualitative content analysis or text analysis (Beattie 2014). The current 
chapter will introduce the reader to the data handling procedures particular to this methodology, 
while clarifying how the methods differ from others. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows: The chapter starts with a brief account of the timeline 
of the data collection, analysis and writing up of the thesis. As a second step, the data sampling 
is described in detail. This includes an outline of the companies included in the data, the size of 
the data set, and a list of participants. Thirdly, the CA approach to the use of recordings and 
transcripts is explained. In this section, the CA practice of building collections (outlined in 
Chapter 4) is contrasted with the typical qualitative social science research practice of coding. 
The format of the transcripts and the inclusion and exclusion of data characteristics will also be 
discussed. Lastly, the researcher will reflect on the difficulty of tailoring an interdisciplinary 
research study to audiences with a business or finance background, while remaining true to the 





The research for this thesis was planned, prepared, executed, and written up over the course of 
four years. A brief timeline below shows when the data was collected and analysed. An 
elaborate proposal for this project was submitted and approved in May 2015. The recording of 
the data commenced shortly afterwards. The analysis of the data and the writing up of the thesis 
overlapped, and fundamental changes in the organisation and approach to analysis from the first 
drafts led to an extended writing-up period.  
 
 





•Admission to doctoral programme: October 2014
•Acceptance of Research Design and Outline: December 2014
•Acceptance of Thesis Proposal: July 2015
Data 
collection
•Recording of financial results presentations and Q&As: June 2015 - April 2016
•Transcription of four conference calls without transcripts: August 2015 - June 2016
Data analysis
•Multiple rounds of collection building: June 2016 - December 2016
•Analysis of emerging patterns: August 2016 - August 2017
•Presentation of findings at conferences: March 2017, July 2017, July 2018
Writing Up
•First draft: February 2017 - July 2017
•Second and final draft: August 2017 - November 2018
Examination
•Thesis submission: November 2019
•Viva: March 2019
•Submission of corrections: October 2019
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5.2. The Data Sample 
In the following section, it is described how the data was chosen and accessed. The downsizing 
process from the initial data sample to the final sample will also be outlined. The final sample 
will be introduced with further details concerning the number of companies included, and the 
amount and size and format of the recordings. 
5.2.1 Access 
This project’s aim is to study interactions between investors and the management in 
corporations within the financial sector listed at the London Stock Exchange. These two parties 
are frequently in touch with each other throughout the financial year; analysts converse directly 
with the top management at roadshows, at events concerned with financial results presentations 
and strategic updates or during conference calls. They also regularly talk to representatives of 
the management, in one-on-one meetings or telephone calls with the investor relations 
department, which works closely together with management in compiling financial results 
reports. Most of these meetings and events have very restricted access regarding attendance, let 
alone allowing the making of recordings, and were therefore not suitable for data collection. 
Some companies do choose to make selected voluntary disclosure activities public on their 
homepages, but the readiness to publish reports or presentations from roadshows, etc. varies 
remarkably amongst corporations. 
I decided against collecting data from both voluntary and mandatory disclosures, as the formats, 
incentives for hosting these various events and the audiences attending them were not 
necessarily comparable. As discussed in Chapter 3, management can decide what, when and 
how to disclose selective voluntary information. Mandatory disclosures such as half year and 
annual results, by contrast, follow strict guidelines and regulations, and the format of the 
presentations remains constant over time and throughout the sector. Quarterly results 
presentations are part of fixed scheduled disclosures throughout the financial year. The internet 
is an ideal platform for these types of announcements, as investors all around the globe can 
attend or at least follow meetings online. As financial results of corporations are made available 
to the entire public, the presentations based on the reports and subsequent Q&As are often 
publicly available also. By focusing on these public interactions, the major obstacle of getting 




5.2.2 Webcasts as a disclosure medium 
The webcasts of financial results presentations are distributed via the homepages of the 
corporations. The term ‘webcast’ derives from the term ‘broadcast’, as contents are distributed, 
or broadcast, via the internet. Webcasts are initially accessible via a live stream, and a recording 
remains online for viewers to watch or listen to on demand. When listening to a conference call 
live, the audience can participate and call in throughout the Q&A. For meetings, questions are 
usually taken from the audience that is present at the venue, but questions can sometimes be 
sent via e-mail. In the following, it will be explained how webcasts are part of the online 
presence of corporations, as they are a vital medium for (potential) investors from around the 
globe to stay up to date with the firm (Seaton Kelton and Yang 2008).  
 
In order to access the financial results presentations, one has to locate the “investor relations” 
section of the company website. The current financial results report is usually advertised in the 
centre of that page and links to the document and related reports are provided there as well. In 
order to find a list of all available webcasts or audio recordings, one must locate a link to 
variations of “results and reports”, “financial information”, or “events and presentations”. The 
different names for the same service indicate the spectrum of recordings a company publishes 
on a platform that is easily accessible to investors and the public. Some of these focus on 
financial results only, while others also provide video recordings from events that fall into the 
category of voluntary disclosure. Image 1 shows the drop-down menu on the HSBC “events 
Image 5.1 Investor Relations Online 
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and presentations” page, which lists various data types that can be viewed and retrieved without 
creating an account with HSBC. The available options range from mandatory disclosure events 
such as the half year and third quarter results presentations to voluntary disclosures, such as 
roadshows. External interest parties can access various elements from the results presentation 
day: The presentation slides can be downloaded, formatted transcripts of the conference call 
can be read, and one can also listen to a recording of the actual call. Voluntary disclosures seem 
not to be represented with such a richness in media files – only either presentation slides or 
transcripts are made available, while recordings are not made public at all. For Schroders, it is 
only the results presentations which can be found in the “Results, Reports and Presentation” 
section. All of these disclosures are mandatory, and for all of them multiple data types are made 
available: The “data pack” for annual and half year results include presentation slides, the press 
release, a transcript of the results presentation and the subsequent Q&A, an online version of 
the actual written report, and a webcast recording. The data pack for the Q1 and Q3 interim 
management statements does not include any recordings or online versions of results reports.  
 
A company’s online representation of investor relations can be fairly different in nature: both 
voluntary and mandatory events that are relevant to external interest parties can be listed in the 
same public place online, or exclusively mandatory disclosures of the financial calendar year 
can be offered. This does not imply that one company is less transparent than the other, but that 
additional voluntary disclosure has restricted access.  
Image 5.1 HSBC Investor Relations 
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5.2.3 Initial sampling 
Initially, all corporations listed at the London Stock Exchange that were part of the FTSE100 
in 2015 and operate within the financial sector were considered. Corporations are legally 
required to publish financial data regularly and are therefore suitable for analysing strategic 
communication between external interest parties and managers. The companies in question had 
to be amongst the largest on the market, as it can be assumed that these interactions are managed 
at the highest professional standard, due to a wide public interest in the performance of the 
biggest corporations in the country. They also had to be from the same industry or sector, as 
consequently the same group of analysts would be participating in the calls or meetings and 
would question managers facing comparable challenges in the same market. There was a special 
interest in the financial sector, due to its dominant role in the British economy and the particular 
public scrutiny it has been facing since the financial crisis in 2008. Eligible companies were, 
however, not identified through databases that scholars of Finance and Accounting usually use, 
because the primary supervision team and the researcher were from other disciplines, and 
simply not familiar with or aware of these resources. Instead, the researcher used websites such 
as londonstockexchange.com in order to create a list of companies that offer financial services.  
As the methodology of this research project ideally required video- and, at the very least, audio-
recorded data, one of the main selection criteria was the online availability of video recordings 
of financial results presentations, or audio recordings of a conference call. The table on the next 
page shows all FTSE100 companies within the financial sector that made recordings of their 


























The 13 companies listed in the table above can be sorted into three groups, based on the sectors 
in which they are operating. The first group are the companies that are so-called high-street 
banks, which are large retail banks that have multiple branches across the UK. Besides the retail 
Corporation Sector 
Aberdeen Asset Management Investment Management  
Admiral Group plc Non-Life Insurance 
Aviva Group plc Life Insurance  
Barclays plc Banking 
Capita plc Business Process Management: also 
financial outsourcing services   
HSBC holdings plc Banking  
Legal and General Life Insurance 
Lloyds Bank plc Banking 
Prudential plc  Life Insurance  
Schroders plc Investment Banking and Brokerage 
Services 
Standard Chartered plc Banking   
Standard Life plc Investment Banking and Brokerage 
Services 
Table 5.1 Initial Sample Overview 
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function, they also provide further financial services as commercial banks. Also part of this 
group is Standard Chartered, which is a universal bank with a much less dominant retail 
presence in the UK, but its consumer bank branch still has a focus on retail. Therefore the 
“retail” group includes Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds and Standard Chartered. The second group 
includes corporations that focus on asset and wealth management. This applies to Aberdeen 
Asset Management and Schroders. A third group lists the corporations that have insurance 
services as part of their core business. This is the case for Standard Life, Prudential, Legal and 
General, Aviva and Admiral. Capita does not explicitly fit into any of the three groups, as it is 
predominantly engaged with outsourcing practices for businesses, and financial products like 
asset, cash and liquidity management are just one of many kinds of services Capita provides.1  
At first, data was collected from all 13 corporations. Recordings of between two and four 
quarterly reports of an average of 44 minutes each left the researcher with more than 30 hours 
of data to analyse. As CA is not just qualitative in nature, but operates on a micro-analytic level, 
basing the analysis on small interactional phenomena such as pauses, overlaps and intonation, 
the data size was deemed problematic. Furthermore, when details about the participants were 
gathered, it was found that there was no overlap between analysts participating in financial 
results presentations of group “insurance” and group “retail”. This might have been clear from 
the outset, but to a researcher from linguistics it was new. The rationale behind examining a 
sample from the same sector had originally been that the same pool of experts would ask the 
management about performance-related questions of companies that operate within and 
compete on the same market. The study aims to create a representative account of rituals, norms 
and strategies in interactions within comparable settings as a first step – later studies could 
compare these findings with other settings. The financial analysts who participate in the 
presentations are, however, also from three different groups, as well as the organisations that 
they represent. As the participant groups and their backgrounds are clearly separated, 
potentially different social practices during the results presentations could run the risk of 
diluting the findings of this study. 
These concerns led to the decision to drop the group whose core business lies within the 
insurance sector. Capita plc was left out as well, due to the marginal importance of financial 
services to the corporation. The corporations left in the sample are consequently Aberdeen 
                                                          
1 http://www.capita.com/about-us/where-we-operate/scotland/, accessed 18/10/2016. 
78 
 
Asset Management, Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds, Schroders and Standard Chartered. This final 
sample will be described in more detail in the following section.  
5.2.4 The final sample 
Aberdeen Asset Management, Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds, Schroders and Standard Chartered all 
publish recordings of their quarterly results online and make these publicly available. However, 
the form and extent of these uploads varies greatly. The following table shows how many of 
the four reports were disclosed on the homepage (First Quarter (Q1), Half Year (HY), Third 
Quarter (Q3), Full Year (FY)), whether it is audio or video data and if a transcript of the Q&A 
was available as well. The structure of all the webcasts is the same, for both audio and video 
recordings, conference calls and meetings: first a short presentation is given by the CEO and 
other management, which is then followed by the Q&A, which is central to this study. As can 
be seen in Table 2, not all corporations in the sample chose to upload all quarterly reports. 
Aberdeen Asset Management and Schroder only upload webcasts on biannual reports, and 
Standard Chartered have omitted a Q3 webcast. The links to the webcast are often only 
temporarily available, time frames vary from a month up to a year. For this reason all 19 





Quantity Recording type Meeting type 




HY, FY All audio All meetings 
Barclays Q1, HY, Q3, FY Q1, HY, Q3 audio 
FY video 
Q1, HY, Q3 conference call 
FY meeting 
HSBC Q1, HY, Q3, FY All audio Q1, HY, Q3 conference call 
FY meeting 
Lloyds Q1, HY, Q3, FY Q1, Q3 audio 
HY, FY video 
Q1, Q3 conference call 
HY, FY meeting 
Schroders HY and FY All video All meetings 
Standard 
Chartered 
Q1, HY, FY Q1 and HY audio 
FY video 
Q1 conference call 
HY and FY meeting 
Table 5.2 Final Sample Data Overview 
Transcripts were available for 4 out of the 6 firms. The available transcripts were formatted and 
amended to “increase its readability only”2 by the firm, which means that numerous discourse 
markers like pauses, laughter or interruptions, overlaps, repetitions and self-repair mechanisms 
were omitted from the text. Incomplete sentences were repaired and single utterances were 
turned into full sentences by the authors of the official transcripts. As the recordings themselves 
have not been edited, these manual corrections could be detected and where necessary amended 
by the researcher. The researcher had to compile her own transcripts for Standard Chartered 
and Aberdeen Asset Management. Details of speech like intonation, speed and respiration were 
                                                          
2 See Barclays Q&A transcript heading 
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not regarded for the first drafts of the transcripts, but later added when specific interactions 
were chosen for further application of CA.  
The majority of the webcasts in this sample are audio recordings of both conference calls and 
meetings. Besides the nine conference calls, in which participants communicate over the 
telephone, 4 of 8 meetings were only available in audio format, even though the attendees of 
the event could see each other. Consequently, facial expressions and gestures that participants 
reacted to in interactions could not be taken into account in the analysis. It was not expected 
that this omission would compromise the quality of the analysis, as the interactions at the event 
are not directly face-to-face, meaning that gestures and facial expressions might not be visible 
to the participants of the conversation, and could therefore not necessarily be included in the 
analysis in any case. The three images below show the room layout and seating arrangements 
of these meetings, as well as the quality of the video recordings. 
The managers usually sit on a stage, overlooking the audience in a medium sized lecture or 
conference hall. When an audience member would like to ask a question, they are handed a 
microphone to facilitate the interaction. Eye-contact between the participants is very likely to 
be restricted by other audience members or simply the spatial distance, which is why generally 
Image 5.2 Lloyds Financial Results Meeting 
81 
 
spoken language is the main resource to communicate a message. The resolution of the videos 
is generally very high, and multiple cameras zoom into the audience when a question is asked, 
and likewise when the question is answered by one of the speakers from management on stage. 
The availability of multiple cameras is a clear benefit, but as these cameras were not installed 
for research purposes, this material is also imperfect. As can be seen in the images above, the 
zoom in focusses on the face of the participant, thus gestures are barely visible. Furthermore, 
there is only one participant in the frame at a time, preventing an analysis of immediate non-
verbal reactions to what has been said. In summary, the video recordings improved the 
researcher’s understanding of the setting and can enrich the analysis when interactions rely 
heavily on non-verbal cues, as for instance with laughter and humour, or agreement through 
nodding, or disagreement through frowning. However, since the video recordings are only 
available for a few recordings, and due to a lack of continuous video material of all speakers 
throughout the conversation, the empirical analysis in this thesis focusses on the analysis of 
patterns in audio recordings.  
As shown in Chapter 3, the structure and general content of financial results presentations have 
been discussed in the academic literature (see for instance Crawford Camiciottoli 2010). This 
thesis, however, will focus on the discussion section following the presentation. The table on 
the next page shows details about the Q&A: the length, word count, the number of questions 

















Barclays Q1: 00:54 
HY: 00:40 
Q3: 00:36 











Q3: 4  
FY: 5 






















































Average 00:44 7,117 11 5.5 
Total 13:26 135,216 215 88 
Table 5.3 Q&A overview 
As the results presentations are not part of the analysis in this thesis, they are not included in 
the table above. The presentations are shorter than the average Q&A, with a length of between 
10 minutes and 40 minutes. The presentation slides are available for both meetings and 
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conference calls, except for four cases (Standard Chartered Q1, Lloyds Q1, Barclays Q1 and 
HY).  
Apart from Schroders and Aberdeen Asset Management, the banks seem to handle results 
presentations similarly: The average time devoted to a Q&A is around 45 minutes, and 10 to 
14 questions are taken. Aberdeen Asset Management’s and Schroders’ Q&As are less than half 
an hour long, and naturally fewer questions are answered, namely between 5 and 9. Follow-up 
questions are especially of interest as these interactions breach with the envisaged structure of 
the Q&A. That guidelines for these occasions exist is made clear several times in interaction 
from both sides throughout the data. In some instances, the managers asked the whole audience 
to only ask one question, and at the same time also reminded them of the time limit of the event. 
Analysts generally do not adhere to this request, as the data shows very few instances in which 
a participant only asks a single question. This breach is acknowledged by the analysts with 
apologies and downplay techniques throughout the Q&A, even when no announcement 
regarding the limited time was made (see Chapter 6, Excerpts 6.4.1 and 6.4.4). However, the 
above table does not indicate how many questions the participants ask altogether, instead the 
section on “follow-ups” in Table 5.3 lists the instances in which multiple turns were taken in 
order to generate a desired response. Follow-up questions can be of two types, and only one is 
of importance here: Firstly, analysts might open their initial turn by associating their upcoming 
question with one that had been asked previously by another analyst in the same Q&A. This 
does not necessarily mean that the previously given answer was unsatisfactory as a whole. As 
answers in this setting are mostly very lengthy and elaborate, it is very likely that a previous 
answer raised an issue that the analyst would like to discuss in more depth. In this case a follow-
up would serve more as a point of reference. This potential function of a follow-up is 
acknowledged in this study, but this is more of an indicator for the analyst’s interests regarding 
content. This form of follow-up is only taken into account for analysis when it is accompanied 
by an evaluation of a previous answer, which would then be of interest in terms of how 
scepticism and expressions of doubt are used as a tool in interaction to generate a more 
informative answer. This is not captured in Table 5.3.  
The second type that occurs in this data are follow-up questions asked by an analyst after their 
initial questions have been answered. These respond directly to the answer provided by 
management, and this is mostly only necessary when the answer has not been satisfactory. 
These cases are all listed in Table 5.3. The numbers suggest that follow-ups are a common part 
of Q&As in this setting, even though they vary from one company to another. Schroders is the 
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only company in the sample where follow-ups are completely absent, and the Q&A is also 
comparatively short. Aberdeen Asset Management’s two webcasts have the same length, the 
half year results show four follow-ups, the full year none. There is no definitive answer as to 
why follow-ups come up less often after results presentations in these two companies of the 
aforementioned wealth and asset management group. They do not seem to be forbidden, as the 
half year results by Aberdeen Asset Management show. It is also unlikely that answers by these 
managers are more complete than others. The assumption by the researcher is that the analysts, 
who usually follow a small number of firms closely, attend all events by these two corporations 
and are therefore aware of the company-specific procedure around the results presentations and 
adapt to these rituals. They know that the Q&As are kept shorter and that fewer questions can 
be taken. For Lloyds, Standard Chartered and HSBC on average every second question taken 
will be followed up by the same analyst. The scope of a follow-up varies from short clarification 
requests to discussions with multiple turns, which will be discussed in Chapter 6.4. 
5.2.5 Participants 
The participants in the webcasts are the firm’s executive managers, and financial analysts who 
are usually experts in their field and follow the company closely. The following pages offer an 




The figure below shows what positions managers participating in financial results presentations 
hold in the company. In most cases a financial results presentation and Q&A seems to be a joint 
responsibility for both the CEO and the CFO of a firm. For Standard Chartered and Barclays 
the CFO even held conference calls alone, and the CEO and other board members only joined 
when the results were presented in a meeting. Other board members that answer questions 
throughout the Q&A include the chairman or the group director, and they usually do not attend 
the first quarterly report. Most board members in this sample are present for the half year results 






•Q1: Group Finance Director
•HY: Group Finance Director, Chairman
•Q3: Group Finance Director
•FY: Group Finance Director, Group CEO
HSBC
•Q1: Group CEO, Group Finance Director
•HY: Group CEO, Group Finance Director, Group Director
•Q3: Group CEO, Group Finance Director, Group Director
•FY: Group CEO, Group Finance Director, Group Director
Lloyds
•Q1: CEO, CFO




•HY: CEO, CFO, Executive Vice-Chairman and Global Head of Distribution
•FY: CEO, CFO, Executive Vice-Chairman and Global Head of Distribution
Standard Chartered
•Q1: Group CFO
•HY: Group CFO, Chairman, Group CEO, Deputy Group Chief Executive
•FY:  HY: Group CFO, Chairman, Group CEO, Deputy Group Chief Executive
Figure 5.2: Q&A Participants: Management 
86 
 
The Financial Analysts 
Overall, 47 financial analysts participated in the recorded Q&As and asked a question. Out of 
all of them, only one remained anonymous, everyone else declared the full name and company 
affiliation at the beginning of their turn, and during conference calls also the operator shared 
the participants’ details. The following table provides an overview of how often these 47 
analysts took part in the analysed discussions. Based on their activity in 2015, the analysts seem 
to have specialised in one of the two fields: wealth and asset management (Aberdeen Asset 
Management and Schroders), and retail banking (Standard Chartered, Lloyds, HSBC, 
Barclays).  
Number of Q&As in 
which analyst actively 
asked a question 
Analysts for Wealth and 
Asset Management 
Analysts for Retail 
Banking 
1 11 2 
2 2 2 
3 2 1 
4 3 3 
5 1 4 
6 1 5 
7   
8  5 
Over 8:  5 
Table 5.4 Q&A Participants: Financial Analysts 
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For wealth and asset management, 11 financial analysts only asked one question during one of 
the Q&As in the sample. That does not necessarily mean that the group of discussion 
participants is more diverse than for retail banks; it is more likely that other firms that are 
followed by these analysts are not in this sample. Altogether 20 analysts asked a question to 
Schroders and Aberdeen Asset Management, and 27 posed a question to at least one of the four 
retail banks in the sample. Over 50% of these 27 analysts asked questions during as many as 6 
different discussions. The analysts that were most active with up to 15 questions are Chintan 
Joshi, Martin Leitgeb, Chris Manners, Tom Rayner and Manus Costello. It has not been 
researched whether differences in activity have an impact on their behaviour during the 
discussion.  
5.3 The Data Approach  
So far in this chapter, details about the data set have been described: The sampling method, the 
final sample, and participants. However, Conversation Analysis remains agnostic of the types 
of ethnographic information included above, focusing solely on the practices through which 
these social interactional events are organised. This means that characteristics that would 
usually be crucial for research in Finance and Accounting, like company performance, company 
size, or the dependencies between actors, are being deliberately ignored in this study. This 
might seem pointless – why study interactions of financial results presentations, when the 
results do not matter? Why take a close look at how actors communicate, when their intentions 
connected to their professional roles are not considered? The theoretical assumptions of the 
study of social actions within CA were described in Chapter 4, and in the following section it 
will be explained how this method was applied to this specific data set.  
One main principle of CA is arguably the key difference to other approaches in social science, 
namely its emic perspective. As shown in Chapter 4.3, an emic perspective means that 
Conversation Analysts study how participants ‘talk their world into being’. The participants’ 
perspective becomes apparent through talk, and through the sequential environment of talk 
(Seedhouse 2004). In this thesis, it is for example analysed how a social action such as that of 
expressing scepticism is realised by participants in how they design their turns at talk. The CA 
analysis of scepticism includes for instance the ‘morality’ of knowledge: Based on the turn-
design, it is examined how analysts express entitlement to ask for and receive more information, 
and the appropriateness of withholding information. The study of managing this knowledge 
imbalance is referred to as epistemics in CA (Stivers, Mondada and Steensig 2011). 
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Assumptions made by the researcher – for instance, to what extent company performance had 
an effect on the directness or hostility of a question, are not considered for analysis, as this is 
an ‘etic’ approach to the data. This does not mean that such a study would not be worthwhile, 
but it would not be a CA study. In Chapter 9, contributions to the field of Finance and 
Accounting are outlined, and potential further research studies that propose a mixed-method 
approach involving CA are suggested. 
Another aspect of this study that might seem like a missed opportunity is the disregard for the 
background of the actors in this data set. One might expect that the professional relationship 
between the financial analysts and the company they have questions for would be part of the 
analysis, with regards to power imbalances and dependencies. However, these assumptions are 
again part of ‘etic’ research approaches, whereas a study with an ‘emic’ perspective only 
explores how relationships are managed, negotiated, contested, and resisted, and treated as 
normative or deviant through the participants’ behaviour. From an EMCA perspective, power 
imbalance is produced in situ by people in how they format their contributions to an interaction. 
CA understands context as dynamic; talk as a social action itself is context shaped and context 
renewing (see Chapter 4.3 on Talk in Interaction). Participants orient to norms regarding their 
speaking rights, epistemic primacy and access that they understand as appropriate in a setting, 
based on previous interactions, and by doing so their understanding of relationships, power, and 
formality become observable to the researcher. Therefore, in the following empirical chapters 
the names of participants appear on the transcript, but further information, like their seniority 
or the affiliation between the companies both analyst and manager are part of, is not part of the 
analysis.  
In order to study the participants’ perspective without having the researcher’s assumptions 
influence the analysis, CA has developed practices that differ from those used in the 
‘mainstream’ social sciences (Seedhouse 2004). The analysis of a phenomenon follows three 
steps: Firstly, an interesting phenomenon needs to be detected. This could be as small as a 
discourse marker, or a sequence. Secondly, one empirical example has to be thoroughly 
described, and through detailed transcription and analysis it has to be identified what the 
phenomenon is ‘doing’. Lastly, the researcher returns to the data set and builds a collection of 
the phenomenon in order to identify its use as a systematic pattern (Hutchby and Wooffitt 2002).  
In order to undertake the first step, the researcher must approach a data set without preconceived 
ideas or hypotheses concerning what one wants or expects to find, which is in CA referred to 
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as “unmotivated looking”. In social sciences terms, one might find that this makes Conversation 
Analysis an inductive approach (Ten Have 2007). This is, however, contested within the 
discipline, as the term ‘inductive’ is rarely used by Ethnomethodologists or Conversation 
Analysts to describe their methodology. Ten Have (2007) argues that the first steps of the 
analysis follow the logic of induction, as researchers let ‘the data do the talking’. For this thesis, 
the researcher approached the interactions to examine how financial reporting is occasioned as 
an institutional activity. This did not involve a concrete hypothesis, just common-sense 
knowledge: In both private and professional contexts, we have various choices to phrase a 
request. We can use an imperative and be direct about what we want, or we can frame such an 
imperative with politeness markers or modal verbs that consider the recipient’s contingencies 
in fulfilling our request (Ervin-Tripp 1976). Our choices usually depend on our relationship 
with the recipient, and on our perceived right to make a request. Due to the format of the data, 
it was clear that the first-pair part of every conversation would be an information request, which 
is why the researcher started to examine whether these requests had a genre-specific pattern. 
Besides an initial inductive approach, the second step of the analysis can have a deductive 
element. This is the case when one phenomenon is noticed and analysed in detail with regards 
to its function and format, and the data is then revisited in order to determine whether there is 
a pattern based on this single-case analysis. This is how the researcher built collections for this 
thesis, and the patterns that were identified are analysed in Chapter 6, where the behaviour of 
the financial analyst is examined with regards to the use of mitigation devices, personal 
pronouns, confirmation-seeking requests, and follow-up questions; in Chapter 7, where contrast 
structures as means of expressing scepticism is discussed; and in Chapter 8, where the focus is 
on laughter.  
In Conversation Analysis, researchers conduct two types of studies: a single case study or a 
collection study. This thesis belongs to the latter category. A collection study aims to find 
patterns and to establish regularities, whereas a single case study looks at an isolated instance 
without making inferences concerning behavioural patterns. Such a single case analysis would 
be Sacks’ famous study of one deviant case in suicide prevention call centre openings, and the 
in-depth study of what is achieved by not sticking to the norm (Ten Have 2007). Collection 
building is different from coding: Coding is a quantitative approach, and its combination with 
CA is still controversial. The combination of a top-down or theory-driven method is more 
problematic for CA than other approaches that study language use or discourse, as CA does not 
study the content of talk per se, but complex social behaviour that is organised sequentially and 
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from the participants’ perspective (Stivers 2015). If researchers do not pay sufficient attention 
to turn design and the sequential position of an utterance, codes can turn out to be too simplistic 
and misleading (ibid.). Other than formal coding, collection building does not rely on 
frequencies or other statistical tools to filter what phenomenon should be studied in more depth. 
Yet it does aim to achieve a kind of distributional evidence. Researchers build collections with 
interactions where participants accomplish a recognisable social action, which then allows for 
the analysis of reoccurring phenomena. The number of interactions in a collection are not 
related to the overall number of conversations or utterances in a data set. 
At the first step of conducting this CA collection study, the researcher read the transcripts and 
listened to the recordings multiple times, in order to familiarise herself with the common 
practices through which the activity of requesting information was occasioned. Potential 
phenomena were marked using NVivo. This procedure allowed the researcher to identify 
candidate patterns within a collection of data sequences where certain behaviours were in 
evidence. One of the first collections was called ‘scepticism’, as the researcher noticed a 
tendency of information requests being based on disclosures that the financial analysts deemed 
somewhat problematic or inconclusive. This NVivo document listed interactions in order to get 
an impression of how scepticism was handled – how did questions resemble each other, what 
made cases stand out? This document was the basis for the analysis in Chapter 7, but not all of 
the included interactions showed a contrast structure.  
The next step was an in-depth analysis of a single case. A detailed transcript was produced and 
analysed. CA transcripts use Jefferson’s transcription style. This is a fine-grained transcription 
format that includes features like pauses and overlap (see Appendix). The researcher then 
discussed the transcript with fellow practitioners in so-called data sessions, in order to see what 
conclusions were drawn by others using the same data. This step also ensures the reliability of 
the analysis: In CA it is the norm to include transcripts of the data in publications, which makes 
the research process transparent to the reader (Seedhouse 2004).  
The third step is to revisit the data and see whether there is indeed a pattern. Contrast structures 
emerged as a recurring phenomenon, but it is not claimed that it is the most common strategy 
in achieving a constructive tone. CA does not seek to collect descriptions of patterns in large 
collections, but to study “what interactional work is the phenomenon, or device, being used to 
do” (Hutchby and Wooffitt 2002). To illustrate this – in Chapter 7 on scepticism, the use of the 
contrast structure when expressing doubt is studied. It is argued that this structure is a 
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reoccurring phenomenon which allows the financial analyst to express scepticism without 
antagonising management. This strategy is representative of an overall lack of hostility in the 
data set, which allows the researcher to draw conclusions about the enactment of the 
participants’ professional relationship. Counting the amount of contrast structures would not 
weaken or strengthen this case, as it is not argued that this is the only possible strategy to 
mitigate scepticism in interaction. Collection building further differs from coding in how the 
context of included instances is treated. In collections the aim is not to create a category that all 
included interactions fit into, but each instance is still treated as an individual case in which 
certain interactional mechanisms are shared. In short, collections do not homogenise the cases 
they include. The collections of two types of contrast structures were created after this strategy 
was identified in a single case analysis, meaning that the researcher did not code all questions 
that were identified as ‘expressing scepticism’ with one sub-category being contrast structures, 
but specifically built a collection based on a single case. In order to further study the use of 
contrast structures as a mitigation device, one could extend the collection with examples from 
other settings to test whether this use of contrast structures is more universal. This would 
increase the robustness of the finding. In this thesis, however, the nature of interactions in a 
specific setting – financial results presentations – is analysed. 
5.4 Limitations 
This thesis cannot make claims regarding interactive strategies that are representative for the 
overall genre of conference calls or financial results Q&As. The data set of this study is too 
small for generalising the findings to that extent. The detailed analysis, however, did enable the 
researcher to identify systematic practices of this setting, referred to in EMCA as 
‘ethnomethods’. Future studies could test whether these patterns do occur in other financial 
Q&As across other sectors of the London Stock Market, or in the same sector but in other 
countries, where discussions are held in different languages. This would allow CA scholars to 
identify patterns that are characteristic of the genre as a whole.   
One critique that Conversation Analysis is often faced with is ‘cherry picking’ at the analytical 
as well as the presentation stage. One might argue that collection building processes as 
described above are not as systematic and verifiable as typical coding procedures, and that the 
selection of transcript excerpts are tailored to the needs of the researcher, and are not an accurate 
representation of the data set. The researcher tried to reduce these concerns by explaining the 
rationale for collection building in this chapter and in Chapter 4. It is explained in detail how 
the method of coding offers answers to questions that CA does not ask. The following chapters 
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show finegrained analyses of the function of interaction practices, and the conclusions drawn 
are not based on the amount of times a phenomenon occurs, but on what it achieves in talk. 
Every phenomenon is analysed with illustrative examples that represent patterns found in every 
collection. In order to strengthen the case for these identified patterns, more examples have 
been added as Appendix A.  
5.5 A reflection on interdisciplinary research 
The main difficulty for me in completing this thesis was writing it without knowing who my 
audience was. As soon as I had identified sequences that I found analytically interesting, I 
participated in data sessions with other CA practitioners. Unfortunately, the EMCA tribe was 
hesitant to look past a language they did not understand – the amount of jargon seemed to 
intimidate, and participants often argued that this data set was over their heads without trying 
to seriously engage with the transcripts and recordings. I also attended two conferences within 
the field of Accounting and Finance, both with a focus on qualitative and interdisciplinary 
research. My presentations got very mixed feedback – most attendees simply did not know what 
to do with it, as CA offered discussions that were far away from what they are used to, and 
therefore seemed fascinating but pointless to many. Not knowing who you are writing for makes 
it difficult to choose an appropriate research question, and I did change it around quite 
frequently, namely every time when it felt like too little or too much CA. Too little CA meant 
that I realised that I tried to make claims that CA could not make. This occurred especially after 
having engaged with the Financial Communication literature. Too much CA meant that my 
analysis could become very ‘purist’ at times, with a strong focus on the interactional 
phenomenon, and a weak link to consequences for professional practice. In order to not get lost 
in the research process, it was important to regularly take a step back and to check whether the 
research question was appropriate, and whether I actually answered it. Due to the distance 
between the two fields, there was no identifiable or manageable gap in the literature I could 
orient to. The gap was so wide, it felt more like a ravine. It was a challenge to find conversations 
in either Applied Linguistics or Financial Communication that I felt my data could contribute 
to or relate to. It made me question at times whether interdisciplinary studies between two 
categorically different approaches while having an impact at the same time is even achievable.  
Conversations with accounting scholars showed me that a co-authorship for a publication in an 
accounting journal is possible – but only if I change my methodology accordingly. The easiest 
option would be to for instance base my analysis heavily on assumed agendas of the 
participants, making the approach etic, and not emic. Another more challenging option is to 
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take a mixed-method approach, with an analysis that has multiple steps. CA could be a first step 
to an analysis, then additional information and analyses could be combined with the findings in 
a second step, allowing it to remain true to its research philosophy and at the same time offering 
a novel contribution. Tanya Stivers’ (2015) call for coding with CA in order to make the 
findings more easily generalisable is one example for this. I discuss options that I find 
meaningful in Chapter 9. 
So, is the call for interdisciplinary research hypocritical? My impression based on my 
experience with my doctoral research is that it is. At doctoral colloquiums established 
academics tend to warn us about a competitive and static system, where publications in the best 
journals are only possible when we follow strict guidelines regarding data, research questions 
and methodology. They also denounce this system for its insular and destructive effects. They 
treat interdisciplinary research as the way forward – but when confronted with an approach 
outside of their repertoire, there does not seem to be much genuine interest. Interdisciplinary 
research is supposed to encourage scholars to think outside their own highly specific box, but 
in practice it can seem like most academics are not actually willing to make such profound 
compromises, which reinforces a static system.  
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Chapter 6: Professional Presentation of Self as a Financial Analyst 
In this chapter, the researcher will analyse how financial analysts perform their role publicly 
during Q&As following the presentation of quarterly results. As outlined in Chapter 5, the 
discussions take place either over the phone, which is referred to as conference calls, or face-
to-face, in meetings. They involve financial analysts and the top executives of the company. 
The analysis in this chapter does not distinguish between audio- and video-data. The discussed 
data is presented as transcript excerpts, according to the Jefferson transcription system (see 
Appendix C).  
Financial analysts compile reports after these events, which have a direct impact on trade 
activity (Whitehouse 2018). Hence scholars treat this setting as one of the key events that lead 
to a reduction of information asymmetry between external interest parties and insiders. 
Practitioners also appear to deem it as very important, as the highest executives of the company 
are always present (Rocci and Raimundo 2018). Other than printed commentaries and 
announcements, the spoken interactions demand a degree of spontaneity. It is assumed that 
linguistic features like tone, laughter, lexis or gestures could be revealing when the manager is 
caught off guard by a question (Matsumoto et al. 2011). In this study, the focus lies more on 
the financial analysts’ behaviour: It is examined how they design their questions in order to 
receive more information, and how this is changed when the desired information is not 
provided, and a follow-up question is asked.  
The literature shows that questioning management publicly is a balancing act for the financial 
analyst: In the interest of their own career, they try to avoid sounding “like an idiot” (Brown et 
al. 2015), they would not jeopardise sharing ideas or assumptions that could turn out to be a 
competitive advantage (ibid.) and they would also try to avoid exposing or antagonising 
management in their question, as a direct link to management is important to investors (Rocci 
and Raimundo 2018). The financial analyst does not just follow firms for their own career, they 
are also meant to inform their actual and potential clients of high-risk investments, which results 
in the expectation of a watchdog role (ibid.). In the following chapter, it is examined how the 
participants in the quarterly results presentations manage these partly contradictory 
expectations. It will be discussed how question- and turn- design reveal how the practitioners 
understand the unspoken rules of the setting, as well as the rights and obligations of their own 
professional identity. Firstly, it is shown how financial analysts tend to play down the urgency 
of an issue or the entitlement towards a detailed response (Chapter 6.1). This confirms the idea 
that financial analysts prioritise maintaining a positive relationship with management over their 
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ascribed watchdog role. Secondly, it is discussed how analysts systematically associate 
themselves with a group when making an information request. It is argued that financial 
analysts thereby suggest that an answer is requested in order to keep the market as a whole 
informed, instead of helping an individual with their report (Chapter 6.2). Thirdly, it is shown 
that the preferred question design by the financial analyst is to seek confirmation. This shows 
that financial analysts take measures to ensure that they do not ‘look like idiots’, and it also 
shows that in such Q&As, the discussed information is introduced by the financial analyst, not 
by management (Chapter 6.3). All the aforementioned sections show at least four excerpts to 
support the claims above, and in all these excerpts the language use is noticeably polite, and 
demands are made in an indirect manner. This changes partly in Chapter 6.4, when follow-up 
questions are examined. Follow-up questions are of analytical interest as they challenge the 
norm concerning the speaking rights in this setting. The financial analyst rejects the response 
as a final turn, demonstrating greater entitlement to the desired information.  Further examples 
for all four sections can be found in the Appendix A. 
6.1 Just checking in – keeping disclosures casual 
This section looks at reoccurring lexical choices the financial analysts made during their initial 
question. One was noticed by the researcher since the very beginning – ‘just’. The word usually 
occurred when financial analysts introduced their question, immediately following the preface. 
There have been numerous studies on the use of ‘just’ in interaction research, and it was found 
that there are a great variety of functions that this seemingly small discourse marker fulfils. It 
can modify a problematic interaction (Turowetz 2017), it can both minimise and strengthen the 
speaker’s commitment to an action (Ernet 2017), it can distance the speaker from a previously 
mentioned action (Wiegenad 2016) or it can qualify actions (Lindström and Weatherhall 2015). 
For this setting, the researcher will argue that it contributes to a less face-threatening tone, and 
creates a more casual mood, as it lessens the urgency of a question. As a mitigation device, 
‘just’ enables the speaker to reduce the pressure for an immediate answer to the recipient. 
Depending on its position in the sentence, it qualifies the gravity of a question and can also 
minimise the analyst’s commitment to the issue he/she enquires about. The following extracts 
show representative examples of questions that are introduced with phrases that include the 
word ‘just’.  
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Excerpt 6.1.1: “Just looking at trend x” 
The relevant use of “just” occurs in line 3. 
 
Andrew Coombs’s question has a structure that is fairly common in this data set: He opens his 
turn with a greeting, and announces what exactly is going to be discussed, including the number 
of questions, and what topics will be covered. This excerpt only shows the first question, in 
which Andrew Coombs downplays his request with lexical choices like modal verbs and the 
discourse marker ‘just’. The use of modal verbs in the first-pair part of the adjacency pair 
indicate lower entitlement: “perhaps I could open” (line 2) is almost phrased as a permission 
request, and “perhaps you could elaborate” (line 6, 7) includes potential contingencies 
concerning the management’s ability to reply. In line 3, the discourse marker ‘just’ directly 
precedes the verb ‘looking at’ and the topic that is inquired about. ‘Just’, in the sense of ‘only’, 
qualifies the verb which stands for the research that the analyst had conducted preceding the 
call. This downplays the complexity of the question, and thereby at the same time qualifies the 
expected complexity of the response in the second-pair part of the interaction. The actual 
assessment that he presents in the question preface is, however, not qualified but presented with 
high certainty (“obviously” line 4). The question itself is downplayed, but the basis for the 
question, his professional assessment, is not.  
Excerpt 6.1.2: “was just trying to quantify” 
This second excerpt shows an interaction between the financial analyst Chris Manners and 
George Culmer of Lloyds, during the Q3 conference call. It starts with the second question in 
Chris Manners’ initial turn and leaves out another question that follows the second.  





In line 1 the financial analyst opens with “I was just trying to quantify what we could look at”, 
mitigating his information request. He describes his action as “trying”, and in combination with 
the discourse markers “just” and “could”. When posing the actual question, he asks whether the 
result of his assessment is “the sort of thing” that can be expected, which is a rather colloquial 
and vague formulation (line 5). Again, the assessment itself is not mitigated. The lexical choices 
contribute to a mundane and un-agitated tone, as he downplays his information request as “just 
an attempt”. As can be seen in the reply by management, his request gets turned down, which 
George Culmer says was “anticipate(d)” (line 17). This indicates that management also oriented 
to this question as ‘just’ an attempt, and not as a serious information request which could be 
followed-up if denied. 
Excerpt 6.1.3: “Can I just confirm” 
This excerpt shows an interaction between the CFO of Standard Chartered, Andy Halford, and 




This initial question shows several of the discourse markers that have been introduced above. 
In the introduction to the question preface, Jason already plays down the scope of the 
interaction: “three short ones please if I could” (line 1) ensures the recipient of the question that 
the matter is quick and easy to solve, playing down the complexity of both the questions and 
the anticipated answer. The introduction to his first question achieves the same: “can I just 
confirm” (line 2) signals to the recipient that not much effort is required when replying to the 
request – a confirmation request is generally a closed question, meaning the answer would just 
have to be a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’. In this case, the financial analyst also uses mitigation devices when 
presenting his assessment that he seeks confirmation for: “sort of” (line 3, line 5), “I guess” 
(line 4). The manager treats the question in a casual way as well – as he interrupts the analyst 
with a brief and colloquial affirmative in line 9. This interruption is quite unusual in this setting, 
which can be seen by the following overlaps and the financial analyst asking how to proceed 
(line 10). The second question is designed in a similar way – “just on ALM” (line 13) again 
creates a mood that does not demand a complex response, as it almost qualifies the importance 
of the discussion.  
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Excerpt 6.1.4: “I thought I would just ask you” 
The analyst Chris Stanley asked the following question during the Barclays 2015 Q1 results 
conference call. 
 
This last excerpt shows two instances in which the discourse marker ‘just’ has been used. 
Firstly, in line 1, when introducing the topic, and a second time, when he introduces his actual 
question. In both cases, ‘just’ mitigates the acuteness of the issue: “it was just on capital” (line 
1) treats capital as a topic that does not require a complicated discussion, and by saying “so I 
thought I would just ask” (line 3) he treats his own request as an innocent attempt, a shot in the 
dark. This downplays his own entitlement to a precise reply, and orients to the contingencies 
that involve a reply from management, like the unpredictability of future performance.  
Creating an Informal Mood in a Formal Setting 
The four excerpts above showed a reoccurring pattern in initial questions across the data set: 
Attempts to mitigate the urgency in the first-part pair which treat a less precise answer or a 
dismissal of an information request in the second-part pair as an expected and acceptable 
response. In Q&As, one might expect that participants making an effort to ask a question 
display entitlement to further epistemic access, especially when comparing it to similar settings, 
like the questioning of politicians by journalists (Clayman and Heritage 2002). It was, however, 
found that a claim to said access was softened by, for instance, the discourse marker ‘just’, in 
connection with further markers like ‘maybe’ or ‘perhaps’, and also often together with modal 
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verbs which emphasise contingencies that might impede the fulfilment of an information 
request such as ‘could’ or ‘can’. It was furthermore found that financial analysts tended to play 
down the information request, but less often the certainty of their own assessment on which a 
request is based. The financial analyst still demonstrates his knowledgeability, but at the same 
time takes pressure off management by also showing awareness of their potentially limited 
ability to disclose more information than the financial analyst has already gathered. It is argued 
that this very strategy, to phrase the information request as if one just wants to test the waters 
instead of demanding more information, creates a casual and understanding environment, in 
which the analyst community makes a discursive effort to not seem necessarily entitled to more 
information. This adds to the hypothesis within the literature that gaining particular pieces of 
information is not the priority of the participation in a Q&A, but that managing the relationship 
is of great importance, too. 
 
6.2 Pronoun use in questions: the financial analyst as a representative 
of the market 
In the following section it will be discussed how financial analysts refer to themselves and their 
profession when asking questions in this setting. This allows the researcher to examine when 
analysts emphasise that they alone are responsible for an action, as opposed to when they refer 
to themselves as part of a group, or a community of practice.  
6.2.1 First person use – taking agency 
Throughout the data set, analysts tend to refer to themselves by using the pronouns ‘I’, ‘me’ or 
‘my’ when presenting their assessment in the question preface. The analysis of the following 
three excerpts, which are found to be representative of the use of ‘I’ in this sample, will show 
what effect this has on the way in which the financial analyst presents his argument. 
Excerpt 6.2.1.1 “Obviously I think it makes sense” 
This excerpt is taken from the HY conference call hosted by Barclays in 2015. The asking 




Chris Manners constructs himself as an individual analyst multiple times during this turn, 
noticeably all cases are during the first half of the question. Besides the opening, in which he 
formally requests permission to ask a question in the first place (line 1), he also uses “I think” 
(line 4) before presenting his evaluation, thereby not treating it as general knowledge but as a 
result of his own knowledgeability. He later exchanges this for “we” (line 11), which in this 
case could refer to his own team and their models, or to the competition that could have had the 
same idea. Using “we” instead of “if I add 150 basis points” gives the calculation that the analyst 
presents a wider scope, as it is potentially more experts than him who use the said numbers. 
This performs a different action than the question preface: The agreement with management 
and strong positive evaluation comes from the analyst alone, whereas the more tentative or 
potentially sceptical actual question (“you’re really sure about that as an end state” line 9) is 
framed with a pronoun that takes less agency. This makes doubt seem less personal. If the 
financial analyst asks for the market and not just his own model, he asks management to prevent 
wider misunderstandings, and to improve transparency. 
Excerpt 6.2.1.2 “I guess the direction of travel is clear” 
This excerpt shows a follow-up question by the analyst Ronit Ghose that was asked during the 




The financial analyst Ronit Ghose introduces and presents his assessment with multiple 
references to himself in combination with verbs that emphasise cognitive activity: “I’m just 
thinking about” (line 3), “I guess” (line 4, line 5), “I shall assume” (line 5) and “I’m looking 
at” (line 6). Alternatively, Ronit Ghose could have omitted these frames, and the content of the 
statements would not have been altered: the difference between “the direction of travel is clear” 
or “I guess the direction of travel is clear” lies not in the core content, but in the stance that the 
speaker is taking. In the first and alternative version, the evaluation is treated as a generally 
accepted fact, whereas in the second and actual statement he mitigates, but also takes agency 
for the evaluation. As can also be inferred from his lexical choices, he still orients to a limited 
epistemic access – he presents his thoughts as “guesses” and “assumptions”, demonstrating a 
lower certainty. The self-reference frame achieves that assessments are presented as the product 
of the analyst’s own skills, but also show his stance towards such statements. The first instance 
includes ‘just’, and downplays the scope of the question, and the following two instances of the 
singular pronoun use are also mitigated by these verbs. By making these efforts in phrasing his 
question, the analyst strengthens his standing as an active and knowing participant, which treats 




Excerpt 6.2.1.3 “I obviously listen to your calls avidly” 
In the following extract, Peter Toeman asks a question during the Q&A following Barclays’ 
full year results.  
 
In this question preface, the analyst declares that he does not just listen to the content of 
announcements, but also pays close attention to their delivery (see line 1 and 2). This is in 
accordance with the research literature which shows that analysts even seek help from FBI 
profilers in order to read verbal and non-verbal cues effectively (Brown et al. 2015). Peter also 
treats this as “obvious” knowledge (line 1). His pronoun use shows a clear distinction between 
the disclosure that was directed at the general public (“today we learn” line 4, “you’re trying to 
convey to us” line 14) and his own analysis and assumption: “I noted that” (line 2), “I 
wondered” (line 6, line 12), “am I reading too much into this” (line 13). He is portraying himself 
as an active listener, whose analysis is based on public disclosures. His question focusses on 
contradictory statements by management, and instead of complaining about potentially 
misleading disclosures, he contrasts this with the public announcements (this strategy will be 
discussed in depth in Chapter 7). Here the financial analyst also points at his own shortcomings 
(line 13), and depicts the management’s public communication as carefully crafted and thought 
through, instead of being potentially flawed or inconsistent (line 14). The pronoun use 
emphasises the personal use of this publicly available source of information, which is treated 
as important and worthy to “listen avidly” (line 1).  
6.2.2 Association with a group – us, we, our 
The analysis of the following excerpts will focus on how financial analysts associate themselves 
with a group rather than just speaking for themselves. As identified previously in 6.2.1, the 
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analyst tends to refer to himself with a first-person pronoun when presenting an assessment of 
the firm’s performance. However, in the actual information request, which signals how entitled 
the participant feels to an answer, financial analysts tend to refer to a group. 
Excerpt 6.2.2.1 “I was hoping you might be able to give us a bit more granularity” 
This first excerpt is from an interaction between Jonathan Pearce of BNP Paribas at the Q3 
Barclays conference call.  
 
Jonathan Pearce includes an imagined audience as well as fellow practitioners in this question. 
Of interest for this analysis is how he starts his request with the expression of a wish, where he 
is the subject (“I was hoping” line 3), and then continues the actual question and switches to a 
plural: Instead of “give me a bit more granularity”, he orients to a wider and undefined audience, 
which could include his team, the investors he is reporting to, the competition, or the market as 
a whole (line 3). This makes the request less personal, as the financial analyst does not ask for 
more information just for his own benefit, but for fellow members of this community of 
practice, and thereby requests transparency.  
Excerpt 6.2.2.2 “If you don’t want to give us a hard number” 
The second exchange that will be looked at here took place during the Barclays HY results in 
2015. The financial analyst Chintan Joshi presents a detailed analysis that he presents as his 




Chintan produces an assessment concerning the accuracy of the management’s statements (line 
1), and then “our models” (line 7). It is not clear if this only represents his own team or an 
imagined wider audience, but he refers to this undefined group again when he phrases the actual 
question: “Can we expect this RWA number to go down at least even if you don’t want to give 
us a hard number” (line 11). He asks the CEO of Barclays to manage not just his expectations 
based on the discussed calculations, but those of a group, and makes concessions on what type 
of response would count as an acceptable reply to ‘us’. This again emphasises that even though 
the financial analyst shared his knowledgeability by laying out his own calculations, he requests 
more information in the name of more practitioners than just him. By depicting a wider audience 
as the beneficiary of the request, the financial analyst’s question again gains a wider scope – it 
is not asked to help him personally, but to help the market.  
 
Excerpt 6.2.2.3 “Giv[e] us more” 
The following exchange is a statement by the analyst Ronit Ghose after his questions have been 
answered during a HSBC results Q&A, and a brief reply by the Executive Director Iain McKay.  
 
This statement is meant to close the interaction. The analyst does not have a question, but 
evaluates the firm's disclosure policy. He first shows appreciation and declares that 
management made his job much easier ("it's actually much easier to track your bank" line 2,3), 
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and then makes a suggestion for future reports. He forecasts what the analyst community will 
be interested in during future quarters and recommends to "pre-empt [those questions] by giving 
us more balance sheet disclosure quarterly" (line 5,6). With the pronoun use the analyst takes 
the conversation to another level. His feedback seems to come from the analyst community as 
a whole, not just from him personally, and he does not just thank management for one particular 
disclosure but highlights the importance of both sides’ reciprocal obligations. Ronit Ghose 
orients to an assumed influence of financial analysts on corporations’ disclosure policies, which 
has been argued for in the literature (see for instance Laskin 2018). 
I think, and I ask, because we need to know. 
In this section, two aspects have been looked at more closely: The first person use in analyst 
questions, as well as pronouns that link the financial analyst’s actions to a wider community. 
The use of pronouns like ‘I’, ‘me’ or ‘my’ might not seem to be revealing, as the caller is an 
individual and it is inevitable that he or she refers to themselves at some point during an 
elaborate turn that is the result of their ground work, but it is nevertheless telling what actions 
are presented as simply that – actions, and them as actors – and what actions are presented as 
passive, or where a group is the beneficiary or the initiator. As one might expect, the financial 
analyst’s assessments and evaluations are usually introduced with a first person singular 
pronoun, which is followed by a verb that demonstrates a mental activity: “I think” (Excerpt 
6.2.1.1), “I guess” (Excerpt 6.2.1.2), “I note” (Excerpt 6.2.1.3). Instead of choosing a passive 
construction, which would present these assessments as more factual, financial analysts usually 
present them as their own work, emphasising their contribution and knowledgeability. 
Interestingly, when their question reaches the point in which they have to declare what reply 
they expect from management, the analysts switch to the plural pronoun. The financial analyst’s 
question is therefore a product of his own skill, but the management’s reply is for the 
community. This is an interesting discursive choice that financial analysts repeatedly make, as 
one could assume that answers in conference calls can be tailored to the specific analyst who 
asked the question: To him or her the public reply might be more revealing than to others, based 
on previous private conversations. Based on the pronoun choices of the financial analysts in 
this setting, however, they seem to claim that they are seeking more information in the name of 
the community of practice, and publicly orient towards the conference call as a disclosure 




6.3. What do financial analysts claim is the purpose of their call? 
Financial analysts usually give very specific reasons for why they would like to pose a question. 
This could be a particular piece of information that has been disclosed in a relevant report or 
during the presentation of the call. The analysis of this data set showed that financial analysts 
tend to make one type of request: They seek clarity or confirmation. The following two 
examples briefly show how seeking confirmation paints the financial analysts in a different 
light than when they make a ‘plain’ information request. 
Excerpt 6.3.1 Two types of information request 
Type 1: “Plain information request” (Schroeder HY) 
 
 
Type 2: Seeking confirmation (HSBC HY) (line 7) 
 
In the first example, the financial analyst David Boyd asks an open question concerning 
strategy. He hints at the fact that he knows about potential contingencies that would prohibit an 
answer (“if you can reveal” line 2), but does not share any of his own assumptions or 
recommendations with management or the wider imagined audience that also has access to this 
conversation. In the second example, however, Tom Rayner asks two questions in his first turn, 
both of them seeking confirmation of an assumption he has made and shared with the audience. 
This showcases the financial analyst as a knowledgeable professional, who offers a chance to 
the management to have a say in his report as well, or as it is referred to in the literature, make 
the analyst’s forecasts more accurate (Mayew 2008). The following three interactions show 
what this usually looks like and at the same time how it makes the financial analyst look. 
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Excerpt 6.3.2 Not a layman 
In the following excerpt, the analyst, Alastair Ryan, poses a question to the management of 
Aberdeen Asset Management following their half year results. For readability, this transcript 
only includes one question by the analyst, and skips over the reply to his first question. The 
following excerpt shows the answer that was given immediately after the first question had been 
discussed, even though the lines imply that this was an immediate reply.  
In the beginning of his question, analyst Alastair clearly distances himself from laymen who he 
characterises as easy to mislead (line 2) and contrasts his own analysis to such thinking (line 
4). He presents two different assumptions as his own in line 7 and 8. He does not explicitly ask 
for confirmation but invites management to comment on his two suggestions. The 
management’s response is the following: 
 
The management indeed evaluates the financial analyst’s assumption around obvious facts that 
laymen would focus on (“I think your assumptions […] are broadly correct” line 12) and finally 
declares which suggestion he leans towards at the end of his turn in line 22. The financial analyst 
demonstrates his knowledgeability in two ways: Through lexical choices, by distancing himself 
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from non-professionals (“the layman”), and through the framing of his question, as he does not 
simply make an information request, but emphasises theories he already has.  
Excerpt 6.3.3 “My understanding is…” 
The following question was posed during the HSBC Q3 conference call. Raul Sinha’s turn starts 
with a closing remark concerning a reply to his first question. The question shown below is not 
to be treated as a follow-up, however, as it was not prompted by the management’s reply, but 
was already announced during the analyst’s introduction prior to the first question. Sometimes 
analysts ask multiple questions in one turn, and other times, as is the case below, analysts 
receive an answer immediately after the question. In the turn below, Raul Sinha asks the actual 
question in line 4 and 5. What will be looked into more closely is what follows after the question 
has been asked. 
 
Firstly, in his introduction, his rationale for asking the question is another good example of the 
tendency amongst financial analysts to associate themselves with investors or the market in 
general (see 6.2.2): “so that we are informed” (line 2) links his question to the responsibility of 
management to use events like conference calls to improve transparency. He then goes on to 
ask his question, and follows up with his own assessment, which prompts a closed follow-up 
question (a yes or no question) in line 6, and another assumption (“it clearly looks like” line 8) 
that is not followed by an interrogative. The first question in line 4 and 5 is an information 
request, which on its own would focus on the missing information, and not reveal how much 
the financial analyst thinks he knows. Instead of leaving it at that, Raul continues and gives 
insights as to how he interprets this and asks management to negate or affirm this, and when he 
makes his last point, he does not add an interrogative. After a noticeable pause, the CEO replies 





Stuart Gulliver treats the financial analyst’s assessment as a question, as his turn is designed as 
a response to an interrogative. He does not design his turns as stand-alone assessments, but as 
a reaction to the financial analyst’s assumptions. Stuart Gulliver evaluates the presented 
assessment (“you’re right” line 22, “you’re entirely right” line 25, “I don’t think that has any 
advantage” line 15). Raul Sinha ends this interaction by thanking management for “clarifying” 
(line 34) remarks. By orienting to the management’s action as “clarifying”, the financial analyst 
emphasises that the information was not produced by management, but by himself. He therefore 
entered the interaction as a knowing participant. At the same time, the financial analyst assigns 
epistemic primacy to management by requesting an evaluation of his assessment.    
Excerpt 6.3.4 “Obviously it is not ideal at the moment” 
This last excerpt shows the financial analyst Manus Costello ask a question during the Barclays 
half year results. He poses a question in line 4 – 6, and immediately afterwards presents his own 




Manus Costello requests more “particular” information on Barclays’ business in Africa. The 
question stretches over four lines in the transcript, as the analyst provides two response options 
to management. The analyst asks two non-polar and one alternate question, thereby narrowing 
down the options for a potential reply. He adds to the question, in the form of a postscript, in 
which he positions himself as knowing with an assessment he treats as factual (line 8 – 10). The 
postscript assessment is not necessarily to be confirmed by management but displays the 
motivation for asking the question. Manus does not explain where he has obtained the 
information in line 9 – 10 from, or what the effect of the big minority could be, and thereby 
treats it as information that he and the recipient already shared before this interaction.  
Displaying knowledgeability in questions 
These excerpts aimed to show how the financial analysts display themselves as knowledgeable 
during public discussions. Even without conducting a detailed linguistic analysis this becomes 
clear, as the first turns by the analysts are lengthy and elaborate. The effort that is put into the 
question preface alone shows that there is more going on than ‘just’ an information request. 
Financial analysts present their own assessments and assumptions; they usually seek not just 
information, but clarification or confirmation. They are often accompanied by discourse 
markers like ‘obviously’, which convey a high certainty concerning the accuracy of the 
assessment as well as concerning the assumption that the knowledge is shared at least with the 
party that is expected to produce the second-position pair. Asking for clarification or 
confirmation also achieves that the desired information is partly produced by the speaker, and 
is invited to be reinforced or negated, or added to. This sharing of the financial analyst’s thought 
processes furthermore achieves transparency and confirms the two-way communication model 
in Investor Relations (Laskin 2018). While displaying high skilfulness, management is treated 
as the crucial information source which has superior epistemic access, as well as superior 
epistemic primacy.  
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6.4 The change in tone of Follow-up Questions  
As could be seen in the excerpts throughout this chapter, the Q&A discussion does look very 
different from what the term “discussion” might imply – in many cases the financial analyst 
asks one question, and management gives one reply. However, it also occurs in every Q&A that 
follow-up questions are asked, which shows that financial analysts do display entitlement to a 
certain quality or depth in an answer. The following four excerpts show that this can, but by no 
means has to necessarily, become face-threatening and complicated for management. The first 
excerpt, excerpt 6.4.1, is the most direct and open disagreement that was found in the whole 
data set. It shows how gradually a Q&A becomes an intense discussion, and both parties insist 
on their standpoint and at times drop the mitigating discourse markers, for instance self-
referencing frames, that were shown to be characteristic of this setting in for instance Chapter 
6.1. The second excerpt, 6.4.2, shows an open expression of disbelief, which was also not 
typical for this data set. Excerpt 6.4.3 shows a follow-up question that adheres to the politeness 
norms of this data set, and lastly, excerpt 6.4.4 shows a clarification request, which impedes a 
potential attempt by management to hide behind ambiguous statements. Overall, these excerpts 
are a representative sample of what follow-up questions can look like in this setting. A follow-
up does not mean that the interaction will escalate, but it is a possibility which management is 
likely to be aware of when responding to a question. This makes a follow-up question a 
powerful tool for financial analysts as it allows them to exert pressure when deemed 
appropriate.  
Excerpt 6.4.1 An open complaint 
The following excerpt is of analytical interest as the interaction slowly progresses from a 
mitigated expression of scepticism to a direct complaint. The first half of the exchange is not 
unusual for this setting (line 1 – 23), however, the second half is as close as it gets to a 
disagreement between a manager and an analyst in a public financial results Q&A session (line 
24 – 49). This interaction took place during the Standard Chartered Q1 conference call. The 
analyst Ronit Ghose participates frequently in financial results or earnings release Q&As by 
British retail banks. The manager answering the questions is Andy Halford, the CFO of 
Standard Chartered. Ronit Ghose brings up the topic that later turns into a complaint at the 
beginning of the interaction, in line 2, but then changes the topic within the same turn to request 
clarification about a separate issue (line 6). Once this is resolved (line 22), he revisits his initial 
concern in line 32, which leads to an open complaint. The contrast between the financial 
analyst’s handling of the RWA and capital issue demonstrates two different strategies of the 
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financial analyst in accomplishing a disaffiliative action. On RWAs, he seeks help from 
management to resolve a problem, on capital, he wants to cause a change in the future practice 
of the firm. The first excerpt shows the introduction of the capital discussion, which later 




The excerpt starts with a follow-up question by Ronit Ghose. He reacts to an earlier refusal by 
management to share the CET1 number. He does this by first acknowledging the received 
information, but then immediately afterwards makes his strongest counterargument, which is 
followed by a humorous remark (line 3). Humour is displayed by Ronit Ghose with “unless you 
are telling us”, followed by a statement contrary to common sense (“your progression is lumpier 
than other banks”, line 4). He closes the topic with a serious remark, namely that the competition 
offers information that this manager denies (line 5). The “comeback” after the denial does not 
request another response at this stage (line 15), but also shows management that the financial 
analyst does not see this as resolved. The humorous comment debunks potential reasoning 
behind the denial and underlines that Ronit Ghose is not convinced. The absence of a pause de-
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escalates the interaction, as management is not required to give another dispreferred response 
publicly. 
The discussion of the second issue is handled very differently, and almost representative of how 
“being sceptical” in this data set is done: The analyst starts by pointing out his own 
shortcomings as the potential source of the problem. “I don’t understand” is not an accusation, 
but from the beginning shifts the focus to the analyst’s struggle to make sense of the available 
information. He continues this narrative by adding “maybe I am being slow but” (line 6), 
forming a contrast structure that depicts his own skills as inferior to that of the management. 
After a considerably long pause, Andy replies to the problem and, noticeably, he starts off with 
“well sorry” (line 12), which adds to the accommodating and peaceable tone of the conversation 
until this point. He cannot finish his answer, as the analyst interrupts him. Ronit Ghose disagrees 
with the management’s explanation, again in the just described manner: “maybe I’ll go check 
the numbers” (line 16) softens his disagreement, as it again includes the option that the analyst 
made a mistake. After another noticeable pause the manager solves the problem, which was in 
fact a misunderstanding, which the analyst immediately clarifies in line 22 and again below in 




Ronit continues to mitigate his efforts through discourse markers such as “just” and verbs such 
as “try” (line 24, line 26), emphasising an inferior epistemic status in relation to the 
management. The financial analyst then closes the discussion, “thanks that’s clear now” (line 
32), and again within the same turn changes the topic and revisits his remark from line 2 – 5. 
The tone is still reconciliatory, as he appeals to management that it “would be really helpful” 
(line 34) if Standard Chartered would share the CET1 number, and this time he leaves out the 
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sarcastic remark. What follows is another longer pause. CA research has shown that pauses 
longer than 0.1 seconds foreshadow a dispreferred response (Pomerantz 1984). Ronit Ghose 
appears to orient to the pause as such an indicator as well, as he takes the floor again and 
attempts to close the interaction with “thank you” in line 36. The absence of a question gives 
management the option to ignore the request and to treat the “thank you” as a closing remark. 
The excerpt below shows that Andy Halford still responds to Ronit Ghose’s request, which 
leads to the open disagreement.  
 
 
Andy Halford denies the request twice and justifies this by relativising the information that had 
been produced by Ronit Ghose at the beginning of the interaction (‘nearly everyone’ to ‘some’ 
in line 41, line 42). Ronit Ghose interrupts both attempts, repeating his assertion and thereby 
rejecting the manager’s version. Still, no accusations are made. The financial analyst does not 
evaluate how or why he disagrees with the CFO, the rejection of the management’s justification 
is only made clear through the interruptions and the repetitions. As the conversation progresses, 
the strategies by the speakers to manage a potential escalation of the disagreement change in 
different ways. The financial analyst’s approach becomes more hostile, from dismissing the 
first denial with sarcasm (line 4 – 5), to making a polite request (line 32 – 34), until dismissing 
the manager’s justification for the denials (line 41 – 44). The “sorry” preface displays that Ronit 
Ghose treats his own assertion and interruption as a dispreferred action. 
As will be shown in the remainder of the chapter, such resilience by an analyst to insist on his 
own stance that directly opposes the management’s is extraordinary. However, this exchange 
shares with the rest of the data set that accusations of wrongdoing are entirely absent. Ronit 
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Ghose insists on his own opinion, and repeats it, but he does not explicitly denounce the 
manager’s as untrue or incorrect.  
Excerpt 6.4.2 An open challenge  
When there is a mismatch between the analyst’s expectations and the actual numbers, analysts 
make use of the financial results Q&A to ask for clarification. In ordinary talk, a legitimate 
reaction when addressing a discrepancy between one’s own expectations and another’s 
depiction of events is to assume and express accusations of deception. In this setting, however, 
this does not seem to be an option for the financial analysts. Blame is handled cautiously and 
indirectly. The following excerpt is a rare example of directness in this data set. The excerpt 
starts with a reply by Tushar, the manager of Barclays. The analyst Michael Helsby interrupts 
him, which, as seen in the excerpt above, is barely ever a good sign for the manager. Ronit 
Ghose interrupted the CFO on multiple occasions: to cut an answer short that was redundant in 
his eyes, and to immediately disagree with what the manager has said. Michael Helsby does the 




In his initial question Michael Helsby asked three separate questions, which will be discussed 
later, as he takes on the role of the “diagnosing analyst” (Excerpt 7.2.1, p. 138). Tushar does 
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not get the chance to answer all of them in one turn. The question he replies to here is “can you 
tell us what the associated (.) uplift to revenue would be (.) ehm from the stronger dollar (0.5) 
ehm in twentysixteen” (line 2 – 3, p. 138). The CEO replies to this by outlining general 
growth tendencies of the card business and assures not just the analyst, but the whole audience 
that revenues are higher than costs, but he does not give a hard number. The analyst then makes 
very clear that a hard number was the only piece of information that he was interested in when 
interrupting him in line 38. He deploys the fact that management adopts the order of questions 
he suggested and interrupts the manager before he can elaborate on the second question. The 
analyst’s follow-up in line 38 is a declarative. He does not acknowledge the information 
provided in the answer, and he dismisses the explanations he has just received by saying "it's a 
simple question (.) can you tell us what the revenues are" (line 40). This formulation does two 
things: Firstly, he expresses his doubt that the provided answer was the best he could receive. 
He does this by not plainly saying that he does not believe management, but he makes clear that 
he thinks that management withholds the answer to his question as they "must have worked the 
revenue out" (line 38, line 39). He noticeably refrains from stating that management is 
withholding information on purpose, but he is alluding to it by claiming that management does 
in fact have the information. Secondly, he refrains from using an imperative when telling 
management what to do but uses an interrogative which accomplishes the same thing. He 
repeats his question by changing it from "Can you tell us what the associated uplift to revenue 
would be" (see Excerpt 7.2.1 line 2, p. 138) in his initial question to "Can you tell us what the 
revenues are" (line 40). The analyst's criticism becomes clearer in the follow-up question, due 
to a reduction of hedging devices, as well as high certainty when making assumptions about the 
management's actions. This directness still does not lead to the preferred response; Tushar 
Morzaria does not end up providing a hard number, merely a reference number. He provides an 
excuse by calling out the unpredictable components of the equation, and then manages to close 
this problematic exchange ("So that's too hypothetical, I think, to add a huge amount of rationale 
to." line 46). Curl and Drew (1979) refer to this as an appeal to contingencies, and this would 
make compliance by management impossible.  
Excerpt 6.4.3 “I am sorry, but you missed something” 
The following excerpt shows that while the tone does not necessarily become more hostile with 
a follow-up question, the analyst still manages to exert leverage on management. The financial 
analyst who asks a follow-up question below, does so in a polite and formal manner, but still 
makes clear that he insists on a reply to a question that management did not give in their initial 






As mentioned before in this chapter, sorry- prefaced statements show that the financial analyst 
orients to his own turn as problematic for the recipients (see Excerpt 6.4.1). Michael Helsby 
begins his follow-up question with this preface, treating it as risky to tell management that the 
reply to his initial question has not been satisfactory (line 36). As seen in 6.4.1 and 6.4.2, the 
financial analyst does not cast blame by making the accusation that information has been 
withheld purposefully but treats it as an unintentional oversight (line 36). Management, 
however, resists this comment that he had “missed” this point. Tushar Morzaria starts with 
“again” (line 40), implying that he has commented on his stance towards this particular 
guidance already, thereby not taking up the notion of a mistake as suggested by the financial 
analyst, but treating it as purposefully withheld information. He then, however, still “helps to 
frame” his forecast for the analyst’s better understanding in line 43. The analyst produces a 
sound that signals understanding right after the new piece of information was stated by 
management (“probably increase”, with an emphasis on the direction of that trend, line 44), 
which suggests that this was the kind of information he had been looking for. 
In comparison to the former two examples of follow-up questions, 6.4.2 and 6.4.1, the financial 
analyst in this excerpt does not display high entitlement to further disclosure or assurances by 
management, as he makes use of phrases that show awareness of contingencies that could 
prevent an answer (“are you able to” line 36 and 37), mitigate the complexity of the issue (“just 
the one thing” line 36) and only require a vague answer (“give us an idea of” line 37). Treating 
the omission of desired information as a mistake also displays optimism towards these 
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disclosure practices, as the financial analyst displays the stance that he expects cooperation 
from management to go into the issues the analyst flags up. 
Excerpt 6.4.4 Cutting to the chase 
This last excerpt shows how CEO Tushar gets interrupted with a clarification request by the 




The analyst interposes a statement amidst the initial reply of management, just after the topic 
which the interruption is concerned with is finished. The question is a declarative, a statement, 
for which a brief ‘yes or no’ answer is sufficient. The analyst checks if his understanding of one 
aspect of the matter is correct, and Barclays’ CEO confirms that he is right with his assumption. 
Tushar Morzaria then pauses, and only continues with the question he would have answered 
before the interruption took place when the analyst signals that this question is resolved (“okay” 
line 64).  
The fact that the financial analyst does not have to wait until management has finished their 
turn is an interesting insight into the participants’ speaking rights. As this institutional setting 
is highly formalised, with clear rights concerning who has the power to select the next speaker, 
one might assume that interruptions are treated as impolite or unwelcome. However, 
interruptions occur across the data set, and can happen multiple times during one interaction. 
As mentioned in the analyses of Excerpt 6.4.1 and 6.4.2, interruptions often foreshadow an 
issue with what has been said. This does not necessarily mean that the tone becomes 
confrontational, as financial analysts do not only interrupt to disagree, but also to seek 
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clarification. Manus Costello does not interrupt Tushar Morzaria mid-sentence, but when he 
hesitates, which signals the end of the topic. Manus’ follow-up clarification request is not just 
double checking whether he has understood the reply correctly, it also achieves something else: 
the triple rephrasing of the same factor (“there is nothing/ there is no additional/ this does not 
account for anything” line 56 – 59) seems to aim at closing any potential loopholes in the 
management’s reply. The occurrence of interruptions turns a Q&A with an originally strict 
speaker-selection structure into a discussion between more equal parties, in which speakers can 
also self-select. 
A lot of effort for a mere ritual?  
These four excerpts show a noticeable effort from the financial analysts to get their desired 
reply. It becomes clear that they do not feel entitlement to a detailed response per se, but when 
they do, they can be persistent. This persistence has differing degrees – follow-ups can flag that 
the financial analyst deems the initial reply unnecessarily vague (6.4.4), incomplete (6.4.3), 
implausible (6.4.2) or even unacceptable (6.4.1). These are all potentially face-threatening 
actions, and their occurrence could be a counterargument against the body of literature that 
deems conference calls and subsequent public discussions as a farce (Brown et al. 2015). If the 
conference call participation only had the purpose to demonstrate a close link to and to maintain 
a favourable relationship with management, such socially risky actions would not be necessary. 
By asking uncomfortable follow-up questions the analysts demonstrate analytical rigour, and 
at least a degree of independence. Such difficult conversations also seem to show that 
conference call discussions offer what had been envisioned by legal changes that made public 
disclosures a requirement for listed firms – instead of sharing and discussing analyses in private 
conversations only, they are public, adding to more transparency around disclosure practices. 
The occurrence of follow-up questions does not tell the researcher whether these conference 
calls are in fact informative for financial analysts and investors, or if they are just the basis for 
ongoing private discussions. However, the regular occurrence of follow-up questions 
demonstrates to both the audience as well as management that the quality of their answers does 
matter to the financial analyst. This means that not offering the desired information without – 
according to the financial analyst – a convincing reason could and does increase the pressure 
on management. The analysis of the transcript excerpts also shows how financial analysts 
accomplish the action of pushing further for information: Initial replies are dismissed without 
explicitly criticising management. Financial analysts do not cast blame which would undermine 
the management’s role. This way, even when a reply is treated as not satisfactory, management 
is treated as cooperative.  
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6.5 Doing ‘being a Financial Analyst’ in a Conference Call 
The methodological lens which the researcher applied to this data set offers four insights into 
the behaviour of participants in discussions subsequent to financial results presentations. 
Firstly, the tone or mood that financial analysts set in the first pair-part is not hostile or assertive, 
as in other related settings, but casual. Demands to further epistemic access are mitigated 
through multiple linguistic choices such as the discourse marker “just”, often in connection with 
other lexical choices which strengthen this effect, like “perhaps”, and self-referencing frames 
which express lowered entitlement and high regard for the recipient’s contingencies. This tone 
can change when a financial analyst does not accept the second pair-part as a final response and 
continues the exchange with a follow-up question. The option to ask follow-up questions allows 
analysts to exert further pressure on management, as it demonstrates that they feel entitled to 
further information. The follow-up questions do not just narrow down the number of acceptable 
response options, but analysts also at times choose to clarify their stance towards the issue more 
explicitly as the interaction progresses. 
Analysts furthermore tend to emphasise their contribution to an interaction, which is their own 
evaluation of company performance as well as their interpretation of disclosed trends and 
results. This becomes clear through elaborate question prefaces, and the type of question that is 
usually asked in this setting – seeking confirmation. This requires preparatory work and allows 
the asking analysts to present themselves as informed participants, which could be an effort to 
prevent being perceived as a “layman” (Brown et al. 2015). In their questions, the analysts 
requested disclosure not just for themselves, but for a wider community, even though this 
community remained unspecified. Both the fact that the analysts shared their own analyses, as 
well as designing the beneficiary of the desired information to be other interested parties, points 
at the fact that the financial analysts orient to increasing transparency when actively 
participating in the Q&A.  
The in-depth analysis of their questions also shows the analysts’ efforts to maintain a 
constructive relationship with the management of the company they follow. Initial and also 
follow-up questions explicitly take the management’s contingencies into account when it comes 
to sharing the requested information with the analysts and the wider public. The importance 
and the complexity of an anticipated answer is often mitigated or downplayed (see 6.1), and 
face-threatening social actions like accusations and casting blame are absent in this data set (see 
6.4). In mundane interactions, we have the option to voice it when we feel like somebody is not 
telling us what we want to know or when we feel deceived – we can tell people that we suspect 
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that they are lying, or that they are not telling the full story. In professional talk this is also 
common practice, like in police interviews, in news interviews or in court rooms. In this setting, 
however, it is the practised norm to perform socially risky actions without being disaffiliative, 
which shows the importance of maintaining a positive relationship – or to remain in favour with 
management. The handling of expressing scepticism will be discussed in more detail in the 
following chapter.  
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Chapter 7: Doing being Sceptical in Professional Settings 
This chapter examines one central aspect of Q & As more closely: What if a caller participates 
in order to express dissatisfaction with results, the management's decision, or disclosure 
practices - how is that done in this setting? How do analysts express disbelief or disagreement? 
What are the unspoken rules that analysts comply with in order to express scepticism 
appropriately for this professional context? The expression of scepticism is understood as doubt 
concerning the accuracy or truthfulness of a statement. In CA, the expression of doubt is defined 
as a disaffiliative action. 
This analysis was originally meant to identify and examine instances in which analysts' 
questions were disaffiliative with management. Starting from Clayman’s and Heritage’s studies 
on questioning presidents (2002), it was assumed that financial analysts would also ask 
questions that expressed doubt or criticism regarding the published results. The first finding 
however turned out to be that explicit disaffiliative questions are uncharacteristic for a financial 
results Q & A. As discussed in Chapter 4, affiliation is defined according to Stivers (2008), as 
"the affective level of cooperation".  Disaffiliation therefore describes an action that breaks with 
a previous action. At first, a collection of disaffiliative social actions was generated from the 
data set, but commonly suggested categories from the literature (Drew and Steensig 2008) like 
reproaching, criticising, or complaining could not be successfully applied to this sample, except 
for very few instances. These two instances have been discussed in Chapter 6.4.  
In this chapter, the normative practice of expressing scepticism will be shown and discussed. 
When identifying a disclosed item by management as problematic, analysts make in fact a 
noticeable effort to not appear as opposing management. Analysts do take care not to question 
the legitimacy of the management’s actions, or to undermine their role in this community of 
practice. This is not a straightforward task, considering that the reason the analysts are 
dissatisfied is based on either poor performance that the top management is accountable for or 
a disclosure policy-related decision that again comes directly from management. So how do 
analysts express doubt in this professional setting, without blaming or antagonising 
management and the role that they represent? After the analysis of ten transcript excerpts, this 
chapter concludes with the finding that analysts as well as managers still seek affiliation when 
expressing doubt, by orienting to a superior knowledge authority of management.  
Even though financial analysts present themselves as highly skilled (see Chapter 6.2 and 6.3), 
they do design the questions as if they need help to solve a puzzle. Two roles were found to be 
adapted in this data set: The puzzled analyst, and the diagnosing analyst. For both types, five 
124 
 
transcript excerpts show how this is achieved in interaction. In both roles, analysts use a strategy 
which within CA is called a contrast structure (Wooffitt 1992). Such constructions link two 
usually opposing points with “but”. The 'puzzled analyst' presents two contrasting statements 
or pieces of information to management, which do not include an assessment that he or she 
presents as their own. The puzzled analyst links the following statements with “but”:  two 
contradicting statements by management; an assessment by management and one by a third 
party; or a statement made by management is contrasted with an incomplete factor that the 
financial analyst is struggling with. The 'diagnosing analyst' contrasts an assessment by 
management with his own analysis, which emphasises his skill and knowledgeability, and 
challenges the assumed epistemic imbalance concerning an issue. Statements by management 
that the financial analysts reference can be utterances from the same discussion, phrases used 
in the immediately preceding presentation, written statements of the PowerPoint presentation 
or the latest report, or can refer back to interactions that have taken place during an unspecified 
point in time in the past. While the 'diagnosing analyst' takes a stance and the 'puzzled analyst' 
does not, none of the two types clearly suggest any flaws or wrongdoing by management. 
Instead, affiliation is suggested by designing their question overall as a genuine information 
request, and the issue is treated as solvable by management. 
 
7.1 The puzzled analyst 
In this section, five excerpts are discussed. They show how analysts present an issue as a puzzle 
which requires the help of management to resolve. This way, managers answering the question 
are not the source of the problem: The questions do not construct managers as responsible for 
an inconclusive disclosure, an unclear forecast or a dubious evaluation of past performance, but 
they are the helping hand that the analyst needs to make sense of the published numbers and 
statements. Other than the “diagnosing” analysts, a role that was taken on more frequently than 
that of the “puzzled” analyst, a contrastive construction was not used to oppose the 
management’s suggestion to the analyst’s. It instead enforces the analyst’s state of 
powerlessness, as they admit to how they struggle with or worry about a lack of information. 
The following excerpts show how this accomplished in interactions during meetings or 




Excerpt 7.1.1: “We can’t work it out from the outside” 
The analyst Alastair Ryan asked the question that is shown in the following transcript excerpt 
during Barclays’ Full Year results presentation. The relevant sequence starts in line 8 until line 
15. 
 
Alastair Ryan starts his argumentation with “we can’t work out from the outside” (line 8), 
highlighting his role as an outsider to the company from the outset. He depicts himself as being 
epistemically inferior to management in the preface of his question, due to limited access: he 
emphasizes how it is “obviously hard for us” (line 3) to interpret the management’s actions, 
which results in a tentative “sort of” assumption (line 6, 7). His use of “but” in line 14, during 
the actual question, is not a contrast structure per se, it is rather a statement claiming that shared 
information is not sufficient. In the first part of the construction, Alastair Ryan uses a phrase 
that is typical for a “but” contrast structure: “I appreciate that” (line 13) plus the management’s 
action. However, he then does not continue to oppose the management’s comments but 
continues with a request for more “clarity” (line 15). He is not insinuating a problem or a 
discrepancy, but requests a missing piece of information, another piece to the puzzle, which 
only management can provide him with. Contrast structures in this setting usually set the tone 
for the question, whereas in this case, the construction with “,but” is the actual question. Tushar 
Morzaria, the CEO of Barclays, replies to these questions in one long elaborate turn, which is 
at the end not reacted to by the analyst. Tushar Morzaria also refers to epistemic primacy of 
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participants in his response, but he treats it differently. He refuses to give the desired clear 
answer, by referring to what he treats as shared knowledge: Legal contingencies around the 
Pillar 2A prohibit an answer, “as you know” (line 16). He however continues to explain “how 
I’ve thought about it” (line 31), by referring to processes he tells the analyst to “put together” 
by himself (line 29, 30).  
Excerpt 7.1.2: A passive voice 
The following transcript excerpt shows a question asked by Michael Helsby, in which he asks 
two questions at the HSBC Full Year results conference call. Both questions do “being 
sceptical”, but due to the use of the “,but” construction, especially the latter starting in line 13 
is of interest in this chapter. 
 
The first action of the analyst when introducing the topic of his second question is to explicitly 
acknowledge information that had been shared by management (line 11). He shows that he does 
not take the disclosure for granted, mitigating his entitlement to this information. He then 
continues with a tentative contrastive structure: The first point is phrased in a passive voice, 
leaving out who actually focussed on dividend increases (line 13), and this is contrasted with a 
new piece of information that has been released on the day (line 14). He adds to this that he has 
a “feel[ing]” (line 15), that the market is worried, which is not a passive construction, but 
enables him to still remain vague on who exactly is worried. This formulation does not make 
clear whether he shares the market sentiment or not. He does not add any recommendations of 
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his own, but also contrasts the question that “has been focussed on” with his own, better 
question (line 16, 17). The only discernible stance he shares on the issue is that he is skilful 
enough to understand how new information could affect potential dividend cuts. The question 
that follows this preface does not reflect any criticism, but rather focusses on the market failing 
to ask the right questions. Further to that, it treats management as passive, reacting to a 
“scenario” (line 18). This plays into the narrative that has been discerned in studies on 
managers’ reactions and justifications during a crisis situation, in which external factors are 
blamed for poor performance that eventually leads to measures which disappoint investors, like 
dividend cuts (Keusch et al. 2012; Henry 2008). Not surprisingly, the manager Iain Mackay 
picks up this narrative and treats the issue as a shared one, accepting and reaffirming the effort 
of the analyst to signal social cooperation with a laughable (line 21). He opens his turn with a 
statement on how “nobody”, so both analysts and management, would be in favour of a certain 
scenario, treating them as sharing the same interests.  
Excerpt 7.1.3: “Calm my fears”  
The last excerpt in this section shows the analyst Manus Costello who asks a question during a 
Barclays Q 3 conference call. Again, the contrastive structure is in the question preface, in 
which the analyst builds his case. In this particular example the respective sentence occurs in 
the very beginning of the turn, in line 3. The second question asked by Manus is not on the 
transcript, for the sake of clarity.  
 
In his response, Tushar takes the questions in the same order Manus has asked them. When he 
finished responding to Manus’ first question, the analyst interrupts him with a clarification 





In his initial question, the analyst refers to a question that had been posed earlier during the call, 
and contrasts this to a guidance that had been given that day by management. He treats both 
aspects of the contrast-structure as shared knowledge: He only refers to an interaction, but does 
not summarise it (line 3), and furthermore treats the fact that particular guidance had been 
provided as “obvious” (line 4). He follows this contrast structure with expressing neither 
critique nor doubt when he evaluates the consensus as “looking to low” (line 6), but “fear” (line 
9) and “worry” (line 7). This again demonstrates an effort to demonstrate social cooperation, as 
the analyst does not seek to uncover untruths or poor judgement by management, but seeks help 
to understand the situation better, or as in Manus’ own words “[he] just want[s] to get to grips” 
(line 4). Management again plays along by opening their turn by picking up a phrase which 
very purpose it is to demonstrate affiliation, and not disaffiliation: “I’ll do my best Manus to 
allay your fears” (line 20).  
Excerpt 7.1.4: “I hear what you say, but” 
The following excerpt shows the first out of a number of questions asked by financial analyst 
Ed Firth during the Lloyds HY conference call. The contrast structure starts in line 4, where he 




When expressing that he is sceptical about the firm’s disclosure, Ed Firth only says that he hears 
what management is stating concerning a trend that occurred in the Q1, and contrasts this with 
actions taken in the newest report. He does not explicitly say how he thinks about this, in terms 
of whether there is a discrepancy or why he thinks there is one. Instead of clarifying what is 
problematic, he puts clear emphasis on a positive reception of the current written comments. 
Only when asking the actual question (line 8), he shares his own assessment, which he plays 
down three times as a “guess”. He handles the company’s strategy he is sceptical about very 
carefully: instead of contrasting it with his own expectation or opinion, he outlines how banks 
“traditionally” manage provision cover, which is a fairly neutral and non- face-threatening 
formulation for his evaluation (line 9). He requests more insight into the company’s motives 
for their actions, without suggesting that he could fault them. This way analyst does not signal 
doubt, but more curiosity. The lexical and structural choices in formulating the question suggest 
that a satisfactory reply by management is possible. The analyst achieves that the goal of his 
active participation appears to be seeking information, and not voicing doubt.  
Excerpt 7.1.5 “What I struggle with” 
The financial analyst Raul Sinha asked the following question during the HSBC HY results 
meeting. He adds this question after a first topic had been discussed and resolved, which he 






The bank’s group finance director gives the following reply: 
 
 
In the preface to his question, the financial analyst focusses on how information has been 
received by him. He uses a contrast structure to discuss what aspect he has understood, and 
what part he “struggles” with (line 5). He does not go into detail here concerning why exactly 
he struggles. This achieves that the analyst can avert making an accusation, as remaining vague 
and focussing on his own mental processes allows him to leave aside what actions by 
management lead to this “struggle”. The manager Iain Mackay admits that he cannot answer 
the question, as he does not know either, which puts him on equal footing with the analyst.   
The puzzled analyst 
The excerpts show what the role of the “puzzled” analyst looks like in this setting. Professional 
knowledgeability is handled in two ways: Firstly, the epistemic superiority of management is 
emphasized, instead of the actions that lead to the analyst being puzzled in the first place. The 
contrast structure with “but” does not seek to hold management accountable for a lack of 
information, they highlight a problem without touching on what the source of this problem 
could be. The questions are designed as reaching out for help, not to correct or to dispute. 
Secondly, the questions are affiliative as analysts emphasise that regardless of conflict of 
interest (see Chapter 3), they share both knowledge and interests in one community of practice. 
The analysts present themselves as caring – they are worried, unsure and struggling. This 
accomplishes that while scepticism is expressed, the analysts still present themselves as being 
on the same side as management. Managers reaffirm this representation of the professional 
relationship of the two parties by also referring to shared knowledge and by explicitly 
responding to analyst concerns.  
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7.2 The diagnosing analyst 
In the following, five excerpts are going to demonstrate how the 'diagnosing' analyst expresses 
scepticism concerning the financial results. It is argued that contrasting the management's 
guidance with their own assessment achieves two things: Firstly, it avoids conflict, as the 
financial analyst asks a separate question linked to the contrast structure, which enables 
management to focus on the information request instead of having to comment on the contrasted 
statements. The contrast structure might convey a high certainty of the financial analyst in his 
own assessment, but it also allows him or her to avoid spelling out an evaluation of the 
management's disclosure, and therefore does not have to directly criticise. 
Excerpt 7.2.1: I appreciate that, but / I get that, but. 
The following transcript example shows the initial question asked by the analyst Michael 
Helsby, to which we have seen the reply and follow-up question in 5.4.2 “An Open Challenge”. 
He has three questions, of which only one has a “but construction”. The first question starts in 
line 3, and finishes in line 5, and the second stretches over line 5 to line 10, and the third and 
longest question starts in line 10 until the end of the turn. The said construction is in line 8, as 
part of the second question. Michael contrasts the management's disclosure with his own 
thoughts, but he does not present a solution himself. 
 
 
The point of interest of this turn begins after a short break in line 3, which marks the end of the 
first question the analyst posed. The preface to the second question is used to evaluate a change 
in target by the firm, which Michael first says he is “conscious” of (line 5), and then presents 
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the conclusions he draws based on this change as factual (“clearly you carry a lot of goodwill” 
line 6). After this confident presentation his request is phrased as a contrast structure, using 
“but”. Firstly, he refers to one aspect of disclosed information that he understands (line 8). He 
then contrasts this with his own view, which he again presents as factual: “but still that doesn’t 
cover it” shows no attempts to mitigate, and the analyst also did not state if this view is just his 
own, or how sure he is about it. As seen in Chapter 6, analysts usually mitigate problematic 
claims with “I think” or “it seems”. Such discourse markers are noticeably absent here. The 
question immediately following is a request for a comment on this mismatch the analyst 
detected: “so if you could talk about that” (line 9). The phrasing allows the analyst to present 
his doubt not as a disagreement, as he does not have to share any notions of why he thinks “that 
doesn’t cover it”. He leaves the reason behind this entirely open, so that management can solve 
this problem for him. Fittingly, the third question in this long turn shows what questions often 
look like, and how problematic questions are handled discursively by analysts. He mitigates his 
assumptions (“cause it seems to think ye- that you might be” line 20), and he emphasises 
concern and worry (line 12, 19), and his own inferior epistemic access (“I’m struggling again” 
line 10). In both cases however, the analyst explicitly sides with management by “appreciating” 
(line 8) and “totally get” (line 11) received information.  
Exerpt 7.2.2: You call out x, but it is of course y.  
The following extract shows the first question out of two, asked by analyst John-Paul Cruxley 
during the Barclays Q1 conference call. The relevant construction starts in line 4, and ends in 
line 8, marked by a brief pause. The analyst contrasts the management’s presentation to his own 






The contrast structure that the analyst makes use of here is applied in the preface, as a 
foundation for the actual question. In the first part of the contrast structure, the analyst outlines 
not just the content of the presentation slide that caught his attention, but also sums up what the 
purpose of the slide was. He then contrasts this purpose to the current state of the firm, which 
he treats as factual. He does this by demonstrating high certainty (“of course” line 7, 
“obviously” line 8), and by not using discourse markers that would present this piece of 
information as his own assumption. The contrast structure allows the analyst to treat the 
management’s positive depiction (“healthy sustainable returns” line 6) as inaccurate without 
having to make a direct accusation. The analyst does not ask if management could comment on 
this, but he treats it as shared knowledge of both sides, that does not require any further 
comment.  
The actual question starts in line 10, and it continues to demonstrate the analyst’s 
knowledgeability. He rephrases his question and partly answers it himself (line 14 – 17). He 
ends with a justification for his information request, downplaying his intentions and the quality 
of the information he expects (“so I just wanted to get a feel for how you see the business 
evolving” (line 18, 19). Other than the contrastive statement in the beginning of the turn would 
suggest, the overall tone of this turn is not hostile; but rather constructive.  
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Excerpt 7.2.3: I take your point x, but it looks like y 
In the following excerpt, the analyst asks two comparatively brief questions. The second one, 
starting in line 7, is of particular interest here. The exchange took place during the Aberdeen 
Asset Management half year results conference call. Martin, the CEO of Aberdeen Asset 
Management, replies to the analyst. 
 
Even though the analyst is about to disagree with management, the tone of his question is 
noticeably submissive. He starts with an apology for asking a question concerning a topic that 
has seemingly been discussed before. He thereby treats the Q & A setting not as a space in 
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which he is entitled to ask any question that he deems important but orients to the act of asking 
question as something that has been granted by management. He also uses mitigation devices 
to soften his own assessment (for instance "I think" in line 2). This accommodating tone 
precedes a question in which the analyst assumes bad news to come in the future, as he asks 
"how nervous" management is getting, and not if they are (line 4). The preface for the second 
question is even shorter and consists only of one contrast structure. Bruce Hamilton contrasts 
the management's point on asset allocation, which he deems as "clear" (line 7), with his own 
assumption, which adds another factor, poor stock selection, as a reason for underperformance. 
He mitigates this with "it looks like" (line 7) and does not add an actual question to this 
statement. He lowers his voice to mark the end of the turn, and the manager immediately takes 
the floor to comment on the contrast structure. In his long turn he produces a humorous 
statement that does not invite the analyst to laugh, but still emphasizes agreement and shared 
understanding. As will be discussed in Chapter 8, gallows humour is based on shared 
knowledge, and in this example, the manager answers “how nervous” the company is with 
laughables starting in line 21, marked by an aspiration in line 22. This marks a socially risky 
action, namely the confirmation of bad news, but it also achieves affiliation with the analyst’s 
comments. He ends with “I know Bruce it’s tough at the moment” (line 33) which further 
emphasises the shared understanding and shared concern between analysts and managers over 
the company’s performance.  
Excerpt 7.2.4: but why? 
The following excerpt shows the longest turn by a participant of this chapter. Analyst Arturo 
de Frias’ question consists of three contrast structures. The first is in line 8, the second in line 
13, and the third in line 19. This alone shows how elaborate the case is that the analyst is trying 











The analyst's main point of concern in this turn are incongruous announcements by management 
concerning potential cuts in dividends. Especially the second "but" construction in line 13 
allows Arturo de Frias to present his doubt as a genuine question. He contrasts one statement 
by management that he supports with a question on another he deems problematic. The 
contrastive structure allows him to remain implicit about his concrete stance on the issue, the 
only phrase that gives his scepticism away is "if you really expect that" (line 15). In the preface 
to this question he makes use of another contrast construction, which opposes what “you tell 
us” (line 7) to “but the same time you say” (line 9), followed by a brief pause. It is not until 
after this pause until the analyst introduces his own view on the matter. With phrasing the 
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preface to his question this way, he seems to be only reporting what management said, without 
making any accusations. “So I guess” (line 10) highlights that his own conclusion is based on 
two statements that he has heard directly from management, which is tentative in nature. Similar 
to the actual question starting in line 13, this contrast structure allows him to withhold explicit 
comments on how one or both of the announcements are an issue. He can remain passive, as 
the receiver of information, who attempts to work with what he has got. Interestingly, this 
changes completely with the third contrast structure: Here de Frias contrasts a statement by 
management, which he emphasises can only be understood the way he understood it ("you are 
saying very clearly" line 17), with "the facts is as several of my colleagues asked or mentioned" 
(line 19). He associates himself with fellow analysts who have taken part in the call and asked 
questions, and what unites them are that they know "the facts" about the management's firm. 
Following this, de Frias goes into more depth with his own evaluations, based on the 
management's statement and the analysts' standpoint. He finishes his turn with a 
recommendation (line 29).  
As his long turn proceeds, he emphasizes his own stance more, and gradually moves from being 
puzzled by two statements that are hard to reconcile to presenting his own analysis as distinct 
from the management's approach to the issue. However, one cannot see an increase in hostility 
or a disaffiliative expression of scepticism. The analyst emphasises throughout this long and 
elaborate turn that management is the central source of information for his assumptions (line 4, 
line 6, line 9, line 17), and his actual questions (line 13, line 26) seek confirmation concerning 
his interpretations of what management is thinking. Doubt is therefore not expressed based on 
conflicting pieces of information or differing opinions on strategy, but on limited epistemic 
access.  
Excerpt 7.2.5: It’s got to come down 
This excerpt shows a follow-up question by financial analyst Chintan Joshi, asked during the 
Barclays half year results. The first turn that is shown in this excerpt is in fact a follow-up 






As shown in Chapter 6, analysts can increase the pressure for an answer during follow-up 
questions. Chintan Joshi starts his question off by correcting Barclay’s CEO, as he has not 
answered the question in as Chintan expected it (line 24). He seemingly contrasts his own 
efforts to calculate group cost with the official numbers, and his own conclusion (“that’s got to 
come down” line 28), with a different standpoint from management, which he does not 
explicitly mention here. Tushar agrees in his reply, but also quickly takes away an opportunity 
from the analyst to ask another follow-up on the issue (line 36). By suggesting that they “leave 
it at that” (line 36), Morzaria orients to his own reply as unsatisfying for the analyst. Both parties 
therefore seem to know exactly where the problem lies, even though Joshi does not include the 
contrasting firm statement in his question, just the official numbers. Even though the analyst 
makes his own evaluation of firm performance very clear, emphasising his analytical skill, he 
does not evaluate the management’s statements on such trends. He asks for further guidance, 
which similar to the previous Excerpt 7.2.4 treats limited epistemic access as the basis for 
scepticism. 
 
The diagnosing analyst 
The five excerpts show further examples of contrast structures that financial analysts use when 
expressing scepticism. It is argued that these examples show another way in which the financial 
analyst can perform this action publicly. The puzzled analyst emphasises his own inferior 
epistemic status and expresses that he or she “struggles” to make sense of given information, 
even though guidance had been given. The diagnosing analyst also orients to the management's 
superior epistemic stance, which results in an absence of open criticism concerning firm 
strategy or the quality of forecasts, as the analyst cannot claim to have a better understanding 
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of a matter while he also assumes that he has less access to relevant information than 
management. The diagnosing analyst puts more emphasis on his own skill and 
knowledgeability, thereby presenting herself or himself not as helpless, but as more difficult to 
deceive. There is a clear difference between the requests "but can you give us any clarity" 
(Excerpt 7.1.1) and "but that still doesn't cover it so if you could talk about that" (Excerpt 7.2.1). 
The diagnosing analyst does not explicitly hold management accountable by alleging that a 
mistake had been made, but he exposes an issue with his own evaluation, inviting management 
to comment, and not to help. This also becomes clear in Excerpt 7.2.2, where the analyst 
contrasts the “healthy” numbers management is showing with his own, different perspective, 
which he presents with high certainty (“but it is of course substantially down on where it was a 
year ago”). He shows that he sees through the framing of the issue by management and 
emphasises his high certainty throughout his turn. The asking analyst in Excerpt 7.2.3 does the 
same but presents the contrast between the guidance and his assessment with less conviction. 
Arturo de Frias in Excerpt 7.2.4 also discerns between facts and the guidance and presents his 
conclusions which are the result of discrepancies in disclosures or expectations. The last asking 
analyst links his conclusion, which he treats as inevitable, to a condition – if said forecast 
eventuates, then “(the run-rate)’s got to come down” (Excerpt 7.2.5). As can be seen in this 
short quote, his own evaluation is again presented with high certainty. 
All of these examples have in common that they expose problems in the management’s 
guidance through contrastive structures – usually contrasting the disclosed information with 
their own evaluation, which is presented with comparatively high certainty. Management is not 
blamed or attacked, but only confronted with two contrasting viewpoints which they are 
requested to align.  
 
7.3 The expression of scepticism on the front stage 
This chapter shows the results of the attempt to explore how financial analysts express the 
socially risky action of expressing scepticism towards their most important source of 
information publicly. Due to the format of this setting, this is often done in long turns, which 
can include multiple questions, with a varying degree of certainty or entitlement that is being 
expressed. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the norm for this setting seems to 
be that disaffiliation is not shown openly. Financial analysts do not criticise management 
decisions, and they also do not openly doubt the management’s willingness to disclose relevant 
information or reproach that misleading or contradicting information had been given 
deliberately. Such issues are still addressed in these interactions, disaffiliation is however 
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avoided by emphasising epistemic imbalance which is inherent to this setting – management as 
insiders are treated as having naturally superior epistemic access as well as epistemic primacy. 
Discursively, this is realised through the contrast structures that have been examined in this 
chapter. Such formulations with “but” allow the participant to mark a piece of information as 
problematic, while only describing a discrepancy, without having to include their own stance. 
As shown with the aid of ten transcripts, it is argued that two types of contrast structures occur: 
one is the puzzled analyst who emphasises the need for help to solve a problem, and one is the 
diagnosing analyst who presents his own evaluation as incompatible with the management’s 
disclosure. The diagnosing analysts make an effort to present themselves as knowledgeable, but 






8. Humour and Laughter in Financial Results Q & As 
This chapter examines the social functions of laughter in this particular institutional setting. The 
study of laughter and humour contributes to answering the research question “How do the social 
relations between financial analysts and the company management get displayed and played 
out in their interactions?”. The sequential position of laughter is contributing to the identity 
work that is done in interaction, and also plays a key role in managing the relationship between 
participants. In this data set, laughter was found to be a common feature. It occurred in every 
discussion session at least once and was therefore chosen to be examined further. When laughter 
was rare, it only occurred one or two times in calls that lasted more than half an hour, and when 
laughter was more frequent, it occurred up to nine times in 45minute long sessions. The 
researcher built a collection with all interactions that featured laughter, and then created a 
transcript of each instance in order to discern if there was a pattern concerning who initiates 
laughter and how it is reacted to, and what it accomplishes. 
Laughter can be an uncontrollable reaction, but it was also found to be systematically produced 
and interactionally coordinated (Hepburn and Varney 2013). It is a discourse marker with both 
visual and acoustic properties, and varying intensity, for which the English language has a great 
variety of descriptions, such as: giggle, cackle, or convulsive laughter. Such descriptions often 
have a positive or negative connotation – telling a lady that she cackles is hardly a compliment 
– and they also do not entail what these actions accomplish in interaction (ibid.). The only labels 
that the researcher is using for instances of laughter in this chapter are therefore the concepts 
that have been introduced in Chapter 4.7: Humour, laughter, joking, teasing, gallows humour 
and sarcasm. The researcher tried to represent the different acoustic properties of laughter 
particles in the transcripts. In some instances, pulsed outbreaths were discernible and 
transcribed with “hahHA”, also capturing a change in volume. These can occur as stand-alone 
particles or interpolated. Vowels can be voiced (“he” or “hu”), which might be accompanied 
by sharp inbreaths (“.hh”). Laughter is also sometimes lacking voiced features, and can consist 
entirely of “breathy sounds”, which is aspiration to differing degrees (“.hhh”). The latter is often 
produced simultaneously with talk (“thi(h)nk”).   
Laughter on its own or when accompanying speech achieves social actions like the mitigation 
of problematic utterances (Holt 2012) or disagreement (Raclaw Ford 2017), just to name a few. 
Both affiliation/ disaffiliation (Clayman 1992), as well as alignment/disalignment (Glenn 2003) 
can be expressed through laughter. Alignment refers to cases in which shared laughter, a term 
which refers to a noticeable response laughter following an initial laughter, supports ongoing 
142 
 
social actions, including the roles which are ascribed or taken on by participants, as well as the 
turn-by-turn structure of the interaction, whereas affiliative laughter signals agreement with the 
speaker's stance. 
As shown in the Chapters 6 and 7, talk in financial results Q & As is highly formalized and 
participants are cautious as well as strategic in discussing contentious issues, so this setting 
might not appear to invite jokes. In accordance with the existing body of research on laughter 
and CA (see Chapter 4.3.4), it was found that laughter and also humour served as an important 
tool to accomplish socially risky actions while maintaining social solidarity. 
Laughables, a term that refers to utterances that initiate or invite laughter (Glenn 2010), were 
produced by both financial analysts as well as managers. Laughables are marked by the speaker 
with either laughter tokens or above-mentioned acoustic properties. In this data set there are 
also instances in which the speaker treats a statement by another participant as a laughable, even 
though it is not accompanied by any acoustic properties that would clearly indicate this 
function. It is claimed in this study that this leads to an entirely different dynamic of the 
interaction than reacting to a marked laughable with laughter.  
The following patterns were found in different contexts across the data set: The majority of 
laughables were produced by the managers, and only in half of the cases it was explicitly reacted 
to and treated as a laughable by the analysts. Analysts uttered laughables less often, but they 
were always taken up by management. This finding in itself is not significant, as this cannot 
necessarily be linked to the institutional roles of the participants, but to the sequential position 
of the laughable. When analysts initiate laughter in their question, management is required to 
take the next turn and reply to the questions. A missing reaction would become noticeable. 
When managers produce a laughable in their reply, which is usually a long turn that is in most 
cases not replied to again, another turn to react just to take up the laughable would not be 
expected. 
The first section in this chapter will discuss laughter in long turns by management, which the 
audience does not join in with, at least audibly. The second section looks at laughter in 
interactions with multiple turns when initiated by management, and then at laughter initiations 
by the analyst. Lastly, laughter and speaking rights are discussed. All these types of laughter 
share that they occur when socially risky actions are accomplished. Laughter in long turns 
occurs when management has to discuss a negative performance outlook, and in immediate 
responses to the analyst laughter is a core aspect of delivering a rejection to answer. When 
analysts initiate laughter, they display their awareness of the management's contingencies when 
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answering their question, and thereby effectively limit the askability of their own question. 
Laughter is also used to manage the floor, when management wants to avoid further questions. 
Overall laughter creates alignment when performing an action that can be a potential threat on 
a professional level.  
8.1 Laughter in long turns 
The first type of laughter that will be discussed is laughter in long turns. As mentioned before, 
both turns of analysts and managers can be very elaborate; however, there is a crucial difference 
in the sequential positions of their turns. The analysts produce the first part of an interaction, 
and when they initiate laughter, it is usually immediately reacted to through an interruption, or 
management takes it up when the analyst has ended their turn. In the following transcripts 
however, management produces a laughable in an elaborate reply. The replies by management 
do not require another turn, which is why these instances of laughter are not reacted to with 
another comment by the analyst. The laughables are marked by management as such through 
pulsed and voiced outbreaths, or just aspiration. The following instances also share another 
characteristic: In terms of content, they can all be classified as gallows humour or self-
depreciating comments. As established in Chapter 4.3 of this thesis, laughter can serve as a 
face-saving activity for the speaker, when he or she jokingly discusses his short comings, as 
they are presented as less serious or problematic when packaged as a joke (Schurr and Chan 
2011). In this setting, managers do not comment on their own weaknesses, but they deliver bad 
news or pessimistic forecasts with laughter.  
The first two excerpts that are shown in this chapter are from Aberdeen Asset Management’s 
interim results conference call. Both results and forecasts have remained below the investor’s 
expectations. Consequently, the management of the firm has to explain this underperformance 
to the asking analysts. Both excerpts show how the manager produces a laughable or chuckles 
at his own comments mid-turn. Neither of these laughs is a direct reaction to the analyst’s 
question. 
Excerpt 8.1.1: Laughable on negative outlook 
This first instance of laughter when explaining bad news follows a seemingly neutral question 
from analyst Peter Lenardos from RBC. He asks about future trends for the second half of the 





The laughable occurs as the manager sets out to lower the analyst’s expectations for the second 
half of the year in line 18. The referent for the laughter is the comment that starts in line 16, 
which describes the ideal scenario for the company in order to perform well. The laughter 
particles accompany the message which emphasises that the company is isolated with this desire 
(“we’re .hh we(h)’re the only fund-management group that wants that by the wa(h)y he so:” 
line 18). After this, Martin moves from an ideal scenario to the actual forecast, which entails 
the delivery of bad news to which the laughter is not extended (“it’s gonna be a tricky second 
half” line 20). According to Incongruity Theory (Morreal 1982), the laughter emphasises an 
absurdity in the company’s difficult situation. Laughter also eases the delivery of bad news, by 
making it sound less grave, but not less serious.   
In the following excerpt, laughter is used in a similar way: 
Excerpt 8.1.2: Laughable on negative outlook 
This excerpt again shows an interaction that took place during the Aberdeen Asset Management 
interim results presentation, but this time the analyst Hailey Tam makes a negative assessment, 
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and the manager uses a laughable when discussing the bad performance. Laughter is audible in 
line 22 and also at the end of the turn, in line 29. 
 
Again, the referent of the first laughter is the good performance of the “wrong” market (line 
19). In line 22, laughter is still subtle through aspiration and then becomes clearly discernible. 
This is again followed by a comment on the negative outlook and the announcements of 
“struggles”. A second laughable occurs at the end, where he mentions the pressure of investors 
leaving. Laughter marks two assessments that are bad news for the company and investors, 
however not necessarily analysts, which again does not play down the seriousness of the issue 
but eases the delivery. 
Gallows humour in both instances only works on the grounds of shared knowledge. By turning 
a negative forecast into a laughable, management treats this as an evaluation the analysts have 
made already - or would make - based on the financial results. It is questionable whether bad 
news that the audience does not already anticipate would be delivered with laughter. This would 
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have to be examined further. However, these two examples give the impression that laughter 
when delivering bad news emphasises shared knowledge, which might be the very factor that 
facilitates the delivery. 
8.2 Co-created Laughter between financial analysts and Management 
Other than the previously discussed excerpts of laughter in long turns, the following seven 
excerpts show how laughter occurs and is used a resource on a turn-by-turn basis. The first three 
excerpts show instances in which management initiates laughter, and the latter four excerpts 
are examples for the same action undertaken by the analyst. It is argued that in all instances 
laughter facilitates or even enables both management and the analyst to perform socially risky 
actions while still cooperating with each other to fulfil the institutional goal of the setting, 
decreasing information asymmetry.  
Initiated by Management 
In the following, three excerpts will be discussed in which management initiates laughter. Other 
than in 7.1., these excerpts show a great variety of the sequential position of a laughable or 
laughter, as these interactions have multiple turns. It is argued here that participants overall goal 
is still to achieve alignment as well as affiliation through the use of laughter. The following 
three show how management declines to answer to a question through laughter.  
Excerpt 8.2.1: Laughter enables directness 
In this excerpt, the financial analyst Jonathan Pearce makes a follow-up statement which is 
fishing for information, but management of Lloyds – George Culmer and Antonio Horta – 
Osorio – decline to answer. The laughable that initiates the laughter appears in line 5, initial 





The analyst makes a follow-up statement in line 1, which is a declarative. Due to the setting 
and its sequential position, which is after an answer by Antonio Horta-Osorio, the statement is 
treated as a request for confirmation. The long pause of almost two seconds in line 3 
foreshadows that the answer will be dispreferred (Pomerantz 1984). The CFO George Culmer 
is the first of the management team to react, and after a discourse marker that displays that he 
has understood the question, he starts a sentence which his colleague picks up and finishes for 
him. “That’s that’s private information” (line 5) is the only statement that management makes 
as a response, and the CFO reacts to this with laughter, and thereby marks the comment as a 
laughable. In this setting, most dispreferred responses were accompanied by an explanation, or 
an alternative piece of information. In this interaction, management breaks with that norm, and 
Incongruity Theory (Morreal 1982) offers an explanation as to why this is reacted to with 
laughter: Horta- Osório and Culmer treat the question as inappropriate, and an answer to it as 
absurd. Interestingly, the financial analyst resumes the floor to pose another question without a 
noticeable break. This suggests that he understands the joke to be a final and non-negotiable 
comment on the matter. Even though this is a clearly discernible dispreferred response, he 
responds with a laughter particle, which is a stressed vowel (“he o:okay” line 7). By joining the 
laughter, he accepts the way his request has been declined. The interaction continues, and also 
the next information request is turned down, this time without laughter. The manager gives a 
reason for why he is not able to share the requested information during the Q & A, but does 
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indicate that the desired information might be released at a later stage. The closing remark of 
the TCU by the analyst is again “okay”, accompanied by a brief pause and another question. 
The laughter that accompanies the direct decline softens the dispreferred response, and the 
noticeable laughter particle from the analyst creates alignment with the management’s response, 
as it suggests acceptance. Therefore, the CEO has been enabled by the CFO and the also the 
analyst who made the information request to give a brief dispreferred response, without any 
further explanation. Aligning with this laughter means to also align with the statement of 
management, and “That’s private information” (line 5) challenges the askability of the analyst’s 
question. The analyst’s reaction to the laughable therefore reaffirms a shared understanding 
concerning what information can and cannot be shared. 
Excerpt 8.2.2: A decline based on shared knowledge 
During the Q3 results of Barclays, CEO Tushar answers multiple questions by analyst Edward 
Firth in an elaborate monologue. The last bit of this monologue is shown below, and a laughter 
particle in line 8 is the object of analysis. 
 
In his initial question, the analyst asks whether he should assume a negative Q4 for the year 
2015, which is not in the transcript excerpt shown above. He does not hint at any contingencies 
in his question, but the Tushar does so explicitly in his reply. Tushar first of all evaluates the 
analyst's question as "reasonable" (line 7), but directly afterwards he claims that he cannot 
comment on the Q4 "of course", due to high uncertainty. This "of course" in line 8 is 
accompanied by a laughter particle, which underlines this claim of an inability to reply. Shortly 
after this he again acknowledges the reasoning behind the analyst's question, by agreeing with 
him on a related point ("you're correct to point out" line10). Overall, Tushar agrees with the 
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analyst twice in his answer, but the information Edward was actually interested in is declined. 
This dispreferred response is also treated as a mutual understanding. Tushar's laughter and 
lexical choices treat a refusal as obvious, and as something the analyst should also know. Again, 
laughter enables management to challenge the askability of the analyst's question, without 
creating disalignment.  
Excerpt 8.2.3: Management treats question as laughable 
This exchange took place during the Lloyds 2015 interim results meeting. The analyst Chris 
Cant sits in the audience and asks his question to the management team that sits on stage. The 
camera shows Chris Cant while he asks his questions, and shows only the stage during the 
answer. That is why in line 9, 12 and 23 it is not specified who laughed, the CEO Antonio 
Osorio or the CFO George Culmer. The interaction shows for this setting a noticeably high 
number of interruptions and explicit laughter. 
 
The excerpt shows two information requests by the analyst, which are both not fulfilled. The 
first dispreferred response is delivered with laughter, and for the second one the CEO remains 
serious. The analyst, after posing the actual question in line 6 and 7, adds a postscript in which 
he alludes to contingencies that might complicate providing an answer. The reference to 
contingencies (“obviously things may change” line 7,8) are treated as a laughable by 
management. Only after the laughter by management, which is not into the microphone, but 
audible for the analyst, he has what’s often called a “smiley voice or tone”, which means that  
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subtle laughter particles occur (line 10).  The management’s initial reaction comments on the 
quality of the question. This is not unusual in this setting - management tends to confirm that a 
request was “reasonable” when giving a dispreferred response, or to agree with at least one 
aspect of the question, which achieves that the askability of a question is not challenged. In this 
case however, an evaluation of the question is exaggerated and accompanied by laughter, which 
marks it as a joke (line 15). The CFO responds to this comment with laughter as well, treating 
it as humour (line 16). This joke marks the question as a laughable, treating it as mildly 
transgressive, or cheeky. The laughter enables management to treat the analyst as a “good 
sport”, who innocently tried his luck, instead of condemning the question as inappropriate or 
pointless. The rejection and a follow-up question can be seen below: 
 
The manager is still laughing when giving a reason for why the request cannot be answered 
(line 17), and laughter particles occur again at the end of that turn. The analyst prolongs this 
laughter by both referring to the dispreferred response in expressing his hopes that the next 
information request will be answered (line 22). Management interrupts the analyst with loud 
laughter as an immediate reaction. By co-creating the laughable, the analyst aligns with 
management in their refusal to answer the request. Laughter therefore achieves multiple things 
in this interaction: management can refuse to disclose requested information in a fairly direct 
manner, without offending the recipient. They can at the same time challenge the askability of 
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the question, again without questioning the professionalism of the analyst. The analyst can 
signal acceptance with this by aligning with management through shared laughter.  
The fact that most instances in which laughter occurred were during declines to information 
requests, as well as the analysis of the use of laughables in this interaction lead to the conclusion 
that laughter is meant to ease the delivery of risky content and social actions. Risky social 
actions can be to admit poor performance, and the withholding of information. Both sides, the 
analyst as well as management join in and co-create a laughable, which at least on the surface 
maintains a friendly and constructive tone between two parties, which creates the impression 
that both share an interest in the same outcome of the Q & A, which is more transparency for 
the market.  
In all three excerpts the analysts offer references to contingencies in their questions which are 
taken up with a laughable by management. This allows the managers not to fulfil the request of 
an analyst, while at the same time aligning with them. This accomplishes the delicate task of 
withholding information, and shared laughter does not just facilitate the delivery of a 
dispreferred response, it also creates mutual acceptance of this action.   
Laughter initiated by the Analyst 
The following four transcripts show instances in which analysts use laughter when posing 
questions to management or when reacting to their comments. In all of the interactions in this 
data set in which analysts initiate laughter by either laughing first or making a statement that 
can be treated as a laughable, questions are marked as difficult to answer. Of the following 
excerpts, 8.2.5 and 8.2.6 are examples of analysts explicitly anticipating a dispreferred 
response, 8.2.4 is a reaction to a negative evaluation given in a response, and 8.2.7 is an alternate 
question in which the analyst addresses problems and past mistakes in forecasting the firm’s 
performance. Laughter enables the analysts to maintain alignment with management during 
these various potentially critical points of the conversation. 
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Excerpt 8.2.4: Laughing together about a negative outlook 
In this first excerpt, the analyst Michael Helsby treats the comment by HSBC’s CEO Iain 
McKay and the CFO Stuart Gulliver as a humorous statement, even when the speaker himself 
does not mark it as such (line 12). 
 
The transcript shows the closing of the interaction between two managers and a financial 
analyst. The analyst asks a follow-up question in line 3 and 4, which is after a considerably long 
pause replied to with a brief comment on a vague trend (“somewhat bearish” line 6), but the 
number given by the analyst is ignored. After another noticeable pause, the analyst accepts this 
answer with a hesitation, which the CEO treats as an expression of confusion or dissatisfaction, 
and therefore makes another comment on the issue (line 9). The CFO also joins that 
conversation, with the comment in line 10 “yeah there isn’t much to see there”. The financial 
analyst treats this as a laughable, as he reacts with pulsed outbreaths in line 11. There are no 
vocal properties in the statement that suggest a laughable. The managers also do not join the 
laughter but interrupt the uptake of the joke by ending the call (line 12). Michael still extends 




Laughing as a response to negative performance is a risky social action for the analyst; it could 
be interpreted as alignment, as the recipient is actively helping with relaxing the situation, but 
it could also be understood as laughing at the speaker’s problem. The analyst’s follow up to his 
laughter, in which he says, “tell me about it” (line 13), is not responded to by management. The 
statement as a reaction to the management’s joined comments on poor performance which has 
not changed in years, suggests a shared understanding of the relevance of this piece of 
information, as well as a shared sentiment towards this development. As this affiliative 
comment was made while management made attempts to close the call (“great” line 11), it does 
not seem to have a strategic role in this interaction, but towards the overall institutional 
relationship between the two parties. The analyst presents himself as having shared interest with 
management, who through laughter and agreement signals affiliation with the management’s 
statement that “there isn’t much to see there”.  
Excerpt 8.2.5: Anticipating a dispreferred response 
The following excerpt shows an exchange between the analyst Tom Rayner and the CEO of 
Barclays during the Q1 conference call. Rayner is interrupted by Tushar Morzaria when he 








There are two incidents in which laughter occurs in the transcript, and the referent of both is 
the comment made by the analyst in line 2 and 3. In the preface to his question he acknowledges 
the difficulty in answering his question by making a drastic remark, which is treated as amusing: 
The financial analyst spells out that Tushar Morzaria does not have to answer if this would send 
him to prison. This comment is reacted to immediately by Morzaria, and their speech overlaps 
briefly (line 4,5). Tushar marks the statement as a laughable and continues the joke by 
responding to it as if it were a serious comment. Humour is created here by explicitly stating 
155 
 
knowledge that both participants share due to their professions. It would usually be taken for 
granted that the financial analysts do not expect a reply that is illegal. After the rest of the 
elaborate question has been posed, the manager repeats the overstatement, which results in a 
brief joint laughter (line 26, 27), before he eventually turns down the request. By immediately 
reacting to the analyst’s comment in line 4, and by quoting it again in his actual answer, the 
manager does not just co-create the joke, he also makes it an overarching theme of the 
interaction. As established in Chapter 8.1, shared laughter can only be established based on a 
shared understanding of the context. This joke reflects a mutual understanding of both parties 
concerning the limits and responsibilities of their roles, and this agreement also facilitates 
turning down the information request by the financial analyst. Management can address the 
legitimacy withholding information in a serious as well as non-serious manner (“obviously you 
know the reasons why” line 30, 31).   
Excerpt 8.2.6: Joined laughter makes joined rejection 
In this excerpt, the analyst Tom Rayner asks a follow-up question during the HSBC interim 
results presentation. He asks an alternate question, in which he offers the response option that 
the analyst has come to the wrong conclusion. Information is still shared, but the analyst's 












In the question preface, the analyst discusses which sources of information have led him to ask 
his question. Immediately before he poses his question, he describes the management's actions 
with a contrast structure, as discussed in Chapter 7. Similar to what has been named "the puzzled 
analyst", Tom Rayner contrasts two different statements by management on the same issue. 
However, before he can finish his argument and present his stance, a member of management 
tries to interrupt him. This interruption in line 10 could be interpreted as an attempt to disagree 
with at least one aspect of the analyst’s summary, but due to the overlap, it is not clear what the 
manager has said. However, after the interruption, which the analyst does not allow, he phrases 
a rather cautious question. He adds to his question that his analysis might be faulty due to 
“reading as usual too much into everything” (line 12). As management usually does not 
interrupt the analyst's question, Tom Rayner's efforts to emphasise his inferior epistemic access 
to information could mean that he treated the interruption as an indicator for a reply in which 
management disagrees with him. Furthermore, the analyst does not only emphasise this 
epistemically weaker stance, but he makes a self-depreciating comment: "as usual" (line12) 
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hints at mistakes in his evaluations that he had made in the past. Management takes up his exact 
words with voicing specific vowels (“toohuh much” line 14), and a pulsed outbreath at the end 
of the repetition turns the analyst’s statement into a laughable. The analyst reacts by laughing 
out loud, but instead of extending the laughter, Stuart Gulliver returns to the more serious 
matter, and responds to the analyst’s evaluation. He does not comment on any mistake made 
by the analyst, but instead focusses on the message he is trying to send (“what I am trying to do 
Tom is clarify the fact that” (line 16) and to distance himself from any “wrongful interpretation” 
(line 24) in general. The joined production of a laughable enabled management to avoid calling 
the analyst’s view as false, but to instead pick up the analyst’s own phrase that refers to a much 
more harmless shortcoming, that he was just trying too hard.  
The analyst's question which achieved epistemic downgrading is central to this interaction, as 
it shaped the reply to the information request. Stuart Gulliver is using the analyst's take on the 
epistemic imbalance between the two parties as a resource to disagree with the analyst. He 
agrees with the analyst's jokingly self-deprecating statement, and thereby at the same time 
disagrees with his conclusion that "any softening in tone" (line 12) is happening towards China. 
This alignment is carried out through joined laughter - management first treats the question as 
a laughable, and the laughter by the analyst deems the management's action as appropriate. This 
use of laughter again enables a socially risky action to be carried out in a non-threatening 
manner, enabling the participants to perform a public disagreement in a seemingly light-hearted 
way, as they both also agree on how the analyst reached a conclusion that is not applicable.  
Excerpt 8.2.7: The analyst's shortcomings  
This excerpt shows an interaction from the Q1 results presentation by Barclays in which the 
analyst Alastair Ryan of Bank of America asked two questions. For the sake of clarity only the 
relevant first question and the first sentences of the answer to it are shown on the transcript. 
This excerpt shows another jokingly self-depreciating comment by the analyst, as he is also 




The analyst opens his question with a remark about mistakes he had made in the past when 
analysing Barclays's performance ("I'm clearly fairly hopeless at forecasting your costs" line 
1). He treats this remark as a laughable with pulsed outbreaths (line 2). Even though a similar 
strategy was shown in the previous Excerpt (8.2.6), opening a question by downplaying one’s 
own skills and knowledge is not the norm for this setting: Analysts rather made an effort to 
underpin their expertise, which balances out the epistemically weaker position and strengthens 
their knowledge claims. This does not mean that they never admit confusion or issues with 
drafting their reports (as can be seen in Chapter 7 and the analysis of the “puzzled analyst”), 
but in this data set it was more common to still emphasise confidence and certainty in 
evaluations based on what data is available to outsiders like financial analysts. This breach is 
according to Incongruity Theory (Morreal 1982) what can make this statement amusing. As 
mentioned before, it was found that laughter initiated by analysts usually leads to joined 
laughter, however, this is not the case in this interaction. Tushar Morzaria does not react to the 
humorous comment at all, and therefore does not treat the laughter in the beginning of the 
analyst's turn as an invitation. As the turn of the analyst is elaborate and lengthy, ignoring a 
laughter is not necessarily an act of explicit disalignment. When somebody tells a joke and 
pauses immediately after to allow for laughter, but the recipient remains collected and stern, 
this would be a potentially face-threatening act of disalignment. In this case however, 
management still creates alignment by also referring to exchanges between both parties at an 
earlier stage, with "the guidance we provided to you on the twenty-third of February" (line 8) 
potentially being the basis for the wrong Q1 forecast the analyst refers to in his question preface. 
Picking up the laughable and commenting on wrong forecasts would also be socially risky, as 
this could be understood as ridiculing the analyst's capability in fulfilling his professional role.  
Like the transcript excerpts on laughter initiated by management, these four excerpts displaying 
laughter initiated by analysts show how participants make an effort to facilitate risky social 
actions through laughter. Analysts offer management a more light-hearted ‘way out’, by 
demonstrating their epistemic stance in the question (Excerpts 8.2.5, 8.2.6, 8.2.7). This stance 
is clear inferior epistemic access as well as primacy – analysts make clear that they do not know 
enough to evaluate the information and also that they do not expect to receive the requested 
information. This enables management to refuse the disclosure of information without 
threatening the analyst’s face by doubting the askability of the question, and they also do not 
appear uncooperative. Both parties agree that the answer will not be complete, and analysts 
thereby make withholding requested information acceptable. Laughter is part of the delivery of 
that stance, which also achieves that the analyst does not “look like an idiot” (Brown et al. 
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2015), as laughter signifies an awareness of the managements’ contingencies, and of the limited 
askability of the question. The analyst thereby avoids coming across as naïve or ignorant. 
Laughter in all instances creates affiliation – a sense of a common interest, shared knowledge 
and understanding. In none of the above instances do participants laugh at each other or ridicule 
each other’s behaviour.  
8.3 Laughter and speaking rights  
Laughter also occurred in this data set when there was a lack of clarity concerning who would 
be the next speaker. This can be the case in two moments throughout a Q & A: When a 
conversation is finished and the next analyst is chosen, and when the chance for a follow-up 
question arises. In the first case, the speaking rights of all participants are clear. Management 
appoints the speaker, the analyst waits until he is appointed, which in some cases might mean 
that he is waiting in vain. In terms of follow-up questions, this is a bit more ambiguous. Follow-
ups are not forbidden, but too many consecutive questions asked by the same analyst are not 
encouraged either. The following excerpts show how laughter is used by both management and 
the analysts to strengthen their speaking rights, without being hostile towards the other 
participant. The first excerpt, Excerpt 8.3.1, shows how a follow-up question is avoided by 
management, as laughter and humour allow them to quite forcefully supress explicit attempts 
by the analyst to express scepticism about a provided answer. Excerpt 8.3.2 shows how 
management uses humour when appointing the next analyst to ask a question during a meeting, 
and Excerpt 8.3.3 shows how the analyst reacts to such an appointment, also with a laughable.  
Excerpt 8.3.1: Shutting down an interruption by an asking analyst 
This excerpt is taken from the Lloyds interim results in 2015, and the asking analyst is Ed Firth. 
In the excerpt he is asking a follow-up question, and the CEO Antonio Horta- Osório responds 
to it. Horta- Osório then interrupts his own turn by reacting verbally to a facial expression by 
Ed Firth, leading to the analyst’s attempt to re-claim the floor. This is however halted by 
management. This excerpt is comparatively long and therefore split in half. The first part of the 
excerpts shows the question, initial responds and interruption. The second one shows the 




As most of the Q & As in this data set have taken place over the phone, there are only few 
instances where participants react to facial expressions or gestures of others. Antonio is sitting 
on a stage and seems to have a clear view of the asking analyst when he replies to his follow-
up question. Antonio interrupts himself as he interprets the facial expression of Ed Firth as a 
sceptical response to his statement concerning a “better quality of the book” (line 11). The room 
reacts to his reference to the analyst’s facial expression with laughter, and the analyst himself 
does not join the laughter but takes this explicit reference as an invitation or opportunity to 
elaborate on how this response is problematic for him. Antonio makes two attempts to suppress 
the analyst’s attempt to take the floor, and as Ed Firth does not react to Antonio’s strategy to 
talk over him, he induces a loud banging noise (line 18). It did not become clear from the video 
where the sound originated from, but Antonio immediately makes clear that he did it 
purposefully (line 21). He does not specify why and what he did, but makes a humorous 
statement, to which the room again reacts with laughter.  
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Two difficult situations have been managed with humour by management in this interaction: in 
line 12 the CEO can see a threatening and sceptical response forming on the side of the analyst, 
and in line 15 the analyst actually attempts to contradict the manager’s analysis. In both 
instances Antonio reacted with a laughable, which made his in fact firm and adverse conduct 
seem light-hearted, and almost entertaining for the audience overall. To every interruption, he 
replies with “let me give you” (line 12, line 13, line 17), which sounds like he is offering help. 
The second part shows that he then fully reclaimed the floor. 
 
With what can be described as a “smiley voice” he gives his example (line 25). The smiley 
voice is discernible in an overly clear pronunciation throughout the self-questioning in lines 30 
– 32, a chuckle after his explanation (line 29), and a smile when he finishes his turn. Without 
pausing, he goes on to select a new speaker with a new question, prohibiting the analyst again 
from asking a potentially sceptical follow-up question. He handled the whole situation with 
humour, but when looked closely at his actions, it is questionable whether the analyst actually 
found the exchange funny. His attempts to weigh in when the manager addresses his facial 
expressions were suppressed multiple times, and the exchange was closed by the manager 
before the analyst got his chance to finish the sentence, he started in line 15. The manager did 
not check with him whether his “enlightening example” (line 25) actually answered the question 
he never got the chance to actually ask, even though the manager showed that he was aware a 
question existed. The loud banging noise that shut down the question for good elicited an 
apology by the analyst (line 19), and after that he does not make another attempt to weigh in 
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again. The only reason why this at first does not come across as a hostile action is the repeated 
use of humour which generates multiple instances of laughter; partly one-sided, with only 
management laughing (line 24), and partly joined by the analyst audience (line 22, 14).  
Excerpt 8.3.2: Appointing the next speaker 
This example is taken from the full year results of Barclays, which follow the usual set-up for 
meetings: The managers are standing on a stage, and the asking analysts are sitting in the 
audience. Other than over the phone, management select the speaker personally with a hand 
gesture, or by calling their name. Due to the limited time, not every analyst can pose a question. 
Laughter, but not humour, is sometimes used to bridge the moment where management carry 
out their privilege to appoint the next speaker. 
 
The couple of seconds that Jes Stanley needs to make his decision are bridged by two laughables 
that him and Tushar Morzaria co-create. The first laughable is the management’s attempt to 
make a “fair” choice, by demonstrating that they are appointing the speaker who has been trying 
to ask a question the longest (line 1). The second one is a deliberately casual remark on who 
gets eventually chosen in (line 5), which causes Tushar Morzaria to laugh out loud. The analysts 
do not join the laughter, but it is not clear whether they smiled or acknowledged it in any other 
way, as the video data only shows management. The analyst that gets to ask the question, Peter 
Toeman, does not join in the laughter, but gets directly to the question. 
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Excerpt 8.3.3: Reaction to Appointment 
The following exchange took place during a conference call hosted by HSBC, concerning their 
Q1 results. The very brief transcript shows the operator inviting the analyst to pose a question, 
and after a lengthy pause, the analyst Chintan Joshi comments on the fact that he is the last 
caller allowed to ask a question in the question preface. Management responds with a quiet 
laughter. 
 
Analysts often thank management for letting them ask a question, but this one is a little bit 
different, which management understood immediately. The brief laughter by management in 
line 6 is indicative of this, as usually such acknowledgements are not treated as laughables, but 
as genuine statements. Chintan is one of the most active asking analysts for retail banks, and 
when he wants to ask a question, he is allowed to by all the banks in the data set, every time. 
His “thanks” therefore is not just a genuine “thank you”, but could also signal that he has not 
expected to wait this long with his question. A laughable enables him to bring this up without 
making a complaint and avoid hostility. He joins the laughter in line 4, as a reaction to the 
management’s laughter in line 6.  The laughable does not clearly signal annoyance or 
disapproval, but rather highlights that the analyst as well as management see him as an analyst 
with a higher status.  
The power imbalance in deciding who gets to speak becomes apparent in the just depicted 
situations. Managing this right respectfully is crucial in order to maintain a positive working 
relationship with the analyst community. Using laughter and humour enables the speakers to 
undertake actions that might otherwise be seen as inappropriate. This is especially the case in 
Excerpt 8.3.1, when the manager stifles the analyst's comment, and in Excerpt 8.3.3., when the 
analyst makes a humorous remark instead of a complaint.   
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8.4 The role of laughter in financial results presentation Q & As 
This chapter aims to show where laughter occurs and what social function it fulfils in Q & A 
sessions subsequent to financial results presentations. Laughter was found to be initiated by 
both financial analysts, but more often by management. Variations of laughter occurred in 
multiple sequential positions in this data set: In long turns (Excerpt 8.1.1, 8.1.2), in a 
management reply with an immediate reaction (Excerpt 8.2.1, Excerpt 8.2.2, Excerpt 8.2.3, 
Excerpt 8.3.1), or in a question by the analyst (Excerpt 8.2.4, Excerpt 8.2.5, Excerpt 8.2.6, 
Excerpt 8.2.7, Excerpt 8.3.3). Laughter was in most cases shared, especially when it occurred 
in a sequential position that demanded a reaction. It was furthermore shown that laughter in this 
setting marks socially risky actions. By creating alignment through joined laughter, actions that 
might strain the professional relationship between management and analysts were mitigated. 
Such risky actions are power imbalances with regards to speaking rights, as management used 
their right to appoint speakers and to supress a question (Excerpt 8.3.1) or avoid (Excerpt 8.3.2, 
Excerpt 8.3.3) complaints. Management also used laughter when discussing negative forecasts, 
which the analysts will discuss in their reports after the event (Excerpt 8.1.1, Excerpt 8.1.2), or 
when declining to share information with the analyst (Excerpt 8.2.1, Excerpt 8.2.2, Excerpt 
8.2.3). Analysts used laughter when posing questions that lead to a negative response 
concerning firm performance (Excerpt 8.2.4), or to signal awareness of the management’s 
constraints in answering the full question (Excerpt 8.2.5, Excerpt 8.2.6), thereby effectively 
assisting a dispreferred response.  
Overall, the use of laughter contributed to the establishment of social solidarity and cooperation 
between management and the financial analysts. The success of humorous statements is highly 
dependent on a shared understanding of the context of an interaction. In two examples of 
gallows humour, laughter accompanied the delivery of a negative outlook. In other instances, 
laughter particles did not accompany the delivery of bad news, but the “obviousness” of why a 
question would not be answered, or an agreement with an assessment. Laughter is in none of 
these cases shared, but laughter is based on shared knowledge and marks these statements as 
such. Treating a problematic fact not as news but as mutual understanding eases its delivery. It 
at the same time emphasises an equal epistemic status, which creates alignment. As mentioned 
just before, laughter also occurred when information requests were turned down or anticipated 
to be turned down. In all such instances, laughter was shared. Laughter particles accompanied 
the delivery of the dismissal, or the reason why a dismissal was anticipated. This does not turn 
withholding information into a laughing matter, but it demonstrates a shared understanding of 
why information is withheld and demonstrates acceptance. This becomes especially clear when 
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financial analysts initiate this type of laughter, as they are co-creating the dismissal of their own 
request. Finally, laughter or jokes enabled participants to exploit a power imbalance between 
their institutional roles. Especially when managing speaking rights, management is in a more 
powerful position: They select the speaker and can end the conversation after their response, 
thereby preventing follow-up questions. Laughter and joking mitigates this process, and eases 




9. Discussion and Conclusion  
The content of this final chapter is threefold: Firstly, the findings of the empirical chapters of 
this thesis will be discussed. In 9.1, the analyses of this study will be related to Clayman and 
Heritage's study on questioning presidents (2002), as this setting comes closest to the one at 
hand within the field of institutional CA. This study has been introduced in Chapter 4.3.2. 
Secondly, in chapter 9.2 it is argued that financial analysts do make an effort in demonstrating 
cooperation and social solidarity with management in public interactions, which is expressed 
in a lack of imperatives or directives, the mitigation of their information requests, the use of 
face-saving contrast structures when expressing scepticism as well as the use of laughter in 
socially risky actions. Finally, in 9.3 it is discussed how the presentation of self by the financial 
analyst has the purpose of demonstrating and enacting transparency. This is achieved by sharing 
their own methods with a wider audience, as well by their efforts to elicit further information 
through follow-up questions. The management’s lengthy replies, even if they are not sharing 
new information, and the financial analysts’ final turn in which they thank management for 
their statement, further contribute to the performance of transparency. This seemingly fruitful 
information exchange, built on the interaction rituals that have been reviewed in this thesis, 
convey that the system of public disclosures is functioning.  It has not been examined whether 
or not information that is inquired about is of a symbolic character, or whether it is valuable 
and relevant to investors. The literature on this is ambiguous, and this study does not aim to 
side with either streams. What it does show, is that interactants orient to each other as if an 
information exchange is taking place. In 9.2, the conclusion is drawn by answering the two 
research questions ‘How do the social relations between financial analysts and the company 
management get displayed and played out in their interactions?’ and ‘How do financial analysts 
display an understanding of their respective institutional roles in the design of their turns at 
talk?’. In 9.3, the contributions of this study to the fields of Financial Communication as well 
as Applied Linguistics are outlined, and ideas for future research projects based on the findings 
of this thesis are also presented. 
9.1. Discussion 
This thesis aims to answer the call for more interdisciplinary research in external accounting 
communication by applying Conversation Analysis, a qualitative research method from the 
field of linguistics and sociology, to a setting within Financial Reporting. As Merkl-Davies and 
Brennan (2015) point out in their theoretical framework, only very little research has been done 
so far that examined conversational and relational aspects of accounting communication – the 
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focus so far lay on the actors, the context or the message itself. The past three chapters of this 
thesis showed an analysis of how messages were received and directly reacted to on a public 
platform, which are webcasts of Q&A sessions after quarterly financial results. It was analysed 
how financial analysts built their case to either claim epistemic access or express scepticism 
towards received information. The symbolic-interpretative narrative definition of accounting 
communication, which CA is part of, assumes that the way in which analysts design their turn 
or respond with a follow-up question both reflect how analysts understand their and the 
management’s institutional rights and responsibilities, and at the same time establishes the 
participants’ institutional realities.  
9.1.1 Insights from Conversation Analysis 
The researcher aimed to examine the methods of financial analysts in negotiating the disclosure 
of information following quarterly financial results presentations. The researcher is an outsider 
to this community – she has never worked within the field of Finance and Accounting, nor did 
any personal links grant access to this data set. Therefore, the researcher claims to have no 
vested interests. The literature that informed the initial analytical interest in this setting was 
from the field of CA, and not Finance and Accounting. The researcher compared the question 
design by financial analysts to other studies within CA that looked at institutional interactions 
with strict turn-taking systems, like broadcast journalism or court room interactions. Studies 
discussed in the literature review by Clayman and Heritage (2002) and Sidnell (2010) show 
how interactants adapt strategically to formats which only allow for very few or just a single 
turn and show how a question is not simply a linguistic structure, but a practice.  
Especially Clayman (2002) and Clayman and Heritage (2002) served as a point of reference for 
the initial phase in which the researcher familiarised herself with the data set. Their work on 
questioning presidents is the only one within the field of CA that shares distinctive 
characteristics with the setting at hand. As discussed in Chapter 4, their study aimed to show 
how journalists demonstrated increasing animosity in their question designs, through four 
activities: initiative, directness, assertiveness and hostility. When comparing the data of this 
study to Clayman and Heritage (2002), it becomes clear that journalists and financial analysts, 
which both supposedly hold the moral role of the "watchdog", use different methods when 
questioning their main source of information. Overall, the increasing hostility that Clayman and 
Heritage found amongst journalists questioning presidents does not correspond with the 
atmosphere that was established in the setting of this study. The directness by journalists has 
not turned out to be a reoccurring feature in conference call Q & As. However, the questions 
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by the financial analysts are also usually very elaborate, just as the Clayman’s and Heritage’s 
journalists, as participants add complex prefaces to their questions. Such prefaces do not simply 
give background information: Speakers in both settings used prefaces to share their sources 
and/or share their assessments. For Clayman and Heritage, such extensive prefaces with a 
preface tilt contributed to a more assertive tone, but in this study, it is argued that while 
demonstrating knowledgeability, the tilt contributes to a more casual tone. Lexical choices by 
the financial analysts that mitigate the urgency and expected complexity of an answer, as well 
as self-referencing frames that put emphasis on the management’s contingencies, do not 
increase the pressure on the recipient of the question. It rather facilitates a rejection of certain 
aspects of the question – a less detailed or partial reply is not treated as dispreferred, but as an 
understandable reaction. Open criticism was also very rarely found in this setting. The fact that 
such instances do occur is meaningful, especially when trying to assess whether this setting is 
indeed informative for participants, or rather a ritual. However, the factor that disaffiliative 
actions are rare in this setting is very telling regarding the professional relationship between 
management and financial analysts.  
When comparing the findings presented in Chapter 7: Doing Being Sceptical, to the research 
on scepticism when questioning politicians, it can be seen that both financial analysts as well 
as journalists outline their observations of the question recipients’ actions, and present their 
assessments, at times with very similar sentence structures. However, in most of the questions, 
the financial analyst orients to management as a trustworthy and superior source of information. 
The expression of scepticism is always linked to limited epistemic access, and by doing so, the 
financial analyst explicitly weakens his own assessment. This was shown to be done to varying 
degrees: The ‘puzzled analyst’ lays more emphasis on his role as an ‘outsider’ who ‘can’t work 
out’ (Chapter 7.1) an issue without the help of management, or cannot reach a clear conclusion 
without further input. In contrast to this, the journalists’ hostility stems from a conclusion they 
had already reached before the question has been posed, and they do not ask for further 
information, but ask for an explanation, a justification. The ‘diagnosing analysts’ (Chapter 7.2), 
who present their own assessments with higher certainty, also do not seem to aim for a 
justification from management, but still frame their ‘diagnosis’ as part of an actual information 
request. This is achieved by separating the interrogative or request from the assessment, which 
is either in the question preface or following the question. Furthermore, it is argued that the 
contrast structure which is used to express scepticism allows the financial analyst to circumvent 
direct accusations, which seems to also have been avoided by journalists in the data set of 
Clayman and Heritage (2002). Direct accusations or blame would in most professional contexts 
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be seen as open face-threats and would have negative consequences for social relationships.  
Financial analysts do not construct management as a potential culprit who is to be held 
accountable for his actions, but as a cooperative partner with superior epistemic primacy. This 
was achieved through the question design that requests information, and not a justification, as 
well as mitigation devices and politeness markers.  
In sum, doing being sceptical is done very differently by members of the different professions, 
but arguably their institutional goals are very similar. Looking at White House Press briefings 
today, 16 years after Heritage and Clayman published their work on questioning American 
presidents publicly, the trend of increasing hostility seems to still apply. One of the motives 
behind a more direct and aggressive approach was made explicit earlier in 2018, when 
journalists present at the White House Press Briefing discussed the role of the press with the 
White House Press Secretary, Sarah Huckabee-Sanders. Journalists pressed the representative 
of the Trump administration to take back a claim made by the president, which she refused. 
One of the most cited requests by a journalist towards Huckabee-Sanders reads: 
“(…) But for the sake of this room, the people that are in this 
room, this democracy, this country, the president of the United 
States should not refer to us as the enemy of the people. His own 
daughter acknowledges that, and all I’m asking you to do, Sarah, 
is to acknowledge that right now and right here.” (MNSBC) 
If journalists understand their role as independent from the government, serving citizens of the 
country, backed by the constitution and the principles of freedom of speech and freedom of 
press, then this adds a moral and epistemic authority to their questioning. Information requests 
are more direct and hostile if they are meant to demonstrate that the journalists, and the press 
in general, hold the government accountable for their actions – in the name of the people. The 
image that needs to be conveyed in high profile Q & As therefore is that the press takes on a 
critical role that aims to protect values of a nation, for their readership, which gives the Q & A 
a performative element. It is argued in this thesis that this is not too far removed from the reality 
that financial analysts as well as managers of a corporation face during their public interactions. 
Trust in a government is affected during economic recessions, and trust in the financial market 
has been greatly affected by corporate scandals like Enron, and even though this particular case 
resulted in changes in regulations to protect investors (see Chapter 3.3 on Reg FD), a global 
financial crisis evolved only a few years later. Criticism that little has been done to keep a 
seemingly dysfunctional system in check has been repeatedly issued in the media across 
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countries (for instance Cassidy 2018 (The New Yorker), Brown 2018 (The Guardian), Fricke 
2018 (Der Spiegel)). Conference calls and investor meetings are an integral part of companies’ 
efforts to demonstrate transparency as part of regular financial disclosure (Crawford 
Camiciottoli 2010). Questions by the financial analysts are supposed to demonstrate that issues 
which could concern investors are being heard by management, and the information they 
inquire about should enable investors to make a better-informed investment decision. When 
comparing the financial analysts’ role to the journalists of the aforementioned study, one could 
assume that their central role in the disclosure of value-relevant information would lead to a 
more assertive tone if the financial analyst suspects misleading or withheld information by 
management. However, this was only the case in isolated instances in this data set, as can be 
seen in Chapter 6.4. Unlike the political journalist, the financial analyst seems to make an effort 
to not be understood as the critic or even antagonist of the corporate management in these 
interactions.  
Financial analysts also do not refer to a moral necessity to answer certain questions, for the sake 
of building trust or acting in the interest of the shareholders – which is interestingly a common 
aspect of the answers and presentation narratives by management, who emphasise regularly that 
they have the stakeholders’ best interest in mind (there should be lit on accounting 
communication that verifies this). Financial analysts were not found to explicitly link their role 
to a purpose within financial communication. They did so in a rather implicit way, for instance 
through pronoun-use. As discussed in Chapter 5.2, financial analysts refer to themselves when 
presenting their assessments and evaluations, as well as when framing the questions. This shows 
on the one hand that financial analysts take agency for the calculations and models they use to 
make their case, demonstrating knowledgeability. Framing of questions, like “I guess I just 
wondered” on the other hand are mitigation devices. The only context in which the financial 
analysts associate themselves with a group are when they formulate what they are requesting 
management to do: the beneficiary in such requests is never the financial analyst alone, but a 
wider audience. The financial analysts that actively take part in these discussions are 
competitors, and the literature shows that many brokering firms decide against participating in 
public Q & As in order to not give away any potentially exclusive inkling or conjectures (Brown 
et al. 2015). Financial analysts still ask management to share information with “us”, and not 
“me”. This signals awareness that the competition is listening, and that the speaker assumes 
that they care for the information just as much as the asking analyst does. It furthermore links 
the financial analyst’s request to the overall purpose of reducing the information asymmetry 
where necessary and to offer more transparency to investors.  
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9.1.2 Social Solidarity and Cooperation 
Within the field of Conversation Analysis, the concept of social solidarity is established by 
individuals through talk, which forms, maintains and or challenges institutional structures, or 
social structures in society at large (see Chapter 4 on Symbolic Interactionism). In this setting, 
it was observed that participants of conference calls negotiate disclosure through affiliative 
actions, which presents them as a cooperative unit that shares an institutional goal – which is to 
distribute as much valuable information to the market as possible. Most noticeably, social 
solidarity was defended in socially risky and potentially face-threatening situations. Laughter 
was found to be initiated by management when denying an answer, and by financial analysts 
when they anticipate that their information request could be denied.  
When reviewing the literature on the social functions of laughter in interaction, it becomes clear 
that affiliation and disaffiliation cannot be clearly assigned to joined or not-joined laughter 
(Holt 2013). For instance, if two people are having an argument, and one of them makes a 
humorous statement, joined laughter would relax the situation; but, if the recipient remains 
serious and does not join the laughter, it signals to the initiator of the laughter that the recipient 
is still fully invested in the argument, and disaligns with the speaker’s efforts to lighten the 
mood or to put the problem aside. In a slightly different scenario, during a serious but not hostile 
conversation, an affected party might make a non-serious statement, which highlights 
vulnerability. Laughing along could be understood as insensitive, as if the recipient was 
laughing at the speaker’s problems. Not laughing along would be treating the laughable still as 
talk about a serious subject and be the more respectful and hence affiliative reaction (Fatigante 
and Orletti 2013). In the setting at hand, the findings of this study suggest that joined laughter 
created affiliation between parties. Examples in Chapter 8 illustrate how joined laughter is used 
to co-create the refusal to answer an information request. A dispreferred response is turned into 
an agreement between two parties. Shared laughter creates social solidarity in multiple ways: if 
the financial analyst has asked a question that is unanswerable, shared laughter saves the 
financial analyst's face. The question is not explicitly treated as unprofessional or half-witted, 
but shared laughter - an alignment- simply hints at a potential shared understanding as to why 
there is no reply. If the financial analyst asked a perfectly reasonable question that he expects 
to be answered but gets rejected, joined laughter demonstrates acceptance of the management's 
decision, ultimately legitimising it. Laughter was joined by the other party whenever it would 
create affiliation between the participants. One analyst for instance chuckled when receiving an 
dispreferred response with “okay” (see Excerpt 8.2.1). The chuckle as a reaction to a laughable 
by management signals affiliation with the decision to withhold information, whereas a 
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response with the same lexical choice but without a discernible chuckle would be much more 
ambiguous and could be interpreted as disapproval.  
Financial analysts were also found to turn the “easy way out” into a laughable, which explicitly 
shows an anticipation of a refusal, therefore making it a more socially acceptable action. In 
Excerpt 8.2.6 for instance, the analysts invite laughter by marking doubts concerning their own 
evaluation as a laughable, which management then takes up and aligns with. As pointed out in 
Chapter 8, in some instances joined laughter does not create affiliation, but is face-threatening 
towards the initiator. Excerpt 8.2.7 seemingly shows the same action as 8.2.6: the analyst 
laughingly referred to formerly inaccurate forecasting of the company’s performance as 
“hopeless". Laughing along in this instance might be understood as agreeing with the analyst 
on his own shortcoming and could be interpreted as making fun on the expense of the analyst. 
Overall, it appears that participants avoid these ambiguities and do not join laughter, unless it 
clearly mitigates a socially risky action. Two more instances of laughter that were not joined 
have been found in the data set, and in both management turns the poor performance into a 
laughable in a long response (see Excerpt 8.1.1 and 8.1.2). Both are instances of gallows 
humour. The analysts do not join the laughter, as laughing at negative performance might be 
understood as spite instead of sympathy. Laughter as a marker of a problematic sequence is 
striking, as the accounting and finance literature finds obscure and evasive language use when 
negative news are disclosed (Smith and Taffler 1992 for instance). Gallows humour does not 
mask negative news and neither gives them a positive spin, but it also does not treat the 
problematic piece of information as actual news to the analysts. The manager treats the problem 
as shared knowledge, and gallows humour emphasises this. Gallows humour can be self-
deprecating, but in none of the examples it occurred that management used humour to mitigate 
their own shortcomings or mistakes. The use of laughter at their own disadvantageous current 
situation or outlook does not include comments at personal wrong doings, but at external 
factors, which is in accordance with the existing literature (Keusch et al. 2012).  
Overall, the effort to jointly create a rejection, which is the dispreferred response to an analyst's 
question, might be the most revealing. If one of the main goals of this institutional interaction 
is to demonstrate cooperation, and not simply gathering more information, this behaviour is 
beneficial for both parties. The tendency to cooperate in rejections already becomes clear when 
financial analysts phrase their questions. As mentioned above, a clear preference for self-
referencing frames was found in this data set. In Chapter 6.1 this was looked at more closely. 
Firstly, the financial analysts’ efforts to reduce the sense of urgency in their questions was found 
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to take pressure off the recipients of the question. Ernet (2017) shows in his work on the use of 
the word 'just', how it reduces the speakers' commitment to an action. A similar use was found 
in this data set. Chapter 6.1 explores how participants can use 'just' to make their request seem 
less pressing, but it also lays the foundation for a potential rejection before the recipient has a 
chance to react. Mitigation devices downplay the scope of the topic, and thereby also limit the 
anticipated depth of the reply. It furthermore weakens the speaker's entitlement to an answer. 
The literature on entitlement within CA explored the use and effect of directives and requests 
in interactions, and found that speakers adapt the question design to the assumed ability and 
willingness of the speaker to give a preferred response or to fulfil their demand (Curl and Drew 
2008; Heinemann 2006). The discourse marker "just" was often used together with self-
referencing frames like "I wondered if", "would you/ could you" or as in this example, "I 
thought I would just ask". Such self-reference frames are the norm in this data set. Chapter 6.2. 
shows that financial analysts mitigate their information requests regardless of leverage. The 
overall tendency to mitigate entitlement, to regard the recipients' contingencies and by treating 
a discussion of inquired issues as optional, not pressing, a dispreferred response is facilitated. 
The CA literature on preference organisation (most notably Pomerantz 1984) shows that 
preferred actions are organised differently than dispreferred ones. Preferred actions like 
agreements are produced with little delay and directly, dispreferred actions with a delay, over 
multiple turns and less explicitly. It is the norm that outright and direct rejections are avoided 
(Pomerantz 1984). Management however has to accept or deny the information request in the 
next turn, and the financial analysts are found the make an effort to weaken the normative force 
to give a preferred response through aforementioned practices. If a dispreferred response is 
treated as a likely and legitimate second-pair part, negative social ramifications due to face-
threatening actions are less likely to occur. Face-threats could occur when information is 
demanded with a directive or an imperative that is not imbedded (see Chapter 4.3.4 listed as in 
Ervin-Tripp 1976), and when management does not treat the information request as justified or 
appropriate. Such a disagreement was very rarely found in the data set, and in the two cases in 
which the financial analyst does claim high entitlement to information, management made an 
effort to not let the situation escalate (see Chapter 6.4.).  
Lastly, as discussed earlier in this chapter, the formulations that financial analysts are using 
when expressing scepticism reflect the expectation of cooperation in this setting. As shown in 
Chapter 6, the ‘puzzled analyst’ contrasts different pieces of information, effectively asking 
management to help the financial analyst to solve a problem. Interactants who are here referred 
to as 'diagnosing analysts' contrasted their own assessment with the management's. Financial 
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analysts point at what Pollner (1975) coined as a reality disjuncture, meaning that both parties 
have different experiences concerning the same event, and to overcome this, one must give up 
on the validity of their own experience (in Clayman and Heritage, 2012). Both the ‘puzzled’ 
and the ‘diagnosing’ financial analyst however use contrast structures which orient to a superior 
knowledge authority of management, which ultimately prevents the request from turning into a 
disagreement. Management is treated as closer to the phenomenon, as the financial analyst 
ascribes greater epistemic primacy to management in their question designs (Stivers et al. 
2011). Especially diagnosing analysts display knowledgeability by sharing their information 
sources, and by presenting certain aspects of their assessment as factual, but while doing so, 
they still orient to the managements' willingness to offer a solution to the problem. The contrast 
structure as a question preface allows the analysts to still present their scepticism as an 
information request, which aims to cooperate with, and not antagonise, management.  
When comparing the financial analysts’ behaviour to Sidnell’s 2010 study on question designs 
during inquiry testimonies, it becomes clear that the questioners in this study do not actively 
pursue the role of a ‘watchdog’. Sidnell shows that in setting like a court room, the borders 
between questions and assertions are hard to pin down and he demonstrates that certain question 
types seem to be less concerned with eliciting information, but to hold the witness accountable. 
A court is a very different setting from a conference call, and the researcher does not claim that 
she expects the practices by a lawyer to be the same as by a financial analyst – the desired 
outcomes and institutional relationships are obviously distinct. However, especially when 
analysts appeared to be critical of disclosed information, and at the same time conveyed high 
certainty concerning their own evaluation, the researcher expected the analysts to hold 
management accountable for their actions, as for instance with wh- questions, most importantly 
“why”. The accounting literature points at institutional restraints, like the high dependency on 
a positive working relationship with management, which make it risky for the financial analysts 
to practice being a ‘watchdog’ (Rocci and Raimundo 2018). This was confirmed in this study, 
as even the “diagnosing” analyst refrains from doing so. Even when the preface has a clear tilt 
that treats actions or information as problematic, the question itself that follows this preface 
seeks information. When the preface has a strong tilt, financial analysts tend ask polar 
questions, and seek confirmation for their own interpretation (see Chapter 6.3). This leads the 
researcher to the conclusion that financial analysts make an effort to display analytical rigour, 
but they do not explicitly question the managements’ actions and decisions. Instead of finding 
expected parallels between question designs in this setting and the persecution questioning a 
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witness in court (Sidnell 2010), the behaviour by financial analysts was closer to the defence 
lawyer questioning their own clients.  
Regarding the accounting communication literature, this study cannot inform research on the 
information value for participants of these Q & As. This study does show however that 
participants, with special attention being paid to financial analysts, use these public interactions 
to demonstrate cooperation between both parties. This constructive tone results in an 
affirmation of desirable characteristics of both institutional roles: The financial analyst confirms 
that management is competent and willing to disclose information based on their ability, which 
is subject to legal or strategic constraints. At the same time, elaborate questions demonstrate 
the analyst's access to resources, analytical skill and rigour. This means that the behaviour of 
financial analysts in financial results Q & As maintains that these interactions are doing exactly 
what they are supposed to be doing, meaning efforts to make a faulty system more transparent. 
This finding is not entirely surprising, but the value of this study does not only lie in empirically 
proving that members cooperate with each other, but also in the demonstration of how this is 
achieved through conversational methods, as will be shown in the following.  
9.1.3 Doing being transparent – demonstrating a functioning system 
As shown in the literature review, a direct link to management is a valuable asset to an analyst 
and the group he or she is associated with, as it increases investor's trust in their forecasts 
(Brown et al. 2015). It is disputed in the accounting literature whether the active participation 
in conference calls is a desirable privilege for financial analysts (see discussion of Hollander 
1997; Salzedo 2018; Mayew 2008; Brown et al. 2015 amongst others in Chapter 3). The 
research literature in the field of accounting communication and investor relations however 
treats conference calls as crucial events for financial analysts, due to informative and 
relationship-enhancing reasons (Laskin 2018). As this thesis applies Conversation Analysis, it 
will not be speculated what the potential incentives behind the participation are, but it will be 
discussed how participants orient to the function of the setting through talk.  
This study claims that managers and financial analysts treat their participation in financial 
results Q & As an important event to gather more information, but their question design 
throughout the interactions suggest the demonstration of a cooperative and constructive 
working relationship has priority. This does not mean that results Q & As are an innocent 
exchange of niceties. Especially the frequent occurrence of follow-up questions shows that 
these interactions are not sheer formalities, but that there is a certain degree of new information 
which the analysts expect and claim. As shown in Chapter 6.4, through follow-up questions a 
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different dynamic can evolve between participants. Often, financial analysts repeat one aspect 
of a long reply in their own words, to get a clearer or less evasive response (see Excerpts 6.4.2 
and 6.4.4). They might also point out that one part of a question has not been answered, or a 
question has been misunderstood (see Excerpt 6.4.3). In rare cases, a financial analyst expresses 
dissatisfaction with a previous response in a follow-up (see Excerpts 6.4.1 and 6.4.2). In 
general, follow-ups show more initiative by the speaker, as they decline to accept an answer as 
fully sufficient (Clayman and Heritage, 2002), and the tendency of financial analysts to do so 
might have an effect on the initial replies by management. The accounting literature does claim 
that questions by analyst have a direct effect on managers’ guidance (Chapman and Green 
2018), and the Investor Relations literature also treats two-way communication as pivotal for 
effective investor relations (Laskin 2009). Research also shows that not replying to a question 
is interpreted as bad news and therefore can have a negative effect on the share price (Hollander 
2010.). It is therefore not surprising that analysts use the leverage, which is the potential threat 
of a follow-up question, to their advantage when seeking information that they feel entitled to. 
The regular occurrence of follow-up questions shows that financial analysts treated the 
conference call as informative. However, when a first attempt to receive said information was 
not successful, follow-ups generally still treated management as willing to share the desired 
information: Analysts pointed out that some points were "forgotten" in the reply, instead of 
accusing management of strategic evasiveness, or that they just wanted to "ensure they had 
understood it correctly", which treats a shortcoming on the side of the analysts as more likely 
than a purposefully ambiguous message. It is argued that such efforts by the financial analysts 
to treat management as a willing and cooperative participant in the discussion talk 
“transparency into being”.  
The clear demonstration of knowledgeability by financial analysts further contributes to the 
establishment of transparency. Firstly, elaborate turns, in which their information request is 
often linked to former discussions, actions by peers or chatter on the market, the speaker creates 
intertextuality and adds more complexity and relevance to their question. Often, the actual 
question is not an open question, but an attempt to seek confirmation of the analyst's own 
assessment (see Chapter 6.3). Findings in the literature suggest that efforts to appear 
knowledgeable counteract the risk of "coming across as an idiot" (Brown et al. 2015). It seems 
to be the premise that questions asked during a Q & A are not badly prepared, which could give 
the impression that it was not a genuine information request.  
177 
 
At the same time, in this data set it was found that the same group of analysts took part in the 
conference calls, and overall only two analysts just took part once. This is not surprising, 
considering sell-side analysts focus on a particular industry and therefore follow a limited 
number of firms (Rocci and Raimundo 2018). However, this also made the process of a 
conference call seem less transparent: Quite clearly, a pre-selected group can ask questions, and 
this group of analysts makes an effort to emphasise that it is in regular contact with the company 
management outside of the conference calls as well. Chapter 5 shows the tone or atmosphere 
that is set by the analysts, which is the “plain English” that is expected from financial 
disclosures (Henry 2008), but also demonstrates a certain degree of professional intimacy. The 
literature does suggest that public interactions are often a continuation of private interactions 
and reveal more to the asking analyst than to the rest of the audience (Brown et al. 2015). This 
study found regular references to earlier conversations by analysts and management, but it is 
not clear whether they took place at public events or privately. The lexical choices that 
contribute to a specific casual and conversant tone and atmosphere however give the impression 
that both sides are working together frequently. For this study, the finding that participants 
make an effort to make it sound like they are familiar with each other is sufficient, regardless 
of the actual existence or depth of private interactions. From an analyst perspective, this 
conference call has a promotional effect, as it showcases the professional relationship between 
him or her and the highest executives of the firm he follows. Both the financial analyst’s and 
the management’s behaviour in these interactions construct the setting as one that enforces 
transparency. The question design as well as the elaborate replies and the engagement in follow-
ups orient to the financial analyst as information seeking, and to management as an obliging 
information sharer. The examined interactions however also reveal that social solidarity is the 
main priority of the financial analyst when participating in a conference call.  
9.2 Conclusion 
This thesis aimed to show how participants of financial results Q & As accomplish their 
respective institutional identities, with particular regard to the financial analyst, in a public 
setting. Performing this role, or to behave in a particular way, offers insights into how 
participants understand the responsibilities and rules of their roles. Observable patterns of 
interactional practices such as question design, the management of speaking rights and 
directness in information requests show how financial disclosure as an institutional practice is 
actually managed and reproduced. In the following, the Research Questions that had been posed 
in the introduction of this thesis will be listed and then answered briefly.  
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The Research Questions are: 
1.How do the social relations between financial analysts and the company management 
get displayed and played out in their interactions? 
2.How do financial analysts display an understanding of their respective institutional 
roles in the design of their turns at talk? 
9.2.1 Managing the professional relationship through talk 
The analysis of the Q & A sessions found that participants usually made an observable effort to 
establish or maintain a positive and constructive professional relationship between both sides. 
Financial analysts achieved this by mitigating potentially face-threatening questions and 
evaluations through lexical choices, laughter and self-referencing frames in interrogatives. A 
denial of an information request is usually a dispreferred response, but financial analysts treated 
it as acceptable, which enabled management to refuse disclosure of information without 
seeming overall unwilling to cooperate. In initial information requests, financial analysts would 
even downplay the ‘askability’ of their own question rather than claiming high entitlement or 
the right to ask the question and to receive an answer. This micro-analysis of the participants’ 
behaviour confirms the claim that analysts’ direct access to management is indeed understood 
as beneficial, and that the participation in a public discussion is one means to showcase that 
link.  
Overall it is argued that financial analysts treat the demonstration of social solidarity and 
cooperation as a priority in these public interactions. The elaborate turn design of initial 
questions by analysts does not simply contain an information request, it is also a disclaimer 
concerning how much they claim to know about the subject and whether they anticipate and 
accept a refusal as a response to their information request. Lexical choices contribute to an 
almost casual atmosphere, where participants refer to shared knowledge and past conversations 
which highlight a personal link and play down the urgency of the discussed topics. The analysis 
shows that it is the norm in this setting that management is not put under pressure to provide a 
specific answer.  
In the literature, financial analyst reports are criticized for being too optimistic, biased, and 
lacking analytical rigour (Salzedo 2018). Analyst assessments tend to be too naïve and not 
objective (ibid.). In this study, not the quality of assessments in the analyst reports were of 
interest, but the negotiations leading up to compiling such a report. Therefore, analytical rigour 
has different characteristics through a CA-lens – the researcher was interested if and how the 
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turn-taking organisation or turn design was utilised to accomplish this. The setting has a highly 
formal turn-taking organisation, and is usually organised in three steps: one question, one 
answer, and one brief closing remark by the financial analyst. It was found that financial 
analysts do not necessarily stick to that norm by asking follow-up questions. The finding that 
financial analysts do make an effort to reshape the existing norm challenges the notion of a lack 
of analytical rigour. Follow-ups identified in this study requested a rephrasing of the initial 
answer, or they request further or a different type of information, and thereby reject the 
management’s answer as not fully satisfactory. By doing this the financial analyst does not treat 
the interactions as symbolic, but as genuinely information-seeking. In this data set, follow-up 
questions occurred multiple times in each meeting or conference call. If this was a trend, then 
follow-up questions could become the norm. The norm of a ‘one question and one answer’ 
benefits management, as an evasive answer would usually not be sanctioned. If the practised 
norm were that an interaction between a financial analyst and a manager has multiple turns, this 
could create a context in which they can more frequently demonstrate entitlement to further 
information. The data set showed that interactions in which the financial analyst continued the 
discussion of one topic, expectations and assessments were formulated more directly, 
increasing the pressure on management to provide the desired answer. 
Lastly it is argued that both the financial analyst as well as management reinforce ideal 
characteristics of their institutional roles with regards to increasing or maintaining transparency 
within the market. In this data set, the practiced norm was that financial analysts treated 
management as a cooperative and willing information source, as was shown in the co-creation 
of a dispreferred response. Financial analysts abstained from making accusations when 
information was withheld and did not denounce the quality of a reply explicitly. Management 
also tended to emphasise the quality of the analysts’ questions, even when they did not answer 
them. This validates the financial analysts’ efforts as good work and treats them as genuine 
information requests.  
9.2.2 The institutional role of the financial analyst 
CA claims that a question design reveals more than just what topic the speaker is interested in. 
Speakers adapt their requests depending on the relationship they have with the recipient, and 
on what they understand as appropriate within a particular institutional context (see for instance 
Heritage and Clayman 2010; Heinemann 2006). In this data set, the pattern in question design 
showed that financial analysts do make an effort in presenting themselves as experts, but that 
they do not orient to their role as the one of a watchdog.  
180 
 
In comparable settings, like Q & As with politicians or court room interrogations, the question 
design aims at holding the recipient accountable for their actions (Clayman and Heritage 2002; 
Komter 2012; Sidnell 2010). An increase in negative preface tilts and directness was established 
in research on questioning presidents, as the journalists asking the questions positions 
themselves as representing the interests of their readers (Clayman and Heritage 2002). Lawyers 
in court rooms exploit the interrogation turn-taking structure to establish their account of an 
event, which puts the blame on the witness (Komter 2010). Such interrogations can be based 
on society’s value systems, with the questioners representing the ‘right’ type of values. This is 
particularly true when the audience is the general public, as could very recently be witnessed 
for instance in the Ford and Kavanaugh hearing, when a committee consisting of both 
Republican and Democratic politicians interrogated the alleged victim and perpetrator. The 
question styles made clear what behaviour and values are deemed acceptable by the 
participants, and each side claimed to serve as a watchdog for society as a whole. Q & As in 
the White House are also intensifying, recently having led to journalists being banned to attend 
these events. Due to general misconceptions concerning the roles and responsibilities of 
financial intermediaries by society, financial intermediaries have widely been expected to act 
in a similar way (Shaikh and Talha 2003).  
By representing the investors, laypeople tend to expect that the main responsibilities of analysts 
lie not just in protecting their clients’ interests, but also in detecting and flagging up fraud 
(ibid.). The disclosure literature however shows that the role of the financial analyst is much 
more conflicted. They have to balance multiple and potentially contradicting expectations as 
their most important information source is the company they are supposed to scrutinise (Healy 
and Palepu 2001). The question design of financial analysts reflected this balancing act: The 
disregard for the watchdog role of the financial analyst became clear in socially risky situations. 
Especially when expressing scepticism, the financial analysts did not hold management 
accountable for their actions but chose sentence structures through which they oriented to 
management as a willing source for help to solve a problem. As mentioned before, in most cases 
the act of denying answering an information request was actively facilitated by the analysts. 
Additionally, elaborate prefaces were common in the data set, but unlike the journalists in the 
White House, the questions are lacking a negative question tilt that alludes to misconduct 
(Clayman and Heritage 2002). The knowledgeability of the financial analyst is demonstrated 
through elaborate question prefaces, and it was shown that most information requests 
contributed the information that was discussed to the interaction, as the analysts presented their 
assessments and assumptions in the question prefaces. Fittingly, in their actual questions 
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analysts were found to rather to ask for confirmation, instead of formulating an open question. 
When financial analysts give reasons for why an information request should be answered, this 
is usually in in order to help analysts make more accurate assessments. This highlights what the 
financial analysts deem to be the professional obligations of management towards the audience. 
Financial analysts however do not go beyond this. This means that analysts do not typically 
take an explicit moral stance in their questions, as for instance investor interests or concepts 
like trust or reputation within the market are not mentioned explicitly. This behaviour also 
contradicts a watchdog role. 
9.3 Contributions 
This thesis aims to contribute to two literature streams: Financial Communication and Applied 
Linguistics. Potential contributions and further developments of the findings of this study are 
discussed below, starting with Financial Communication. 
9.3.1 Contributions to Financial Communication 
This thesis adds to the study of what financial analysts actually do (Salzedo 2018). Conversation 
Analysis is a method which is still very novel to the field of Financial Communication, and it 
offers a different lens through which conference calls can be studied. In the literature, market 
responses show whether conference calls are informative or not, and interviews provide 
information regarding the complex conflicts of interests that financial analysts are facing when 
compiling and publishing forecasts and recommendations (see Brown et al. 2015, Salzedo et al. 
2018, Matsumoto et al. 2011, de Oliveira and Rodrigues Pereira, 2018, Crawford Camiciottoli 
2018, Mayew 2008). This study shows the impact of this balancing act on the practice of 
disclosure: The analysis of naturally occurring data shows how an assumed ‘watchdog’ role of 
financial analysts is secondary in financial results presentations, and that maintaining a positive 
relationship with management has priority. It also shows that financial analysts treat these 
interactions as informative, and also a willingness to share information, as indicated by their 
elaborate questions. 
As shown in the literature review of this thesis, there are two stages to the practice of disclosure– 
the Backstage and the Front Stage. This notion is taken from Goffman’s work on dramaturgical 
sociology (1959), as it is also applied in Financial Communication. Studies which focus on the 
‘Backstage’ examine motives and processes behind creating documents and announcements 
which will be shared with the public (see for instance literature on Investor Relations, like 
Laskin 2018, or studies on corporate governance like Ajunka et al. 2005). Studies on the ‘Front 
Stage’ focus on the delivery of the presentation, and the actually published documents (see 
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Rocci and Raimundo 2018; Beattie 2014; Tregidga et al. 2012). The strategic language use 
which aims at influencing or even manipulating the audience has been conceptualised through 
Impression Management (Brennan and Merkl-Davies 2013). This study offers a new 
methodological approach which reveals insights into the dynamics of negotiating disclosure on 
the ’Front Stage’. CA operates close to the phenomenon and the analysis is entirely data-driven, 
meaning that theoretical assumptions by the researcher are not considered. This results in a 
detailed analysis of strategies to elicit and withhold information publicly. Dialogic aspects of 
spoken interpersonal communication have only recently started to draw attention in qualitative 
research within Financial Communication. One of the central contributions of this thesis to the 
field of Finance and Accounting is the originality of its methodological approach. The empirical 
analysis shows how meaning is constructed through interactions between two parties. Financial 
analysts orient to management as reliable and cooperative, which strengthens the impression 
that their disclosure efforts contribute to more transparency. Management in return treats the 
questions by financial analysts as strong and reasonable, which maintains the impression that 
they are gathering helpful and critical information for their clients. This allows the conclusion 
that both demonstrate that the system which they are part of is functioning, even though the 
public does not trust the financial markets due to recent crises.  
The findings of this study could also enrich interdisciplinary studies with additional empirical 
evidence. For instance, linguistic strategies to elicit information could be related to background 
information of the participants. This is something that a CA study alone cannot undertake, as 
this would mean that the researcher’s assumptions guide the analysis, and not the data. One 
research question would be how company performance affects the interactions – it could be 
examined whether financial analysts increase the pressure when the financial results were more 
negative than expected. In the same vein, one could compare strategies by the financial analysts 
to mitigate their epistemic primacy which were found in this data set, to financial analysts 
questioning companies that were accused of fraud or deception. Another factor that could be 
researched further are power (im-) balances. The seniority of financial analysts could 
hypothetically have an impact on how financial analysts present themselves, or what questions 
they can ask. One notion in the literature regarding conference calls is that questions are of a 
symbolic nature, meaning that they are not information-seeking, but that analysts ask questions 
simply to demonstrate a direct link to management. An interdisciplinary study could analyse 
the quality of the content of the questions and relate this to question- as well as answer design. 
This would reveal whether negotiations are performed, and if so, to what lengths participants 
go to do so, especially with regards to follow-up questions. In this thesis it was for instance 
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shown how the tone of an interaction could change when follow-up questions are asked, but the 
quality of the contested piece of information has not been analysed. Without CA, one could still 
analyse the topic of questions asked in financial results Q&As and come to the conclusion that 
these questions are not necessary in order to write a meaningful report, but a conversation 
analytical aspect of the study would show how participants treat these questions as well: Do 
they have a prolonged discussion about a piece of information that they know they cannot get? 
Or can we spot a ‘symbolic’ question because it is quick and easy? Lastly, the findings could 
also be related to the assessments printed in the subsequently published analyst reports, or 
market responses to the call, which might give further insight into whether the discussions 
actually have an impact on analysts’ assessments. In all of these cases it would be important 
that both analyses are carried out separately in order to ensure that the CA-part of the study still 
offers an emic perspective. CA should not become a tool to spice up results that one wanted to 
find in the first place. The analysis should ideally be carried out in parallel or consecutive steps 
by multiple researchers to ensure that the main contribution that CA has to offer, namely its 
new lens, would not get lost in the process. 
9.3.2 Contributions to Applied Linguistics  
Several aspects of the empirical analysis in this the thesis could contribute to the field of 
Applied Linguistics, especially to the study of institutional interactions. This thesis examines 
how individuals with complex institutional dependencies and aims interact and claim the right 
to more information. Said conversations are held regularly, are publicly available and highly 
formal. The only studies on a comparable setting have been conducted by Clayman and 
Heritage (2002, 2006, 2007, 2010a, 2013), and besides research in linguistics and 
communication, their work on presidential news conferences has also informed the field of 
journalism. The main factors which distinguish the behaviour of the participants asking the 
questions in the two settings from each other are the displayed entitlement to the requested 
actions, as well as the watchdog role of the journalists which addresses moral transgressions by 
the officials being questioned (ibid.). This study shows how participants achieve such an 
institutional questioning maintaining and demonstrating cooperation and social solidarity.  
Firstly, this study found that politeness and indirectness played a crucial role in making requests 
during the Q & As, especially in initial turns. Besides the self-referencing frames that have been 
shown to decrease entitlement in interaction (see for instance Heinemann 2006), this study 
found that “just” amongst other mitigation devices occurred frequently in this context. This 
discourse marker was found to mitigate a disaffiliated action by minimising speakers’ 
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investment in it and the importance of the issue. Speakers present their actions and motivations 
behind them as inoffensive and simple, while the addressed issues are acknowledged to be 
complex and difficult to answer. The majority of prior research on the term “just” features a 
mix of thought-up and naturally occurring utterances as both examples and data. Most studies 
of “just” have focused on identifying and classifying its semantic and pragmatic meanings. 
With few exceptions, studies of “just” have not attempted to also track its relation to speakers’ 
actions or its placement within the larger sequential environment. 
Secondly, this study explored how scepticism or doubt is managed when participants have to 
cater for institutional hierarchies and asymmetric dependencies. The study of directives and 
requests explores different degrees of directness, which speakers adapt to depending on the 
context, particularly with regards to social ranks and relationships (Spencer Oatey 2007; Locher 
and Watts 2005; Ervin-Tripp 1976; Craven and Potter 2010). This study found that the financial 
analysts in this data set accomplished “doing being sceptical” when making an information 
request through the use of contrast structures, usually linked with the conjunction “but” in the 
question preface. This allowed the speakers to remain affiliative, as contrasting their own – 
often mitigated – assessment with the management’s did not require them to mark the latter as 
wrong or misleading. The actual question often followed the contrast structure, which enabled 
the speakers to orient to the recipients as being able to provide the solution to their outlined 
problem. These findings add to research on how socially risky actions are managed in 
professional contexts, with the use of contrast structures being a novel strategy to achieve this. 
It furthermore shows how such a delivery of scepticism can strengthen both the speaker’s and 
the addressee’s institutional roles.  
In this thesis the different social functions of laughter were also examined. Socially risky 
actions were softened through shared laughter, which contributes to the literature which argues 
that humour and laughter can create a “safety valve” in which statements are less likely to cause 
offense (Grugulis 2002). It was shown that information requests were delivered with laughter 
and humorous statements when a dispreferred response was anticipated, which facilitated and 
co-created turning down a request. This thesis therefore gives new insights regarding the role 
of laughter in responses to bad news. For future research, it could be explored how this is done 
in other institutional settings in which it is also critical to demonstrate social solidarity. 
Laughables were furthermore produced to mask the performance of an action that demonstrates 
a more powerful position. This finding could also be compared to further institutional settings 
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in which laughter manifests an imbalance in dependency or the hierarchy between 
professionals.  
This doctoral thesis demonstrates that research methods from the field of Applied Linguistics 
enrich disciplines that might seem epistemologically far away, like Finance - a discipline that 
is traditionally associated with quantitative approaches. The application of Conversation 
Analysis to interactions in conference calls, which are known to be crucial information sources 
for investors, offers new insights into how disclosure is negotiated. The analysis is not based 
on theoretical assumptions or simulated experiments, but on authentic empirical data. This 
study shows that asking a question in a conference call “is not an innocent thing to do” (Steensig 
and Drew 2008): As a social action, asking a question accomplishes more than just seeking 
information. The findings of this study underline the argument that the Front Stage (Goffman 
1959) of the conference call is used to strengthen the professional relationship between analysts 
and management through the display of social solidarity, which is at odds with calls for greater 
scrutiny and accountability after the Financial Crisis in 2008. Media reports on the 10-year 
anniversary of the Financial Crisis showed continued mistrust, disbelief and frustration of the 
general public towards the finance sector since scandals around too-big-to-fail institutions like 
Enron and Lehman Brothers first erupted (White 2018 (Reuters), Cassidy 2018 (The New 
Yorker), Elliot 2018 (The Guardian), Fricke 2018 (Der Spiegel)). Even though fines have been 
paid, and regulation reforms have been passed, the public does not believe that an actual change 
took place (ibid.). Considering this and this study’s findings regarding the efforts that analysts 
made to signal cooperation with management, then the notion that more transparency is 
achieved is not what lingers. It is rather the suspicion that today, like John Olson in 2001 
(Schwartz 2002), an analyst who openly challenges company reports would also rather be fired 





Appendix A: Additional data 
 
Chapter 6.1: Just checking in – keeping disclosures casual 1 
Schroder FY
Anil Sharma And then finally Richard ehm this time last year you mentioned you 1 
were going to walk up towards 50% payout ratio (.) and I think you 2 
highlighted at the time that was more of a longer-term target It 3 
seems like we've got there quite quickly eh so I'm just wondering (.) 4 
given the capital build in the Company (.) how should we be thinking 5 
about dividends and dividend payout6 
 
HSBC Q1 
Tom Rayner The second thing is back to the bank levy (.) ehh because I’m ju- I’m just 1 
interested in why you’re mentioning the dividend policy at this stage and 2 
trying to get a sense of ehh is there any concern building that (.) with the 3 
revenue pressures plus the inflation in the bank levy that you just might 4 
not be able to maintain this policy o:r is this trying to give more strength 5 
and support to your view that (.) if something doesn’t change (.) then the 6 
whole domicile question becomes a very real one I’m I’m just trying to 7 
get a sense of what message you’re trying to put out there from those 8 
comments this morning  (.4) Thank you9 
 
Lloyds Half Year Results 
Chintan Josh Yes on taxes (.) you have guided us to 30 per cent I I am just trying 1 
to reconcile that so insurance profits won’t face the surcharge and and 2 
current corporate tax rate plus the surcharge gets you to about 28 per 3 
cent4 
 
Chapter 6.2: Pronoun Use in Questions 1 
Lloyds FY Results 
Arturo de Frias Thank you .hh Arturo de Frias from (.) Santander two questions please 2 
one on capital ehh generation again .. and one on loan growth the one 3 
on capital generation if I look at your (.) chart your bridge on capital 4 
generation I see that the ehh underlying profit generated 340 basis 5 
points of capital (.4) ehh a:nd obviously there are negative items there 6 
such as conduct .hh but I think we all should expect the conduct (.) 7 
element is going to be substantially smaller in 2016 and and and and 8 
forward So when I look at that 340 basis points of organic capital 9 
generation and then I compare that with your 200bps (.5) capital 10 
generation guidance >it is true< that has been improved from the 150 11 
to 200 range before why is it not higher Why are you not going 12 
closer (.4) with your guidance (.) to:wards what your underlying profit 13 
is is is doing Because the other element obviously is RWA growth 14 
but I don’t think hh. we are going to see much of RWA growth (.) so 15 
why you are not getting close to your underlying profit capital 16 






Barclays Half Year Results 
Chirantan Barua  Just a quick question on Visa Europe if you could (.) ehm Visa Inc 1 
has come out and said they would want it resolved by October ehh (.) I 2 
know you are a big shareholder so (.) if you could give us an update 3 
both in terms of where are you in the process and secondly (.) if actually 4 
Visa Inc were to buy out Europe (.) what would it mean for your 5 
merchant expenses and should we see Barclaycard fees go down a bit 6 
 
Standard Chartered, Interim Results 
Tom Rayner  Hey Andy Could you (.) give us a bit more colour ehm around your 1 
comments on RWAs in Q1 (.) slightly up ehm on the year end ehm just 2 
thinking in terms of if it affects credit migration (.) sort of mixed 3 
underlying growth and also if you could tell us whether the equity Tier 4 
1 ratio is going up, down or sidewards in the first quarter please. 5 
Thanks. 6 
 
Chapter 6.3: Displaying knowledgeability in questions 
HSBC Full Year 
Martin Leitgeb  Two follow-up questions from me please (.) ehm one on loan growth 1 
or revenues and one on capital firstly ehh on loan growth (.) could 2 
you confirm ehh  on a constant currency basis what loan growth 3 
was for f o r  the bank as a whole in the fourth quarter I was 4 
wondering if you could give us a steer on how we should think of loan 5 
growth in the core franchise (.) so (.) retail banking eh wealth 6 
management and commercial banking over the next one or two 7 
years Should we assume that loan growth here would be roughly 8 
in line with GDP o:r should we assume that other redeployment trends 9 
mentioned earlier ehh could wait a little bit more on that 10 
 
 
Schroders Year results 
 
Daniel Garrod  And then second question the 25 million increase (.) Richard that 1 
you highlight in non-comp costs (.3) could I just clarify you're 2 
saying 10 million of that is FX- related Is the bulk of the rest 3 
the IT spend And and what are the benefits on the IT spend side 4 
in terms of eh capabilities or revenue generation (.2) Thank 5 
you 6 
 
Lloyds, Half Year results 
David Lock Good morning It’s David Lock from Deutsche First question just 1 
to follow-up on PPI (.3) A lot of your PPI charges for administrative 2 
cost .hh I just wondered if you could clarify on non tax deductibility 3 
(.) because it obviously has quite a big impact when we think going 4 




Lloyds, Interim Results 
Chris Manners And the other one was on the revision to the standardised approach 1 
ehh mortgage risk weight floors As I understand it the- there is a 2 
chance that may not be implemented in the UK (.) but obviously could 3 
have a material impact on business (.3) If you could maybe run us 4 
through your thoughts on that that that would be really helpful to 5 





Peter Toeman Morning (.) Tushar ehh I suspect you’ve already answered this 1 
question already .hh but I’ll mention it because you have gone through 2 
your £400 billion RWA target (.) and you seem to be giving the 3 
impression that future changes in regulation can still be absorbed 4 
within (.) within that £400 billion target so I just wondered i- if if 5 
you could provide (.) more colour on that and whether my interpretation 6 




Chapter 6.4: Follow-up Questions 
Barclays Q1 Financial Results 
Tushar Morzaria  […] I think you will see ehm Core leverage ehm probably continue to 1 
glide down a little bit but ehm (.) as you can see we’ll be more judicious 2 
ehm on how we can deploy leverage where we can What we’re really 3 
targeting at the end of the day is a greater than 4% leverage ratio (.) 4 
ehm we’ll get away there by ehm deleveraging out of Non-Core but 5 
you’ll see ehm (.) some continued reduction (.3) in Core And really 6 
as we continue to become more efficient ourselves in terms of ehm 7 
around sort of capital management I I think you will see some benefits 8 
there as well 9 
Manus Costello (inaudible) just to be clear because it’s not really gliding down at the 10 
moment (.) it was up (.) are you saying that this is partly a seasonal 11 
effect that Q1 is always just higher and actually .hh if we were to get 12 
to the end of 2015 (.) broadly speaking you should be gliding down 13 
versus end 2014 in Core 14 
Tushar Morzaria Yeah I think that’s a reasonable assumption Q1 and Q4 is always a 15 
little bit of a wobbly seasonal effect because of the ehm particularly 16 
settlement balances= 17 
Manus Costelle =[the 18 
Tushar Morzaria    [the trading books just tend to be lighter at year end But your point 19 
is probably a fair one (.3) you’d expect year on year (.) like for like to 20 
be a bit lower in Core as well 21 
Manus Costello Thank you 22 
 
 
Lloyds Half Year Results 
Chintan Joshi Yes and on taxes you you you ehh have guided us to 30 per cent I am 1 
just trying to reconcile that (.) .hh so eh insurance profits won’t face 2 
the surcharge eh and eh current corporate tax rate plus the surcharge 3 
gets you to about 28= 4 
George Culmer =Yes obviously there has been quite a bit of change and there was 5 
prospective change as well as the corporation tax which is why we sort 6 
of had this medium term (.) type rate .hh anyway (.) and there was 7 
actually going to be volatility as well (.) within the rate so you are right 8 
it is on bank profits so excluding the insurance company also excluding 9 
holding companies as well that is quite an interesting thing people are 10 
talking to the revenue about at the moment in terms of their constructs 11 
and where they have debt etc There are some .hh interesting things 12 
being worked through at the moment .hh but we previously said I 13 
think at the low 20s was our guidance I do say around 30 and that 14 
around is quite important .hh there will obviously also be a bit of 15 
volatility (.) ehm should one get in the future any form of conduct type 16 
charges obviously they are not deductible so that will introduce some 17 
volatility into your result .hh but at the moment you know we said 22 18 
(.) we add 7 or 8 to that you will come to around the 30 number but 19 
I I would there is a danger in being too precise at the moment but 20 
around the 30= 21 
Chintan Joshi  =°it is the° conduct that makes you a little bit cautious on the 30 per 22 
cent okay and DTA utilisation has not really picked up it is four and 23 
a half billion .hh at the full year stage and at the half year stage when 24 
do we start seeing that number come down I mean it is good that (.) the 25 
CET1 ratio is going up without needing help but eh at some point when 26 
do we start seeing that number come down [in your 27 
George Culmer        [it i- it is coming down it is 28 
stable now because of the conduct but it has been coming down (.) you 29 
are right (.) I mean it can always go faster I think we disclosed >we 30 
 
previously had< about a 2019 expiration point which we pushed out to 31 
about 2022 or 2023 but again the change in terms of utilising ehm some 32 
of our pre crisis loses so .hh >or post crisis losses< so again we still 33 
stick by that we would expect the losses to be consumed by about the 34 
early you know 2020s 35 
Chintan Joshi  and would the DTA number get impacted by this tax change 30 per 36 
cent surcharge [so (inaudible) 37 
George Culmer       [no because you can’t offset it it’s a it’s a= 38 
Chintan Joshi =[I just wanted to make sure 39 
George Culmer   [there are no offsets as I said hh. there are discussions now around 40 
what constitutes banks etc and I know that there are people out there 41 
lobbying in terms of of where limits kick in and things like that but 42 
some of the interesting stuff is around how you construct yourselves 43 
and what is a bank and non bank= 44 
Chintan Joshi  =so with that said so I know it impacts timing differences so I guess 45 
that does not impact Lloyds so you don’t see any impact on DTA levels 46 
George Culmer  no we do not from the [surcharge 47 
Chintan Joshi       [perfect (.) thank you 48 
António Horta-Osório Can we move on to another question 49 
 
 
HSBC Q1 Financial Results 
 
Ronit Ghose Thanks for that Iain (.) that’s really helpful just to follow up on the 1 
question on the UK capital (.) ehm I’m just thinking about ehh if your 2 
last reported 8.7 or 9 (.2) >I guess< the direction of travel is clear and 3 
(.) at the Group level it’s going up but I guess .hh at the UK eh shall 4 
I assume it’s going up even faster because (.5) and I’m looking at 5 
where Lloyds and RBS want to get to eh a kind of 12-13 number 6 
maybe your balance sheet is higher quality than those two banks in 7 
the UK (.2) but it feels like there’s (.) going to be a clear uplift in the 8 
UK capital compared to an 8.7 or 9 is that a fair assumption that 9 
your UK ratio will have to go up more than your Group ratio going 10 
forward 11 
Iain Mackay I don’t know I can’t answer that question for you .hh (.2) I really 12 
don’t know I don’t know what’s informed Lloyds and RBS and and 13 
they’ve obviously been under quite close scrutiny for the last six years 14 
so (.) we’re not having similar conversations with the PRA but I think 15 
it you know is reasonable to assume that as the PRA have requested a 16 
specific view of the UK Bank under stress-testing that that will (.) in 17 
some way inform their view as to capital requirements for the UK 18 
Bank going forward 19 
 
Lloyds Full year results 
 
António Horta-Osório And Jon just one one comment which might be helpful for you 1 
We are quite confident that at system level the counter cyclical 2 
buffer will be counter(.)acted by several (.) parts in other buffers as 3 
the Bank of England has already stated so I am not saying hh. it 4 
will be totally countered .hh but imagine that you have a 1 per cent 5 
introduction of a counter cyclical buffer I am quite sure that part of 6 
 
that will be countered by other things in other buffers that will be 7 
decreased just to give you some more colour on what George just 8 
said And that has been told to us by the regulators= 9 
Jonathan Perce = So= 10 
António Horta-Osório =so you should expect it 11 
Jonathan Pierce  So to be completely clear (.) you are fairly (.) confident based on 12 
what you see that you can run (.) at 12 per cent plus one year’s 13 
worth of future dividends for (.) the foreseeable future 14 
António Horta-Osório Yes and I repeat to you that we are a low risk bank (.) based in a 15 
AAA rated country and that when you look at our peers we have 16 
the highest capital ratio so you should also ask them that question I 17 
guess because they have a much bigger difference to 13 per cent 18 
hh(h)he 19 
 
Chapter 7.1 Puzzled Analyst 
Lloyds FY 
Raul Sinha °I mean° the second one is I was wondering if you might be able to 1 
give us some indication of the below the line costs (.) ehm that you can 2 
foresee this year I know it it is hazarding a guess but I think you have 3 
talked about 0.7 billion costs related to the ECNs in Q1 ehm if I read 4 
that correctly is there anything else you talked about the ring fencing 5 
potential costs to come eh is there anything else apart [from that 6 
George Culmer              [no no that is a 7 
good question ehm and in terms of 2016 you are right (.) there is the 8 
basically the ECN which is an accounting it is the removal of the 9 
embedded option .hh and then we have taken that out of par so it is the 10 
impact of the pull to par on that that comes through ehh .hh ehh in terms 11 
o:f things that are featured in 2015 (.) so things like <other conduct> 12 
we continue to work through legacy issues I am not going to stand up 13 
here and say there won’t be any other (.4) another conduct charge […] 14 
 
Lloyds Q3 results 
David Lock Morning everyone (.) A couple of questions first one i:s on the NIM 1 
again You have given the 2.63 per cent guidance but I note that 2 
obviously (.) average interest earning assets have been moving around 3 
quite a lot this ye:ar ( .)  so I just wondered if you if you could 4 
give us any colour on how you expect average interest earning assets 5 
to develop going forwards given they fell Q on Q 6 
 7 
 
HSBS Full Year 
Manus Costello I actually wanted to follow up on the TLAC question as well please 1 
I wanted to see whether you had changed your approach to resolution 2 
ehm when we talked about this previously you were talking very much 3 
ehm along the lines of MPE .hh but the way you talk about this now (.) 4 
about issuance coming out of HoldCo and downstreaming capital ehh 5 
seems much more SPE driven I wondered whether that was one of 6 
the changes in approach that has led to this increase in guidance from 7 
200-300 million of impact up to 800 million of impact I also have a 8 
second question on GBM […]9 
 
Barclays Q3 
Andrew Coombs  Ehm sorry about earlier I think my line dropped as I was asking the 1 
question a couple from me please firstly on the ring-fencing .hh can 2 
you just clarify eh what are the major items within the 1 billion ehh of 3 
costs that you’ve flagged today (.) and then also on the revenue side are 4 
you assuming anything at this stage eh relating to the cost of funding 5 
and the credit rating of the non (.) ring-fenced bank (.4) and then my 6 
second question which is on loan growth ehh very good loan growth 7 
eh both in the Corporate Bank and in the Investment Bank .hh 3 billion 8 
in the Corporate Bank 6 billion (.3) ehh in the Investment Bank (.) 9 
just on that point (.) I know this will be the lumpy posi:tions but what 10 
should we be thinking about going forward in terms of the growth of 11 
those two businesses because you do seem to have turned on the taps a 12 
bit again there (.) thank you 13 
 
Chapter 7.2 Diagnosing Analyst 
Barclays Q1 
Chintan Joshi  […] second one is ehh ehh if I think about Deutsche Bank’s eh 1 
presentation the other day .hh it seemed to suggest a 20% RWA 2 
inflation in their business plan .hh now I recognise that eh Barclays has 3 
got more of standardised models the regulator has not been allowing 4 
that aggressive behaviour in modelling ehh RWAs as some of the 5 
German banks but eh that 20% number implied is quite large and I 6 
wanted to see your thinking around tha:t you know have you got 7 
additional thoughts on what RWA inflation (.) you might be baking 8 
in(.)to your RWA guidance because .hh from 65 billion in Non-Core to 9 
45 billion by 2016 .hh eh feels really slow so I’m just wondering how 10 
you see RWA inflation developing […] 11 
 
HSBC Half Year 
David Lock Morning everyone ehh I’ve got two please first one is on cost (.) this 1 
was a small miss I think ehh versus what consensus was looking fo:r 2 
(.) and I note the negative j:aws <in the first half> which you say are 3 
kind of in line with what you’d been planning but I also recall at the 4 
investor day you were you were trying to target positive jaws in 2015 5 
16 and 17 so I just wondered .hh if there was anything (.) we 6 
could >you know< infer from that about the second ha:lf (.) 7 
because typically the revenue performance (.) is obviously a little 8 
bit weaker in GBM in the second half of the year so what can we 9 
infer from that around costs in the second half[…] 10 
 
Barclays HY 
Chintan Joshi  Hi .hh good morning Tushar good morning John ehm I have two 1 
questions one again on the Investment Bank and one on eh costs .hh on 2 
the Investment Bank if I assume 60-40 seasonality: last year’s levy 35% 3 
tax rate (.) ehm you know some amount of non-controlling interest (.) 4 
other equity interest deductions I get about a 7% return on a 12% 5 
regulatory capital requirement which means it’s a lower numbe:r hh. 6 
on tangible equity ehm Tushar you’ve talked in the past about 7 
deferred comp tailwinds eh litigation eh headwinds which will go 8 
away y e  k n o w  even if I give you credit I’m talking about you 9 
know maybe a 8-9% ROTE .hh which still feels like eh you know I can 10 
see that you’re pulling the cost lever ehh but really you don’t want to 11 
expect revenue improvements beyond market trends (.) which means 12 
the capital lever needs pulling and you are talking about it which 13 
makes the 120 billion target ehh difficult to kind of put into our 14 
models and see the Group still delivering see the IB delivering ehh 15 
above cost of equity ehh just a little bit more on that would be helpful 16 
you know what levers how much levers eh how much of the capital 17 
lever can you pull can we expect this RWA number to go down at least 18 
even if you don’t want to: give us a hard number […] 19 
 
HSBC FY 
Ronit Ghose I had three questions I wanted to ask ehh the first one’s on Brazil you 1 
eh you sounded very confident that the deal the transaction is on track 2 
I was just wondering ehh if you could give us some colour on closing 3 
times given the anti-trust investigation (.) originally you’d be hoping 4 
for I think Q1 but officially were saying first half ehh  is this still a first-5 
half close or could this slip into second half That’s my first question  6 
 
Appendix B: Glossary 
 
The following definitions are taken from Investopedia.org. This website is for investing and 
finance education, and its editorial team created a comprehensive dictionary with relevant 
financial terminology and provides introductory videos for more complex concepts. The author 
of this thesis has used this resource in order to get a better understanding of the data set 
throughout her PhD. The definitions below were last checked on the website on the 01.10.2019.  
 
Adjusted earnings Adjusted earnings are the sum of earnings and 
increases in loss reserves, new business, 
deficiency reserves, deferred tax liabilities and 
capital gains for an insurance company from the 
previous time period to the current time period. 
ALM ALM stands for Asset/liability management. 
ALM is the process of managing the use of 
assets and cash flows to reduce the firm’s risk 
of loss from not paying a liability on time. Well-
managed assets and liabilities increase business 
profits. 
Asset An asset is an economic resource for a company 
or represents access that other individuals or 
firms do not have.  
Asset Allocation Asset allocation is an investment strategy that 
aims to balance risk and reward by apportioning 
a portfolio's assets according to an individual's 
goals, risk tolerance and investment horizon. 
The three main asset classes - equities, fixed-
income, and cash and equivalents - have 
different levels of risk and return, so each will 
behave differently over time. 
Balance sheet A balance sheet is a financial statement that 
reports a company's assets, liabilities and 
shareholders' equity at a specific point in time
   
Basel paper  The Basel Accords are three series of banking 
regulations (Basel I, II, and III) set by the Basel 
Committee on Bank Supervision (BCBS). The 
accords ensure that financial institutions have 
enough capital on account to absorb unexpected 
losses. 
Basis point Basis points (BPS) refers to a common unit of 
measure for interest rates and other percentages 
in finance. One basis point is equal to 1/100th 
 
of 1%, or 0.01%, or 0.0001, and is used to 
denote the percentage change in a financial 
instrument. 
Bonds A bond is a fixed income instrument that 
represents a loan made by an investor to a 
borrower (typically corporate or governmental: 
Bonds are used by companies, and also states to 
finance projects and operations. Owners of 
bonds are debtholders, or creditors, of the 
issuer. 
Book Value An asset's book value is equal to its carrying 
value on the balance sheet, and companies 
calculate it netting the asset against its 
accumulated depreciation. 
bps Basis Point 
Capital Capital is a term for financial assets, such as 
funds held in deposit accounts, as well as for the 
physical factors of production; that is, 
manufacturing equipment. Additionally, capital 
includes facilities, including buildings used to 
produce and store manufactured goods. 
Materials used and consumed as part of the 
manufacturing process do not qualify as capital. 
Capital lever Capital leverage (see leverage) 
Capital ratio (Tier 1) The tier 1 capital ratio is the ratio of a bank’s 
core tier 1 capital—that is, its equity capital and 
disclosed reserves—to its total risk-weighted 
assets. It is a key measure of a bank's financial 
strength that has been adopted as part of the 
Basel III Accord on bank regulation. 
Capital planning buffer The capital planning buffer is the amount and 
quality of capital resources that a firm should 
hold at a given time in accordance with the 
general stress and scenario testing rule. 
CET1 Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) is a component 
of Tier 1 capital that consists mostly of common 
stock held by a bank or other financial 
institution. It is a capital measure that was 
introduced in 2014 as a precautionary means to 
protect the economy from a financial crisis. It is 
expected that all banks should meet the 
minimum required CET1 ratio of 4.50% by 
2019. 
 
Commercial banking A commercial bank is where most people do 
their banking, as opposed to an investment 
bank. It is a type of financial institution that 
accepts deposits, offers checking account 
services, makes various loans, and offers basic 
financial products and savings accounts to 
individuals and small businesses. 
Cost basis Cost basis is the original value of an asset for 
tax purposes, usually the purchase price, 
adjusted for stock splits, dividends and return of 
capital distributions. This value is used to 
determine the capital gain, which is equal to the 
difference between the asset's cost basis and the 
current market value. 
Cost of equity The cost of equity is the return a company 
requires to decide if an investment meets capital 
return requirements A firm's cost of equity 
represents the compensation the market 
demands in exchange for owning the asset and 
bearing the risk of ownership.  
Covered bonds Covered bonds are debt securities issued by a 
financial institution and backed by a separate 
group of assets; in the event the financial 
institution becomes insolvent, the bond is 
covered. Covered bonds provide an efficient, 
lower-cost way for lenders to expand their 
business rather than issuing unsecured debt 
instruments. 
Credit It is generally defined as a contractual 
agreement in which a borrower receives 
something of value now and agrees to repay the 
lender at a later date, generally with interest. 
Credit also refers to the creditworthiness or 
credit history of an individual or company. It 
also refers to an accounting entry that either 
decreases assets or increases liabilities and 
equity on a company's balance sheet. 
Credit risk Credit risk is the possibility of a loss resulting 
from a borrower's failure to repay a loan or meet 
contractual obligations. 
Derivative A derivative is a financial security with a value 
that is reliant upon or derived from, an 
underlying asset or group of assets—a 
benchmark. The derivative itself is a contract 
 
between two or more parties, and the derivative 
derives its price from fluctuations in the 
underlying asset. The most common underlying 
assets for derivatives are stocks, bonds, 
commodities, currencies, interest rates, and 
market indexes. These assets are commonly 
purchased through brokerages. 
DFS Dell Financial Services 
Down market A time period with downward security price 
trends. 
DOJ  Department of Justice (USA) 
Dividend A dividend is the distribution of reward from a 
portion of the company's earnings and is paid to 
a class of its shareholders. Dividends are 
decided and managed by the company’s board 
of directors, though they must be approved by 
the shareholders through their voting rights. 
Earnings Earnings typically refer to after-tax net income, 
sometimes known as the bottom line or a 
company's profits. Earnings are the main 
determinant of a company's share price. 
Equity Equity is typically referred to as shareholder 
equity which represents the amount of money 
that would be returned to a company’s 
shareholders if all of the assets were liquidated 
and all of the company's debt was paid off. 
EM Emgerging Markets 
Emerging Markets An emerging market economy is the economy 
of a developing nation that is becoming more 
engaged with global markets as it grows. As an 
emerging market economy progresses it 
typically becomes more integrated with the 
global economy, as shown by increased 
liquidity in local debt and equity markets, 
increased trade volume and foreign direct 
investment, and the domestic development of 
modern financial and regulatory institutions. 
FCA Financial Conduct Authority (USA) 
FHFA Federal Housing Finance Agency (USA) 
Flat market A flat market refers to a trend in which the 
trading range for the broader market remains 
within the boundaries of recent highs and lows.  
 
FICC FICC stands for Fixed Income Clearing 
Corporation, which is an agency that deals with 
the confirmation, settlement, and delivery of 
fixed-income assets in the U.S. 
Fund manager A fund manager is responsible for 
implementing a fund's investing strategy and 
managing its portfolio trading activities.  
FX FX stands for Forex, which is the marketplace 
where various national currencies are traded. 
G-SIB  Global Systemically Important Financial 
Institutions 
G-Sib buffer The G-SIBs are allocated to buckets 
corresponding to of higher capital buffers that 
national authorities require banks to hold in 
accordance with international standards. 
GBM GBM stands for Global Banking and Markets 
within HSBC. It has a focus on clients in 
emerging markets 
Global equity A global fund is a fund that invests in 
companies located anywhere in the world 
including the investor’s own country. A global 
fund seeks to identify the best investments from 
a global universe of securities. Global funds 
may also be passively managed. A global fund 
can be focused on a single asset class or 
allocated to multiple asset classes. 
Gross Margin Gross margin represents how much of a 
company's sales revenue it keeps after incurring 
any direct costs associated with producing its 
goods and services. 
IB Investment Bank 
Impairment Impairment is an accounting principle that 
describes a permanent reduction in the value of 
a company's asset, normally a fixed asset.  
Leverage  Leverage results from using borrowed capital as 
a funding source when investing to expand the 
firm's asset base and generate returns on risk 
capital. 
Levy A levy is the legal seizure of property to satisfy 
an outstanding debt. In the U.S., the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) has the authority to levy 
 
an individual's property, such as a car, boat, 
house. 
LIBOR  The London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) 
is a benchmark interest rate at which major 
global banks lend to one another in the 
international interbank market for short-term 
loans. 
Liquidity Liquidity describes the degree to which an asset 
or security can be quickly bought or sold in the 
market at a price reflecting its intrinsic value. In 
other words: the ease of converting it to cash. 
Litigation Litigation is the practice of settling a dispute in 
a court of law. 
Macro Environment A macro environment is the condition that 
exists in the economy as a whole, rather than in 
a particular sector or region. In general, the 
macro environment includes trends in gross 
domestic product (GDP), inflation, 
employment, spending, and monetary and fiscal 
policy. The macro environment is closely 
linked to the general business cycle as opposed 
to the performance of an individual business 
sector.  
Margin Margin is the money borrowed from a 
brokerage firm to purchase an investment. It is 
the difference between the total value of 
securities held in an investor's account and the 
loan amount from the broker. 
Net effect The net effect the final result after all the 
positive and negative components have been 
combined. 
NIM NIM stands for net interest margin. This is a 
ratio that measures how successful a firm is at 
investing its funds in comparison to its 
expenses on the same investments. A negative 
value denotes that the firm has not made an 
optimal investment decision because interest 
expenses exceed the amount of returns 
generated by investments. 
Non-core item A non-core item is an engagement considered 
to be outside of business activities or operations 
that are the main revenue source of the 
business. Non-core items are considered to be 
 
peripheral or incidental activities, while core 
items are considered central to operations. 
Nutmeg Nutmeg is an online investment management 
service. 
Operational risk Operational risk summarizes the uncertainties 
and hazards a company faces when it attempts 
to do its day-to-day business activities within a 
given field or industry. A type of business risk, 
it can result from breakdowns in internal 
procedures, people and systems—as opposed to 
problems incurred from external forces, such as 
political or economic events, or inherent to the 
entire market or market segment, known as 
systematic risk. 
Performance Drag Performance drag refers to the difference 
between the return on an investment assuming 
there are no costs associated with it and the 
return on the investment after deducting costs 
associated with it. 
Pillar 2a Pillar 2A addresses risks to an individual firm 
which are either not captured, or not fully 
captured, under the Pillar 1 capital requirements 
applicable to all banks. 
PRA Central banks conduct various types of sale and 
repurchase agreements (repo transactions) as 
part of the open market operations they use to 
implement monetary policy. These are typically 
undertaken with the intention to affect liquidity 
and therefore interest rates in the money 
market. A Purchase and Resale Agreement 
(PRA) is the specific name given to one of these 
operations when used by the Bank of Canada 
(BoC), with the intention to provide liquidity to 
the market 
Profit Margin A profit margin ratio is one of the most 
common ratios used to determine the 
profitability of a business activity. It shows the 
profit per sale after all other expenses are 
deducted. 
Provision  A provision is a stipulation in a contract, legal 
document, or law. Often the stipulation requires 
action by a specific date or within a specified 
period of time. Provisions are intended to 
 
protect the interests of one or both parties in a 
contract. 
Regulatory creep Regulatory creep arises when the rules 
regarding standards, guidance and regulation 
are unclear. 
Retail banking Retail banking, also known as consumer 
banking, is the typical mass-market banking in 
which individual customers use local branches 
of larger commercial banks.  
Return A return, also known as a financial return, in its 
simplest terms, is the money made or lost on an 
investment over some period of time. 
ROC ROC stands for Return on Capital. Return of 
capital occurs when an investor receives a 
portion of his or her original investment, and 
these payments are not considered income or 
capital gains from the investment. 
Revenue Revenue is the income generated from normal 
business operations and includes discounts and 
deductions for returned merchandise. It is the 
top line or gross income figure from which 
costs are subtracted to determine net income. 
RMBS Residential Mortgage Backed Securities 
ROE Return on equity (ROE) is a measure of 
financial performance calculated by dividing 
net income by shareholders' equity. Because 
shareholders' equity is equal to a company’s 
assets minus its debt, ROE could be thought of 
as the return on net assets. 
ROTE Return on tangible equity 
Run rate The run rate refers to the financial performance 
of a company based on using current financial 
information as a predictor of future 
performance. 
RWA RWA stands for risk-weighted assets. RWAs 
are used to determine the minimum amount of 
capital that must be held by banks and other 
institutions to reduce the risk of insolvency. The 
capital requirement is based on a risk 
assessment for each type of bank asset. For 
example, a loan that is secured by a letter of 
credit is considered to be riskier and requires 
 
more capital than a mortgage loan that is 
secured with collateral. 
Securities custodian A custodian is a financial institution that holds 
customers' securities for safekeeping in order to 
minimize the risk of their theft or loss. A 
custodian holds securities and other assets in 
electronic or physical form. 
Slide deck  (powerpoint) presentation slides 
Stall-drift Style drift is the divergence of a fund from its 
investment style or objective. Style drift can 
result from capital appreciation. It can also 
occur from a change in the fund’s management. 
Stranded costs Stranded costs are calculated as the difference 
between sunk costs (money that has already 
been spent and which cannot be recovered) and 
the present value of expected operating 
earnings. 
Stress testing A balance sheet is a financial statement that 
reports a company's assets, liabilities and 
shareholders' equity at a specific point in time 
Style Drift Style drift is the divergence of a fund from its 
investment style or objective. Style drift can 
result from capital appreciation. It can also 
occur from a change in the fund’s management. 
Subprime Subprime is a classification of borrowers with a 
tarnished or limited credit history. Lenders will 
use a credit scoring system to determine which 
loans a borrower may qualify for. Subprime 
loans carry more credit risk, and as such, will 
carry higher interest rates as well. 
Tactical deposit Tactical asset allocation is an active 
management portfolio strategy that shifts the 
percentage of assets held in various categories 
to take advantage of market pricing anomalies 
or strong market sectors. This strategy allows 
portfolio managers to create extra value by 
taking advantage of certain situations in the 
marketplace. 
TLAC Total loss-absorbing capacity 
Yield Yield refers to the earnings generated and 
realized on an investment over a particular 
period of time and is expressed in terms of 
 
percentage based on the invested amount or on 
the current market value or on the face value of 
the security. It includes the interest earned or 
dividends received from holding a particular 
security. Depending on the nature and valuation 
(fixed/fluctuating) of the security, yields may 
be classified as known or anticipated. 
 
Appendix C: Jefferson System for CA Transcripts 
 
The following notation system (“Jefferson system” for CA transcripts has been applied in this 
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